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Statement of the
Editorial Advisory Board
We believe that the forthright sharing 
of information among foundations 
and nonprofits builds a knowledge 
base that strengthens their ability 
to effectively address critical social 
issues. We encourage foundation 
donors, boards, and staff to honor this 
transparency in their own practices 
and to support others who do so.
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Since 2010, there has been a significant shift toward creating 
foundations that have a defined endpoint. According to one esti-
mate,1 about 19 percent of family foundations established between 
2010 and 2014 plan to spend out their endowments, compared 
to only 3 percent of those created before 1970. The U.S.’s biggest 
foundation is a limited-life foundation — the Gates Foundation is 
set to close 20 years after the death of the donors. 
Limited-life (also known as sun-setting, or spend-down) founda-
tions have some things in common with perpetual foundations 
that are exiting a line of work. Beginning in the late 1990’s 
with the rise of strategic philanthropy, many perpetual foun-
dations began funding time-limited strategic initiatives. The 
Skillman Foundation in Detroit, for example, funded the “Good 
Neighborhoods” initiative for more than ten years, ending in 2016. 
Both of these situations — ending the foundation or ending a line of work — create a specific set of 
challenges. What is the best way to exit and leave in place strong organizations, networks, and fields 
that can continue to achieve positive results for their communities? How do you preserve the knowl-
edge and intellectual assets of the foundation? How do you manage foundation staff in the context of a 
spend-down or ending support for the line of work they are passionate about? How does the foundation 
ensure that the organizations in which they have invested will continue to honor the intent of the fund-
ing? How do you create partnerships with other funders, including government? 
As new foundations are choosing to limit their lifespans and perpetual foundations continue to fund 
work in targeted, limited-time initiatives, their effectiveness at addressing these and other questions 
has a significant impact on the nonprofit landscape. It requires that, more than ever, nonprofits think of 
philanthropy as seed capital rather than on-going support. It requires that exiting foundations are extra 
diligent about mission alignment. It requires greater collaboration among funders. It requires creative 
approaches to human resources.
Dear Readers,
editorial
Teri Behrens
1"Trends in Family Philanthropy." National Center for Family Philanthropy 11/02/2015.
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Fred Smith (2016) shared a compelling metaphor for what ideally happens when a foundation ends its 
grantmaking:
If I knew I was setting an end date, I would call it dissolution — but not in the way that term is normally 
used… When salt dissolves, it is absorbed and assimilated into the body… It becomes an integral 
part of the body, and long after we consume it, the effects remain… 
That is how I see the most important work of a foundation. If we do our work right, we will do more 
than invest in a community or make financial gifts that evaporate when we are no longer there. 
Rather, we dissolve and the things that are truly lasting — our values, our way of seeing opportuni-
ties, our relationships, our non-financial contributions — become a lasting part of the community in 
which we live (para. 4–6). 
The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, Atlantic Philanthropies, and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation 
have co-sponsored this special issue of The Foundation Review on Exit Strategies to expand what we 
know about how to achieve that lasting impact. 
Gienapp, Reisman, Shorr, and Arbreton describe the findings from a time-bound initiative of the 
Hewlett Foundation on nuclear security and how learning from that initiative has influenced how they 
think about exiting other fields of work.
Foundations have often proposed that their role is to pilot interventions, with government funding then 
taking over support for successful approaches. Knox and Quirk share the experience of exiting work in 
Northern Ireland and partnering with government as the exit strategy.
While many foundations now appreciate the importance of bringing evaluation in at the beginning of 
an initiative, thinking about how to conduct evaluations at the end of an initiative poses its own chal-
lenges. Beadnell, Djang, Vanslyke, Masters, and Anderson conducted a “sunset evaluation” and share 
some of their methodologies.
Kibbe draws on interviews of grantmakers and grantees to identify areas in which foundations can 
improve their exit practices, offering a summary of advice from both perspectives.
VOL. 9  ISSUE 1
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As part of exiting out of the Building Health Communities initiative, the California Endowment 
commissioned a research project to identify effective exit practices. Yu, Jhawar, and Berman report 
on the results of this national scan.
Halverstadt and Kerman share the emerging hypotheses of two foundations, The Atlantic 
Philanthropies and the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation — each four years from sunset — about the 
opportunities and challenges for evaluation in the limited-life context.
The issue includes an interview with Marie Columbo, director for strategic evaluation and learning 
at the Skillman Foundation, about the unique challenges of exiting place-based work.
We conclude with personal reflections from Debra Joy Perez about the role of relationships in exiting.
We hope these articles inspire our readers to plan their exits to be both graceful and impactful.
Teresa R. Behrens, Ph.D.
Editor in Chief, The Foundation Review
Director, Institute for Foundation and Donor Learning, 
Dorothy A. Johnson Center for Philanthropy at Grand Valley State University
editorial CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE
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The Legacy of a Philanthropic Exit: Lessons 
From the Evaluation of the Hewlett 
Foundation’s Nuclear Security Initiative 
Anne Gienapp, M.P.A., and Jane Reisman, Ph.D., ORS Impact; and David Shorr, M.P.A., 
and Amy Arbreton, Ph.D., William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
Keywords: Summative evaluation, advocacy evaluation, time-bound investment, philanthropic exit, nuclear security 
Introduction
The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s 
Nuclear Security Initiative (NSI) began as an 
exploratory grant in 2007, and was extended into 
a seven-year, $24.7 million initiative when the 
foundation’s leadership saw a window of oppor-
tunity and the potential to make a significant 
impact within a relatively short time. The initia-
tive was sunset in 2015. 
The Hewlett Foundation currently organizes 
its grantmaking within five core program areas 
(William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, n.d.). 
Like many foundations, Hewlett pursues oppor-
tunities for impact beyond its primary program 
areas, reserving funds each year to support 
what it calls “special projects.” These projects 
— including one-time grants or multiyear ini-
tiatives — are not required to align neatly with 
existing program goals, but must adhere to 
the framework (now called Outcome-Focused 
Philanthropy) that guides all of Hewlett’s strate-
gic work. 
Once funded, special projects are often renewed 
or extended over several years, so it can be easy 
to lose sight of an impending end point. Such 
was the case with the NSI: partnerships had 
developed, momentum built, and expectations 
arose as the initiative was extended over seven 
years. Uncertainty among Hewlett staff, grant-
ees, and co-funders about when the initiative 
would end led to disappointment within and out-
side the foundation when the NSI exit strategy 
began to take shape. 
Key Points
 • As its seven-year Nuclear Security Initiative 
wound down in late 2014, the William and 
Flora Hewlett Foundation engaged ORS 
Impact to conduct a summative evaluation. 
That evaluation yielded insights pertinent to 
future work on nuclear security and other 
fields where policy-related investments, 
strategies, and goals are prioritized, as well 
as insights regarding Hewlett’s approach to 
the initiative exit.
 • During the life of the initiative, significant 
changes in the geopolitical landscape 
influenced both the relevance and the 
expected pace of advancement of its 
established goals and targets. Rather than 
focusing on whether identified targets had 
been achieved in a narrow “success/failure” 
framework, the evaluation explored where 
and how Hewlett’s investments and actions 
made a difference and where meaningful 
progress occurred over the seven years of 
investment. Evaluation findings highlighted 
contributions and areas of progress that had 
not been explicitly anticipated or specifically 
identified in the initiative’s theory of change. 
 • This article describes the initiative and 
its theory of change, evaluation methods 
and approaches, findings, and how these 
informed the foundation’s planning for 
initiative exits and approach to measure-
ment of time-bound investments. Although 
time-bound philanthropic initiatives are a 
well-established practice, the approach 
merits closer examination in order to discern 
effective ways to implement, evaluate, and 
wind down these types of investments.
DOI: 10.9707/1944-5660.1347
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As the NSI drew to a close in late 2014, Hewlett 
engaged ORS Impact to conduct a summative 
evaluation. Although the NSI included specific 
goals and targets, the foundation team and eval-
uators determined that summative evaluation 
would not focus narrowly on assessing whether 
or not these had been achieved. Instead, eval-
uation sought to document how and where 
Hewlett’s investments made a substantive dif-
ference during the seven-year NSI, where mean-
ingful progress occurred, and how Hewlett’s exit 
was perceived by the field. The timing of ORS 
Impact’s evaluation offered a rich opportunity for 
the foundation’s leadership and program staff to 
deepen understanding about both philanthropic 
approaches and monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) in the context of a time-bound initiative. 
Although time-bound philanthropic initiatives 
are a well-established practice, the approach 
merits closer examination in order to discern 
effective ways to implement, evaluate, and 
wind down these types of investments. This 
article describes the NSI evaluation along with 
how findings informed Hewlett’s philanthropic 
approach, and provides a case example of a phil-
anthropic-initiative exit. Key considerations for 
M&E practices that are particular to the context 
of philanthropic investments where an exit is 
planned are also presented. 
Overview of the Nuclear 
Security Initiative 
Security issues are not a central element in the 
Hewlett Foundation’s main programs, though 
it has a history of funding special projects in the 
peace and security space in response to perceived 
opportunities. At the time the NSI was launched 
in early 2008, the foundation assessed that near-
term gains on pressing policy issues were possi-
ble, presenting a ripe opportunity for impact. 
The initial NSI investments occurred at a 
time when many philanthropies were shifting 
from more traditional grantmaking to bolder 
approaches — sometimes called “big bets” — 
that were often designed to address complex, 
systemic issues and achieve meaningful social or 
environmental change. A common belief in the 
philanthropic sector was that with a high degree 
of accountability to impact, foundations could 
surgically and successfully realize ambitious 
goals within a reasonable time period (Brest, 
2011). At the NSI’s inception, Hewlett’s philoso-
phy of grantmaking was guided by this point of 
view, an approach known as “strategic philan-
thropy” (Brest & Harvey, 2008). 
The NSI had a bold, aspirational goal to reduce 
the risk of a nuclear disaster by a discernable 
margin. The initiative encompassed three main 
strategy areas, each one large and complex in its 
The initial Nuclear Security 
Initiative investments 
occurred at a time when 
many philanthropies were 
shifting from more traditional 
grantmaking to bolder 
approaches — sometimes 
called “big bets” — that were 
often designed to address 
complex, systemic issues 
and achieve meaningful 
social or environmental 
change. A common belief 
in the philanthropic sector 
was that with a high degree 
of accountability to impact, 
foundations could surgically 
and successfully realize 
ambitious goals within a 
reasonable time period.
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own right and each with numerous ambitious 
policy targets.1 (See Figure 1.)
During seven years of investment the NSI set 
over 100 specific targets that spanned numerous 
issues, including strategic developments within 
NATO, multinational as well as nation-specific 
actions, and the fair consideration and adoption 
of treaties and agreements.2 The number and the 
array of targets reflected the foundation’s view 
that a time-bound investment could be success-
fully and precisely calibrated. 
The NSI grants were made to a range of orga-
nizations, including university-based research 
institutes and think tanks, as well as nonprofits 
engaged in advocacy and communications activ-
ities. Grants included both restricted support for 
specific programs and general operating sup-
port. Significant investments were made in five 
1A target is a type of outcome that describes a specific change or specific amount of change (e.g., 90 percent of all third-
grade students are reading at grade level). Targets communicate expectations about impact and are often used in strategic 
philanthropy or venture philanthropy. In the context of the NSI, targets reflected expectations about change and could be 
assessed as having been “achieved” or “not achieved.” 
2Although some of the NSI’s targets may reflect the passage of legislation (based on inputs from grantees and experts in the 
field), the Hewlett Foundation does not lobby or earmark its funds for prohibited lobbying activities, as defined in the federal 
tax laws. Its funding for policy work is limited to permissible forms of support only, such as general operating support grants 
that grantees can allocate at their discretion and project support grants for nonlobbying activities (e.g., public education and 
nonpartisan research).
FIGURE 1  Overview of NSI Strategy Areas 
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“anchor” grantees — organizations that the foun-
dation viewed as key partners in the pursuit of 
initiative goals. 
Beyond these financial investments, Hewlett 
invested human resources to boost the efforts of 
grantees and enhance impact. The NSI program 
officers took steps to convene grantees and sup-
port coordinated strategy, and were also careful 
to situate the initiative’s efforts with the ongo-
ing work in the field, coordinating closely with 
their counterparts in the Peace and Security 
Funders Group. As time went on, program offi-
cers gained a sense of the nuclear security field’s 
strengths and weaknesses and shared insights 
with both peer funders and grantees in order to 
inform strategy. 
A combination of shifts in the foundation’s stra-
tegic priorities and an assessment of diminished 
opportunity in the nuclear policy arena led the 
foundation to wind down the NSI in 2013. An 
important aspect of the wind-down strategy 
was intentional efforts to strengthen capabili-
ties within the nuclear field via joint efforts with 
other funders and a number of organizational 
capacity-building grants. 
NSI Evaluation Approach and Methods
The field of nuclear security is beset by a host 
of wicked problems. Thousands of destructive 
weapons — in the hands of regimes that are 
stable and in those that are less so — inevitably 
shape power relationships within a complex, 
global political system. Nuclear materials are 
transported and stored without proper pro-
tections and there is the risk that weapons or 
nuclear materials can wind up in the hands of 
nefarious actors. For these sorts of problems, 
the pathway to desired goals cannot always be 
plotted in advance. Despite established goals and 
targets, the actual results for any initiative tack-
ling such a web of wicked problems are unlikely 
to conform to plan. To maintain relevance, tar-
gets — and sometimes goals — must evolve in 
response to an interplay of global factors. It is 
against this complex backdrop that the NSI sum-
mative evaluation took place. 
Evaluation can be conducted for a number of 
purposes. The NSI evaluation did not focus on 
accountability; nor did it aim to assess the merit 
and worth of the NSI’s impact by examining its 
100-plus targets within a narrow “success/fail-
ure” framework or by asking whether the ini-
tiative had advanced its bold goal to reduce the 
risk of a nuclear disaster. Instead, ORS Impact’s 
evaluation was intended to support the founda-
tion’s learning and ongoing strategy decisions.3 
As such, the evaluation was a broad and inclusive 
inquiry that aimed to systematically assess and 
determine how and where the NSI had made 
a substantive difference — where meaningful 
progress had occurred, and perceptions within 
the field about the foundation, the initiative, and 
the exit process. 
To support learning and decision-making, evalu-
ation inquiry broadened the notion of what could 
be considered “success” in a global-scale poli-
cy-change effort and assessed where progress had 
occurred in forms other than achieving specific 
policy targets — certainly the most visible but 
also the most ambitious sorts of change. 
3The NSI evaluation’s purpose and methods are consistent with strategic learning. For further description of this evaluative 
approach, see Patton, 2011; Coffman & Beer, 2011; and Lynn, 2012. 
[T]he evaluation was a broad 
and inclusive inquiry that 
aimed to systematically assess 
and determine how and where 
the NSI had made a substantive 
difference — where meaningful 
progress had occurred, and 
perceptions within the field 
about the foundation, the 
initiative, and the exit process.
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The NSI summative evaluation relied on four 
sources of data: 
1. in-depth interviews with a broad cross 
section of actors in the field, including 
Hewlett staff, grantees, funders, policy-
makers, and experts inside and outside of 
government (n = 35); 
2. analysis of 720 grantee and program officer 
reports; 
3. review of selected news articles, op-eds, 
websites, and grantee and funder publica-
tions; and
4. a focus group with four evaluation experts, 
including those with experience in philan-
thropy, where the intent was to discuss 
monitoring and evaluation approaches rele-
vant to initiatives such as the NSI. 
Using purposive sampling, key informants were 
carefully selected with the help of an advisor 
who consulted with the evaluation team. The 
evaluation advisor, Joy Drucker, brought deep 
expertise in peace and security issues and was 
able to identify and help broker connections to 
those who could provide rich perspectives on the 
questions of interest, including those inside and 
outside of government.  
Key informant interviews and reporting doc-
uments underwent thorough content analysis. 
Interviews and reports were coded to surface 
particular patterns and themes where data 
offered a weight of evidence. To provide perspec-
tive on how and where meaningful differences 
had been realized over the life of the initiative, 
the evaluation drew on the metaphor of an ice-
berg. (See Figure 2.) The evaluation sought to 
describe the wide base of the iceberg “below the 
waterline” — the array of less visible changes 
 
Iceberg: A Metaphor for Policy Change
Improved 
communications
M O R E  
TA N G I B L E
L E S S  
TA N G I B L E
Achievement of domestic & international policy targets
Better and more 
relevant research
Strengthened 
relationships
Increased coordination 
among NGOs 
E X A M P L E S :
E X A M P L E S :
FIGURE 2  Iceberg: A Metaphor for Policy Change. Adapted from Schlangen and Coe, 2014.
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that constitute modest but important incremen-
tal progress or establish the enabling conditions 
for more visible policy changes, such as more 
effective dialogue, stronger alliances among key 
actors, and improved capacity for effective com-
munications. In the case of the NSI, the “below 
the waterline” outcomes were highly relevant to 
the initiative’s strategies — including both grants 
and nongrantmaking approaches (Schlangen & 
Coe, 2014).
The methods employed in this evaluation were 
intended to generate useful findings that could 
inform action. Findings are not intended to be 
generalizable, though they may be reasonably 
applied to other, similar settings — e.g., poli-
cy-change initiatives implemented in an environ-
ment of complexity that are also time bound.4
The foundation understood that insights from 
the summative evaluation would not be applied 
directly to its efforts within the NSI; rather, the 
desire was for an inclusive, comprehensive set of 
lessons that could be applied to other foundation 
initiatives. The foundation was also interested in 
delivering insights to those that would remain in 
the nuclear security field — including its grant-
ees and the Peace and Security Funders Group 
(PSFG). 
Insights relevant to the foundation and the field 
that are described in this article include the 
following:  
• Be thoughtful about the desired impacts of 
a time-limited initiative based on the con-
text, the scale of investment, and the range 
of strategies. 
• Regularly reassess the ongoing relevance 
of desired impacts and/or targets given 
changes within foundations or the sur-
rounding environment. 
• Apply broad measurement frames that 
allow a full, rich picture of progress to 
emerge — beyond quantifiable targets. 
Evaluation Findings: Notable 
Accomplishments
The weight of evaluation evidence pointed to 
key accomplishments that were attributable to 
Hewlett’s grantmaking and its role as a philan-
thropic partner. As a partner, the foundation 
spurred interchange and collaboration within 
the field by convening key players, identified and 
addressed the field’s biggest capacity gaps, con-
tributed to significant policy agreements, and 
facilitated tighter alignment among grantees 
and funders. 
The ‘Three-Legged Stool”
The NSI addressed shortcomings and enhanced 
capacity within the nuclear security field by 
emphasizing that the field’s diverse organizations 
— including technical, research-focused orga-
nizations and politically savvy advocates — are 
necessary complements for one another. The NSI 
program officers recognized the need for grant-
ees to adopt a sustained campaign mentality to 
marshal their strongest arguments and allies 
against the wicked problems inherent in the field. 
The NSI helped grantees and funders see that the 
field must function as a “three-legged stool” in 
order to be most successful. The concept refers to 
intentional integration of elements that together 
provide a solid base for advancing policy change: 
the “legs” being strong, relevant research and 
analysis; effective advocacy and communica-
tions; and seamless coordination among mul-
tiple actors, some of whom might specialize in 
either research or advocacy. The NSI supported 
an expansive group of grantees, including those 
that were described as “new voices, new players.” 
Noting that grant support in the field had previ-
ously been tilted towards research, interviewees 
credited Hewlett with proactively and intention-
ally leading the effort to build advocacy capac-
ity within the field. The cohesive “three-legged 
stool” framework reflected a new way of operat-
ing for the field. 
While emergence of a strong campaign mental-
ity was not one of the targets specifically artic-
ulated within the NSI, evidence indicates that 
4For more discussion of the generalizability of qualitative evaluation data, see Patton, 1980. 
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grantee efforts bore impressive fruit by helping 
create an enabling environment for adoption of 
the New START strategic arms reduction treaty 
in 2010. As one interviewee noted, “[to advance 
policy solutions], you want to have a set of grants 
that goes at the drivers of [nuclear security] pol-
icy.” In the case of the New START, well-coor-
dinated actors with a greater range of expertise 
were well positioned for success. There is also 
evidence that the NSI’s ongoing, balanced invest-
ment in research and analysis, advocacy, and field 
building helped ensure that actors were prepared 
for future efforts.
Improved Nuclear Governance
One of the NSI’s strategy areas was to create or 
strengthen international rules and governance 
structures to address weapons proliferation, 
prudent development of nuclear power, and safe 
handling of nuclear materials. Consistent with 
Hewlett’s approach, there were numerous pol-
icy targets associated with this strategy area, 
and the evaluation found evidence of progress 
on a number of them. Grantees also succeeded 
in highlighting urgent nuclear security issues 
confronting NATO. And, the NSI was credited 
with boosting the capacity of nongovernmen-
tal nuclear policy specialists in key countries to 
engage more effectively in the arena. 
A notable international policy success arose via 
one of Hewlett’s anchor grantees — namely, 
the creation and adoption of the nuclear ven-
dors’ code of conduct, which enlisted commer-
cial vendors of nuclear energy technology in a 
new nuclear security regime and thus achieved 
an important paradigm shift. One NSI grantee 
observed that vendors had previously viewed 
those in favor of nonproliferation as radi-
cal: “You couldn’t be pro-nuclear energy and 
pro-nonproliferation. [With the code], that has 
now evolved.” Although the complexity of the 
policy-change process can make it difficult to 
confirm a clear causal relationship between phil-
anthropic investment and policy outcomes, this 
was a rare instance where it was possible. As one 
expert put it, “This was the Hewlett Foundation 
punching above their weight.” 
Adoption of the code of conduct was one of the 
initiative’s targets, and highlights the notion of 
quality over quantity. There were numerous 
policy targets associated with this NSI strategy, 
and some may ask whether achievement of a 
single target qualifies as a notable accomplish-
ment. However, it is important to recognize the 
code of conduct was a significant, multinational, 
cross-sector agreement that resulted from strenu-
ous negotiations. 
Perception of Hewlett as Leader
The Hewlett Foundation’s re-entry into the 
nuclear security space was seen as bringing 
“excitement, energy, and innovation”; many key 
informants perceived the Hewlett brand as syn-
onymous with innovation. Throughout the NSI, 
the foundation showed a willingness to embrace 
new, potentially high-value investment areas that 
had not received significant attention from other 
funders in the nuclear security space. An exam-
ple was investments the NSI made in Turkey and 
Brazil, which were emerging both technologi-
cally and politically and thus bound to influence 
the trajectory of nuclear security. Hewlett was 
credited with being a leader and the main funder 
for this work, and those knowledgeable about the 
effort described the impacts as “huge.” 
Although the complexity of 
the policy-change process can 
make it difficult to confirm 
a clear causal relationship 
between philanthropic 
investment and policy 
outcomes, this was a rare 
instance where it was possible. 
As one expert put it, “This 
was the Hewlett Foundation 
punching above their weight.” 
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Early in the NSI, there was concern that certain 
states entering the global nuclear security debate 
lacked a cadre of thought leaders with sufficient 
expertise, relationships, and funding to wield 
meaningful influence. Hewlett’s investments in 
building the capacity of both government and 
civil-society actors to develop localized solutions 
to nuclear challenges, enhance oversight, and 
shape the debate at the domestic and interna-
tional levels were viewed as critical to improving 
nuclear security globally. Those familiar with the 
NSI’s work in Turkey and Brazil saw significant 
gains in both states in terms of knowledge, trans-
parency, and relationships between governmen-
tal and civil-society actors. 
Hewlett also made a concerted effort to encour-
age innovation in the field. During the final years 
of the NSI, the foundation forged a partnership 
with four other nuclear security funders — the 
Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John 
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 
the Ploughshares Fund, and the Skoll Global 
Threats Fund — to form the Nuclear Innovation 
Collaborative. A charge of this group is to bring 
“positive disruption” to the arena of nuclear 
security in order to identify new ideas and 
approaches. The ultimate aim is to update the 
archaic Cold War framework within which 
nuclear security is often discussed and address 
the waning prominence of nuclear weapons 
issues in recent political debate (Ploughshares 
Fund, 2014). Although the collaborative is still 
young, one of its major areas of focus will be 
bringing together innovators from different 
backgrounds to pursue high-impact collabora-
tions and draw more active and effective people 
into the field. 
Like the campaign mentality that emerged, 
broadened innovation in the field was not articu-
lated as an NSI target — although evidence indi-
cates that the foundation’s work in this area led 
to impressive results. 
Insights Regarding Strategy, 
Evaluation, and Exit Planning 
Contemporary approaches to grantmaking 
employ a wide variety of philanthropic tools for 
addressing a problem or opportunity of interest to 
a foundation. Traditionally, grantmaking focused 
on establishing core programs and continuing to 
support them over a long time frame. The desire 
for high-impact approaches grew with the trends 
of venture philanthropy, strategic philanthropy, 
and grantmaking effectiveness. The concept of a 
targeted, time-bound initiative is an outgrowth of 
these newer philosophies; emphasis is on invest-
ment in specific strategies aimed at achieving 
clear goals in a limited time period. Given that 
the success of policy-focused efforts can be contin-
gent on mercurial realities, it can be self-defeat-
ing to tie an initiative’s success to overly specific 
or ambitious goals. This raises the questions of 
how a time-bound initiative can be both targeted 
and responsive, and which approaches are best 
to gauge progress. Discussion below illuminates 
insights from the NSI evaluation. 
Shifting Strategy Amid Changing 
Opportunities
During its lifespan, NSI strategy shifted in 
response to changing opportunities in the global 
landscape while retaining many of its original 
targets. The foundation re-examined the NSI’s 
strategies and goals after an initial three-year 
investment and, after some tweaks, extended 
the initiative for another three years. A mid-
course evaluation of the initiative carried out 
by a respected expert in the field suggested that 
Hewlett’s investments in 
building the capacity of both 
government and civil-society 
actors to develop localized 
solutions to nuclear challenges, 
enhance oversight, and shape 
the debate at the domestic 
and international levels were 
viewed as critical to improving 
nuclear security globally. 
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the NSI’s strategies had been largely successful 
to date — namely due to the code of conduct 
and the grantee’s work on adoption of the New 
START — and that continuation of the NSI 
would likely achieve more of the initiative’s tar-
gets. Hewlett’s board agreed to extend the NSI, 
but as the second phase of the initiative began, 
a number of shifts occurred around the globe. 
Tensions between the U.S. and Russia intensi-
fied as Russia effectively annexed the Crimean 
Peninsula. At the same time, relations between 
the U.S. and China had begun to cool and the 
2011 earthquake and tsunami, which resulted in 
a critical incident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear 
plant, dampened the potential for expansion of 
nuclear energy. These factors, along with increas-
ing gridlock in Congress, meant that earlier 
hopes for rapid advances in nuclear security pol-
icies were starkly diminished. Internally, a new 
program officer assumed management of the 
NSI. With a strong background in policy work 
via years of experience working on Capitol Hill, 
this officer recognized that advancing policy- 
related targets would be challenging. 
As the second phase of the NSI moved forward, 
strategies shifted to reflect a “perceived niche” 
for the foundation (Redstone Strategy Group, 
2012). Goals continued to be ambitious, empha-
sizing alignment and agreements among global 
actors. The new program officer focused her 
efforts on building a stronger, campaign-style 
infrastructure across the field so that everyone 
— including a range of grantees and members 
of the Peace and Security Funders Group — 
would be more effective both individually and 
collectively. 
A Mismatched Focus on Policy Targets
Continued focus on ambitious policy targets was 
a mismatch with both the time frame of the NSI 
and the mix of funded strategies. The NSI’s mul-
tiple policy targets suggest that perhaps there 
were outsized expectations about what could be 
accomplished within given grant cycles and via 
the funded strategies. 
As noted, Hewlett’s philosophy of grantmaking 
at the outset of the NSI was guided by a strategic 
philanthropy approach that emphasized setting 
clear goals and measureable targets. The targets 
were useful in so far as they helped establish 
what the initiative set out to achieve. However, 
many of the NSI’s fixed targets became quickly 
outdated as global circumstances shifted and 
thus were less useful as longer-term benchmarks. 
Setting targets in the dynamic context of policy 
change work is challenging because impact is 
affected by a multitude of factors, including the 
evolving complexities of the decision-making 
environment as well as the types, scale, or com-
bination of funded strategies (Guthrie, Louie, 
David, & Foster, 2005; Reisman, Gienapp, & 
Stachowiak, 2007; Morariu & Brennan, 2009). 
The potential pitfall of relying on highly speci-
fied targets as the measure of success is that they 
may skew toward a best-case scenario — what 
could happen given unfettered strategy. Targets 
may not accurately reflect what is achievable 
given fundamental capacity in the field and 
inherent obstacles in the landscape, or the less 
dramatic but often very important incremental 
steps necessary to advance goals. 
While the NSI realized progress on many fronts 
— including the enhanced capacity of certain 
actors, stronger dialogue and debate, and adop-
tion of the New START and the code of conduct 
— it was probably overly optimistic to expect the 
initiative to advance so many ambitious targets 
without more sustained and targeted investment 
(Harvey, 2016). In addition, important successes 
of the initiative were not reflected within the 
100-plus targets — e.g., greater alignment and 
cohesiveness among grantees and funders in 
the field and increased momentum due to new 
energy and innovation in the field. 
As noted above, policy work is somewhat like 
an iceberg: it is not always easy to see in its 
entirety. Major policy advances are typically 
visible — like the tip of the iceberg — but reflect 
only one component of a much greater set of 
achievements, i.e., the deep, wide base of related 
results that are less visible. The base of the poli-
cy-change iceberg is comprised of elements that 
signal the right conditions for big policy “wins” 
as well as less newsworthy budgetary or tech-
nocratic steps that can still be quite valuable, so 
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it is important to bring them to light (Reisman, 
et al., 2007). As noted, there is evidence that the 
NSI influenced change “below the waterline” 
— e.g., greater capacity to build bridges, stron-
ger relationships with decision-makers, and 
enhanced coordination among a range of actors 
in the field. Although these outcomes were not 
identified as expected targets at the outset of the 
initiative, these types of changes were nonethe-
less a logical fit given the mix of NSI strategies. 
During the NSI’s second phase, as the landscape 
shifted, a greater focus on advancing the neces-
sary preconditions for policy change rather than 
precise policy targets would have been more 
reasonable and “right sized” given the initia-
tive’s breadth and time frame.
Challenges to Measurement
Because the NSI’s measurement tended to focus 
on achievement of targets and did not inten-
tionally assess progress on interim outcomes, 
measurement efforts were not as comprehensive 
or valuable as they could have been. As is com-
mon with a strategic philanthropic approach, 
measurable goals and targets were viewed as 
the markers of progress for the initiative. Many 
of the targets were built on linearly predictive 
“x will lead to y” assumptions. As policy targets 
appeared to be less obtainable later in the initia-
tive’s life cycle, the NSI program officer focused 
on advancing “below the waterline” outcomes. 
However, grantee reporting and the foundation’s 
measurement remained narrowly focused on tar-
gets. Grantee reporting focused on performance, 
such as the number of conferences organized, 
the satisfaction of conference participants, the 
production of conference proceedings, and num-
ber of white papers developed. The vast major-
ity of grantee reports stated that performance 
targets had been “met” or “exceeded.” However, 
there was no formal or intentional measurement 
of how grant-funded work was advancing policy 
targets or broader strategy outcomes. 
The increased infrastructure and development 
of champions realized by investing in a few 
“anchor” grantees, for example, was not identi-
fied as a key expectation or measure of the NSI’s 
progress. In reality, infrastructure development 
is largely accepted in the field of advocacy and 
policy-change evaluation as a key progress indi-
cator for advocacy investment.5 Similarly, the 
convening role that the foundation played led 
to stronger alliances among the PSFG. While 
increased capacity, the championing of develop-
ment, and alliance building are not adequately 
captured by quantitative targets, these changes 
can in fact be directly measured through many 
innovative techniques that are becoming com-
mon practice in the advocacy-evaluation field. 
Intentional measurement in these areas can 
help foundations to better estimate progress 
Because the NSI’s measurement 
tended to focus on achievement 
of targets and did not 
intentionally assess progress 
on interim outcomes, 
measurement efforts were not 
as comprehensive or valuable 
as they could have been. As 
is common with a strategic 
philanthropic approach, 
measurable goals and targets 
were viewed as the markers 
of progress for the initiative. 
Many of the targets were built 
on linearly predictive “x will 
lead to y” assumptions.
5A few existing frameworks describe outcome areas related to advocacy and policy-oriented work, and describe the areas of 
infrastructure and other interim outcomes that reflect enabling conditions or otherwise signal progress for long-term policy 
change or social change. See Reisman, et al., 2007; Coffman, 2007; Reisman,  Gienapp, & Kelly, 2015; Alliance for Justice, 2013; 
and Klugman, 2010. 
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and inform decisions about strategies or fund-
ing approaches. 
Approaches to Gauging Success
The NSI evaluation acknowledged the weak-
nesses inherent in a too-narrow assessment 
of policy work, and applied a broader frame 
to describe the initiative’s successes. Gauging 
success by documenting the percent of targets 
achieved over the course of the initiative would 
have provided a more quantified but a much 
more limited picture of the results of the ini-
tiative. While some targets were achieved, the 
changing global landscape meant that many 
targets were off the mark and out of reach. The 
assumptions upon which targets were built 
became overtaken by events — assuming, that is, 
that the original optimistic views of the opportu-
nity were solid in the first place. 
By probing deeply in the areas “below the water-
line,” the NSI summative evaluation was able 
to provide rich data about the varied types of 
success that were actually realized and pointed 
toward areas of opportunity to continue the 
work. Significantly, the evaluation was also able 
to lift up important messages about the exit 
strategy and the effects of the initiative sunset 
on partners who were continuing to forge ahead 
to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of 
bad actors. While the foundation’s intent was to 
make a gracious and conscientious exit and leave 
the field in a strong place, there were unique 
aspects to Hewlett’s role and the expectations 
applied to its presence and actions in the field 
that left questions about how key efforts would 
be sustained following the NSI’s sunset. 
Impact of Evaluation Findings on 
Hewlett’s Thinking 
Many of the NSI evaluation findings illuminate 
how careful thought about goals, outcomes, 
and strategy — at the heart of the foundation’s 
Outcome-Focused Philanthropy (OFP) approach 
— reflects both strengths and potential pitfalls 
(William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, 2016). 
While the foundation’s approach to OFP has 
evolved, its commitment to reflect on both 
successes and failures has been consistent 
(Hartnell, 2003). When Hewlett staff commis-
sioned the NSI evaluation, a hope was to use the 
results for learning. Aside from documenting 
achievements of the NSI, the evaluation sur-
faced provocative issues and recommendations 
relevant to complex, policy-oriented, and time-
bound initiatives — features that characterize 
the foundation’s existing work. The NSI evalu-
ation findings brought timely value to Hewlett 
staff in a number of areas. 
Outcome-Focused Philanthropy
The evaluation affirmed a reorientation of out-
come-focused grantmaking already in progress at 
the foundation. Outcomes-Focused Philanthropy 
retains a focus on outcomes already in place at 
Hewlett, but more explicitly recognizes the need 
at times to flex and adapt outcomes throughout 
a philanthropic strategy’s life cycle. As described 
earlier, there was a too-strict management to 
the NSI’s highly aspirational goals and myriad 
specific targets and not enough attention to how 
developments in the field suggested the needs for 
course adjustments, such as closing opportunity 
windows. While management to goals contin-
ues, OFP places greater emphasis on the utility of 
interim outcomes, scanning for developments in 
the field and at the foundation, and learning and 
adaptation through every stage of a strategy’s life 
cycle — origination, implementation, refresh, 
and, in the case of some strategies and all time-
bound initiatives, exit. 
A subsequent evaluation of another Hewlett 
Foundation policy-oriented strategy provides 
an example of how the foundation flexed and 
adapted outcomes. Program officers intention-
ally shifted monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
questions to better recognize the initiative’s 
early stage. Given the context, foundation staff 
recognized that the greatest value of M&E 
would be to guide decision-making and future 
implementation of the strategy. The initial M&E 
questions focused heavily on the extent of prog-
ress toward policy goals. Upon reflection, those 
questions were recognized as too far-reaching 
and too summative, given the strategy’s stage of 
development. Foundation staff instead adopted 
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questions that explored grantees’ access to pol-
icymakers, grantee alignment with the estab-
lished policy goals, and the degree to which 
grantees might form an effective coalition. 
These questions were a better fit with the strat-
egy context and M&E purpose, and ultimately 
more useful as findings informed the strategy’s 
adaptation and ongoing implementation.  
Balancing Expectations
The evaluation underscored the need to balance 
expectations about the timeline for progress 
with an understanding of what information is 
needed to make good decisions at key strategic 
moments. As the NSI case illustrates, attack-
ing complex, wicked problems — which are 
the focus of many of the Hewlett Foundation’s 
programs and initiatives — is tricky, and prog-
ress is almost always nonlinear. It is also true 
that advancing ambitious goals often requires 
a long time horizon. To guide learning and 
decision-making in both long-term efforts and 
those known to be time bound, the foundation’s 
evaluation guidance — including its Evaluation 
Principles and Practices (William and Flora 
Hewlett Foundation, 2012) — encourages staff to 
establish comprehensive evaluation questions in 
a project’s origination phase, then prioritize and 
sequence, and apply evaluation findings to learn-
ing and adaptation throughout the life cycle. 
Evaluation questions may address the overall 
effectiveness of the work, value for money, or 
continued “fit” of the strategy and approach, 
particularly given any changes in the external 
environment. 
The NSI evaluation also confirmed the impor-
tance of assessing field capacity thoroughly 
before launching an ambitious initiative, as well 
as the need to align a strategy’s scope and goals 
with the capacity of the field to accomplish those 
goals. In the NSI example, the need for signifi-
cant capacity building was identified only after 
the foundation was deep into the work. Taking 
that to heart, Hewlett has included questions 
about capacity and needs in the OFP framework; 
these are to be addressed throughout the strat-
egy life cycle. 
Finally, the NSI findings illustrate the need for 
caution about targets. Targets can be useful to 
help gauge progress, particularly when initiatives 
are mature, when strategies are stable, when a 
robust evidence base has been established upon 
which to base expectations about future out-
comes, or when there is a clear and logical time 
frame for achievement. For initiatives such as 
the NSI that are implemented within a highly 
For initiatives such as the NSI 
that are implemented within a 
highly complex environment, 
continuing to hammer away 
at specific targets even when 
opportunities have changed 
suggests the need to establish 
better triggers during strategy 
origination that can spur 
reflection about whether or 
when it is necessary to change 
course. For example, staff 
may need to periodically ask 
and answer questions such 
as: What facilitates or creates 
barriers to progress? How will 
we assess whether to keep 
going or change directions? 
It is important to ask these 
questions early enough to make 
a difference, and to be open 
and transparent with grantees, 
engaging them with regard to 
these questions as appropriate. 
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complex environment,6 continuing to hammer 
away at specific targets even when opportuni-
ties have changed suggests the need to establish 
better triggers during strategy origination that 
can spur reflection about whether or when it is 
necessary to change course. For example, staff 
may need to periodically ask and answer ques-
tions such as: What facilitates or creates barri-
ers to progress? How will we assess whether to 
keep going or change directions? It is important 
to ask these questions early enough to make a 
difference, and to be open and transparent with 
grantees, engaging them with regard to these 
questions as appropriate. 
Methods Aligning With Principles
The NSI evaluation illustrated methods that 
aligned well with the Hewlett Foundation’s eval-
uation principles. The foundation’s first principle 
of evaluation is “lead with purpose.” The NSI 
evaluation offered a clear model of how to do 
so when engaged in complex work, be it policy 
change or other long-term endeavors. Given that 
the policy arena can be unpredictable, it is a mis-
take to focus only — or too much — on whether 
a particular policy change has happened. 
“Progress” — frequently the basis for decisions 
about whether to continue an investment — 
should encompass key intermediate steps that 
make ultimate change more likely, such as 
improvements in the capacities of advocates 
or the addition of new allies. The foundation 
increasingly recognizes the value of including 
such interim achievements as relevant markers 
of headway in policy-focused strategies. There 
is more emphasis on how Hewlett’s investments 
can help create conditions for positive change: 
“below the waterline” outcomes versus emphasis 
on specific tactics and whether they generate 
high-profile targets. And there continues to be 
recognition of evaluation data’s value for learn-
ing and enhancing the efforts of the foundation 
and its partners. This approach has been applied 
recently in two foundation initiatives.7 
Exit Planning
The NSI evaluation helped refine thinking about 
exit planning. The Hewlett Foundation is now 
even more cognizant about the need to be as 
crisp and clear as possible regarding the defini-
tion of an initiative and the expectation of exit. 
It is important to point out how initiatives fit 
into the foundation’s ecosystem. In most areas, 
Hewlett invests for the long haul (e.g., perform-
ing arts, Western conservation, reproductive 
health). Initiatives are launched when the foun-
dation sees the potential to have an impact in a 
specific area, and can learn and test whether and 
how its philanthropic dollars can be leveraged to 
make a difference. However, the default expecta-
tion is that an initiative is time bound.
Two issues arose regarding the decision to end 
the NSI and exit the field of nuclear security. 
First, although the NSI was intended as a time-
bound effort, the work gained momentum, open-
ing up the hope that the foundation’s investment 
might continue. There was ambiguity among 
Hewlett staff, grantees, and partner funders 
about when, exactly, the NSI would end. Once 
the decision was made to exit, it caught the field 
by surprise — there was no sense of a planned or 
intended end. 
The NSI’s finite time horizon was not commu-
nicated clearly at the outset, either internally or 
6For further discussion of sense-making in complex systems, see Snowden, 2010. The framework sorts issues facing leaders 
into five contexts defined by the nature of the relationship between cause and effect. Four of these — simple, complicated, 
complex, and chaotic — require leaders to diagnose situations and to act in contextually appropriate ways. The fifth — 
disorder — applies when it is unclear which of the other four contexts is predominant. 
7The Cyber Initiative commissioned its first evaluation in 2016, focusing on progress in building a network of experts. While 
it was one of five initiative outcomes, staff believed it should be evaluated first because findings provide an opportunity 
for learning. To that end, they have identified a number of questions to investigate: Have cyber experts in industry, 
government, academia, and other relevant sectors begun working together? If not, why not? If so, what are the key enablers? 
Are there particular forces that can promote or inhibit the emergence of a network? The Madison Initiative commissioned 
an external evaluation group to work closely with the staff team throughout the initial three-year grantmaking period. The 
evaluators played the role of “critical friend” and helped the team take a developmental approach by asking tough questions, 
uncovering assumptions, and collecting and interpreting data to aid the initiative’s development with ongoing feedback 
offered in real time.
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externally. Although justification for the decision 
to exit was laid out for stakeholders in 2013, the 
hope that had mounted for the NSI’s extension 
led to disappointment both inside and outside the 
foundation. External stakeholders perceived the 
decision as abrupt and opaque, and contrary to 
the openness, frankness, and spirit of collabora-
tion that program officers brought to the PSFG. 
As one funder said, “we had spent so much time 
collaborating and being as open as possible that 
it would have been useful for us to have been 
involved earlier on before the foundation’s deci-
sion to completely pull out was made.” 
For grantees, Hewlett’s decision to exit resulted 
in significant uncertainty, and organizations had 
to make hard choices about where to focus their 
energy. Organizations’ need to increase their 
fund-development efforts necessarily resulted in 
diminished program resources — and this at a 
time when there were significant demands and 
activity in the field during the lead-up to the U.S.-
Iran nuclear framework. In retrospect, it seems 
clear that the foundation could have done a bet-
ter job signaling its intentions and communicat-
ing the decision to exit. 
Once the decision was made, the foundation 
sought to exit the NSI as conscientiously as pos-
sible, augmenting staff and taking other steps 
to leave the field and grantees in a strong posi-
tion. Grantees were informed of the decision a 
full year prior to the NSI’s final grants. Many of 
these grants, supported in part by the founda-
tion’s Organizational Effectiveness grantmaking 
program, enabled grantees to hire consultants 
and address particular areas of organizational 
weakness. One such grant, for instance, went 
toward a communications consultant to work 
with a leading center of scholarship on nuclear 
security. Two grants supported organizations 
facing transitions of longtime leadership, and 
another supported an international network of 
next-generation security professionals to develop 
a case statement to bolster deeper engagement 
of their constituents. In addition to these tar-
geted capacity-building grants, some anchor 
grantees received general support at larger than 
normal levels so they would have running room 
to adapt. The foundation commissioned the 
ORS Impact evaluation in part to harvest lessons 
for the NSI grantees and other funders — con-
ducting the evaluation in an open manner and 
providing grantees and grantmakers with oppor-
tunity to provide input on evaluation questions 
and preview findings, digest, and comment.
The Hewlett Foundation also took steps to pre-
serve funding for nuclear security efforts by both 
encouraging peer funders to stay in the field and 
supporting the recruitment of new funders to the 
field. The foundation was particularly concerned 
about continuation of support for its field-build-
ing efforts in Brazil, Turkey, and Israel, and the 
foundation’s staff stressed the value of this work 
to peer donors. 
Drawing from these and other lessons, the foun-
dation has heightened intentionality regarding 
The NSI’s finite time horizon 
was not communicated 
clearly at the outset, either 
internally or externally. 
Although justification for 
the decision to exit was laid 
out for stakeholders in 2013, 
the hope that had mounted 
for the NSI’s extension led to 
disappointment both inside 
and outside the foundation. 
External stakeholders perceived 
the decision as abrupt and 
opaque, and contrary to the 
openness, frankness, and spirit 
of collaboration that program 
officers brought to the PSFG.
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good exit planning. Hewlett is specifically 
mindful of the need to begin planning for exit as 
early as possible, communicate early and fre-
quently with grantees and other stakeholders, 
and work collaboratively to ensure a smooth 
transition for all. There is also greater inten-
tionality with regard to drawing actionable 
lessons from a planned exit. The foundation’s 
OFP materials also encourage program staff to 
consider a range of questions as they gear up for 
and carry out an exit: 
• To what extent did the strategy achieve its 
goals, outcomes, and key implementation 
markers? 
• What were major accomplishments? 
• What were significant factors enabling or 
inhibiting success? 
• What lessons were learned? 
• What would you have done differently? 
• What are recommendations for colleagues, 
other foundations, and the field? 
Conclusion 
The NSI leaves behind a proud legacy: a 
strengthened professional community, signifi-
cant policy accomplishments, noted progress in 
priority strategy areas such as nuclear energy 
and emerging powers, and the infusion of new 
energy and innovation into the nuclear policy 
field. These outcomes were beneficial to the 
field, though they weren’t initially identified as 
the focus of the initiative. 
Evaluation highlighted the importance and 
value of thoughtfully identifying outcomes 
for a time-limited investment — particularly 
an investment that aims for ambitious policy 
results. In addition, the evaluation points to the 
utility of regularly reassessing the relevance of 
established outcomes (or targets) given likely 
shifts in the operating environment, and appli-
cation of broader measurement frames that gen-
erate learning and inform action. The Hewlett 
Foundation has applied lessons and insights 
from the NSI summative evaluation in order 
to enhance and strengthen efforts regarding 
implementation and measurement of complex 
work, including exit planning for time-limited 
initiatives. While not broadly generalizable, we 
believe that the NSI evaluation findings never-
theless offer lessons that are widely applicable 
in the field as investment in time-bound special 
initiatives has become a more common philan-
thropic approach.
The Legacy of a Philanthropic Exit
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Introduction
Atlantic Philanthropies is a limited-life foun-
dation that has been making grants since 1982 
in eight countries. In 2002 the foundation 
announced its intention to distribute all of its 
assets and close down by 2020; by that point 
it will have granted an estimated $7.7 billion 
worldwide, the largest exercise in limited-life 
philanthropy to date. Atlantic Philanthropies 
has described its philosophy in the following 
way: “Our goal, simply put, is to do as much 
good as possible, for as many disadvantaged and 
vulnerable people as possible, as soon as possi-
ble” (2005, p. 3). Underpinning this general goal 
is a particular focus on tackling global inequal-
ities and injustice. The founder of Atlantic 
Philanthropies, Chuck Feeney, imbued the foun-
dation with his personal philosophy of “giving 
while living” to achieve profound social change 
during his lifetime.
This article will examine Atlantic’s work in 
Northern Ireland, where since 1991 it has sup-
ported three thematic intervention areas: aging; 
children and young people; and reconciliation 
and human rights. Across these program areas 
some basic working principles applied: tackle 
the root causes, rather than the symptoms, of 
disadvantage; lever new or match funding for 
interventions; and mainstream successful pol-
icy and practice across Northern Ireland and 
beyond. Atlantic’s funding approach involved 
supporting key nongovernmental organizations 
to drive and advocate for change. As part of its 
exit strategy, Atlantic Philanthropies has moved 
to partnering with the power-sharing Northern 
Key Points
 • This article is a case study of Atlantic Philan-
thropies’ work in Northern Ireland, where 
it supported three thematic intervention 
areas: aging; children and young people; and 
reconciliation and human rights. Atlantic, a 
limited-life foundation that has been making 
grants since 1982 in eight countries, will 
close down by 2020 and is engaged in an 
exit strategy. 
 • Atlantic’s original funding approach involved 
supporting key nongovernmental organi-
zations to drive and advocate for change; 
its work helped to support and consolidate 
the peace process in that country. Its exit 
strategy has involved a formal partnership 
arrangement with the Northern Ireland 
Assembly to take external interventions to 
scale and mainstream services previously 
funded through NGOs. 
 • This article draws on qualitative data 
gathered through interviews with key 
stakeholders — the funder, government 
officials, and NGOs — and considers 
the consequences of this approach for 
sustaining and mainstreaming policies 
and practices. It also offers both specific 
and general lessons on partnering with 
government as an exit strategy.
DOI: 10.9707/1944-5660.1348
Ireland Assembly, a radical shift in both strategic 
and operational terms. 
Based on reflective practice, this article will 
examine Atlantic Philanthropies’ move from a 
bottom-up external funder that worked through 
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NGOs to a top-down, insider, partnership role 
with the government of Northern Ireland. It 
will also draw on qualitative data gathered 
through interviews with key stakeholders — the 
funder, government officials, and NGOs — and 
consider the consequences of this approach 
for sustaining and mainstreaming policies and 
practices. The article concludes with an exam-
ination of the lessons learned from partnering 
with government as an exit strategy: Atlantic’s 
role changed from funding NGOs to advocate 
for policy change outside government to one 
in which Atlantic is actively collaborating with 
government. The aim is to capture the learning 
from actors directly involved in the partnership 
process. What is offered is a formative overview 
of issues considered important by the stakehold-
ers based on early reflections on their experience 
with Atlantic’s exit strategy. Interviewees remain 
anonymous and no reference is made to their 
host departments for reasons of confidenti-
ality; within Northern Ireland’s small policy 
community, members could otherwise identify 
respondents who gave freely of their time and 
opinions in good faith.
The Northern Ireland Context
The context of Atlantic’s work in Northern 
Ireland is important in understanding the role 
it has played. The island of Ireland was parti-
tioned in 1921, with the southern 26 counties 
gaining independence from Britain and the 
remaining six counties in the northeast remain-
ing part of the United Kingdom. The new state 
of Northern Ireland had a Protestant majority 
(roughly 65 percent at the time of partition) and 
acquired its own parliament and considerable 
autonomy within the U.K. A chronically inse-
cure Protestant majority, an alienated Catholic 
minority, electoral malpractice, ethnic bias in 
the distribution of housing and welfare services, 
and a declining economy meant that the state 
could never command full political legitimacy. 
During the 1960s a civil rights movement began 
to campaign for more equitable access to political 
power, social provision, and cultural recogni-
tion. It met with resistance and divisions within 
unionism — those with allegiance to the U.K. 
Politics spilled onto the streets. In 1969 the 
London government deployed the British army 
in an attempt to restore order. By the mid-1990s, 
more than 3,500 people had been killed. Between 
1974 and the cease-fires of 1994 there were seven 
attempts to reach a political and constitutional 
settlement. All of the initiatives were London-
led and included an element of power-sharing 
between Catholics and Protestants; all foundered 
in the face of local opposition. The first moves 
toward peace progressed along two parallel 
routes: Route one sought to maintain momen-
tum between the constitutional parties; route 
two saw the first tentative moves to involve 
republicans (supporters of a united Ireland) in 
talks. On Aug. 31, 1994, the Irish Republican 
Army declared “a complete cessation of military 
operations” and the main loyalist paramilitary 
organizations followed its example in October, 
paving the way to the Good Friday/Belfast 
Agreement of April 1998 (Darby, 2003).
The Ulster Unionist Party agreed to share power 
with Sinn Fein (the republican political party) 
on the condition that it decommission its weap-
ons; Sinn Fein didn’t do so, and the Assembly 
(established under the 1998 agreement) was 
suspended in February 2002. This fitful process 
was to continue, and devolution was suspended 
indefinitely for the fourth time by Northern 
Ireland’s secretary of state in October 2002 due 
to a “lack of trust and loss of confidence on both 
sides of the community” (Reid 2002). A polit-
ical breakthrough came in the form of the St 
Andrews Agreement in October 2006. Northern 
Ireland has enjoyed a period of political stability 
since 2007 and a significant decline in political 
violence, although legacy issues around flags, 
parading, and otherwise dealing with the past 
continue to dog political progress. While regu-
larly described as a post-conflict society, peace 
remains fragile not least because of such issues 
as the highly segregated nature of Northern 
Ireland on ethno-national grounds and the lack 
of political consensus on how to deal with the 
past. There also remains an insidious under-
current of dissident loyalist (Protestant) and 
republican (Catholic) activities aimed at vulner-
able communities, where those factions exercise 
greatest influence.
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Virtually all of Atlantic Philanthropies’ work in 
Northern Ireland can be traced back to Chuck 
Feeney’s overarching desire to help build a last-
ing, sustainable peace and to reconcile deeply 
divided communities. Feeney’s distress over 
the violence in Northern Ireland became par-
ticularly acute on Nov. 8, 1987, when an IRA 
bomb placed at a British war memorial killed 11 
people attending a remembrance service in the 
town of Enniskillen, close to his ancestral home. 
Feeney saw the gruesome aftermath on televi-
sion while in London and said that he wanted 
to see peace, in his lifetime, in Northern Ireland 
(O’Clery, 2007). Starting in 1990, Atlantic began 
making grants in Northern Ireland, for the first 
five years from its Dublin office. At a time of 
intense and continuing political violence, funding 
opportunities were limited. Atlantic supported 
noncontroversial cross-community and cross- 
border contact and dialogue aimed at broaden-
ing political debate (Atlantic Philanthropies, 
2015). Throughout more than 2 1/2 decades 
of grantmaking in Northern Ireland, Atlantic 
Philanthropies sought to address the legacy of 
violent conflict that prevented movement toward 
reconciliation, stability, and the protection of 
human rights. (See Table 1.)
Atlantic Philanthropies 
in Northern Ireland
The role of Atlantic Philanthropies in Northern 
Ireland has received almost no attention in the 
literature. Jung, Harrow, and Phillips exam-
ined community foundations across the U.K., 
which they define “as independent philanthropic 
organisations working in a specific geographic 
area which build up a permanent collection of 
endowed funds contributed by many donors” 
(2013, p. 411; see also, Daly, 2008). The only 
foundation referenced in Northern Ireland, 
Community Foundation of Northern Ireland 
(CFNI), makes grants to meet a wide variety 
of needs in its service area. While recognizing 
1990 No political settlement
Atlantic makes its first grant in Northern Ireland (from Dublin 
office), for low-risk, cross-community peace-building work.
1993–95
Downing Street 
Declaration
IRA cease-fire
Chuck Feeney negotiates with Sinn Fein (republican party) on 
funding a Washington office to promote a political alternative 
to violence.
Atlantic establishes in office in Belfast.
1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement
A shift in Atlantic’s work supports higher-risk reforms in 
policing, justice, and dealing with the legacy of the past.
2001–02 Northern Ireland Assembly suspended
Atlantic supports building research capacity in higher 
education.
2003–14
2007: Power-sharing 
Assembly restored
2014: Stormont 
House Agreement
Atlantic’s role is in cementing peace through interventions 
in aging; children and youth; and reconciliation and human 
rights.
2014–present
Fresh Start political 
agreement on power 
sharing
Atlantic partners with the Northern Ireland government.
Atlantic’s Belfast office closes (2016).
A strategic decision by its board will end all Atlantic grant- 
making by 2016 and close it by 2020.
TABLE 1  Timeline of Atlantic’s Work in Northern Ireland
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the absence of high-net-worth donors in 
Northern Ireland, Jung, et al. noted that the 
position of CFNI was “greatly enhanced by 
major funding from Atlantic Philanthropies” 
(2013, p. 420) and the European Union’s Peace 
and Reconciliation Fund. Beyond that, there 
has been no in-depth academic examina-
tion of the significant role played by Atlantic 
Philanthropies in Northern Ireland.
During the period 1991–2015, Atlantic 
Philanthropies awarded 618 grants total-
ing about $603 million in Northern Ireland; 
the average grant was around $976,000. (See 
Figure 1.) To put the total grants provided 
by Atlantic into perspective in the context of 
public-sector spending, the Northern Ireland 
public expenditure budget is around $12 billion 
per year. Hence, over the lifetime of Atlantic 
Philanthropies’ involvement in Northern Ireland 
it has provided grants equal to approximately 3.6 
percent of one year’s public expenditure budget. 
In the areas of peace, reconciliation, and human 
rights specifically, it spent almost $156 million, 
or 26 percent of its total funding for Northern 
Ireland. This was the largest percentage of its 
spending, followed by grants to higher educa-
tion, at 22.5 percent; children and young people, 
at 16.8 percent; and aging, at 13.5 percent. The 
remainder of the funding was spent on a vari-
ety of areas, including community development 
and civic engagement, youth development, early 
childhood development, and strategic learning 
and evaluation.
Spending patterns in Northern Ireland reflected 
the wider move by Atlantic Philanthropies from 
2007-09 to support a social-justice framework 
broadly characterized as focusing on the root 
causes of inequality, which perpetuate disparities 
in power and access and which can be addressed 
only through systemic and institutional change 
(LaMarche, 2009; Proscio, 2010, 2012). This 
approach captured the mood of political change 
FIGURE 1  Atlantic Philanthropies’ Grants in Northern Ireland: 1991–2015
Peace, reconciliation, 
and human rights
Children and 
young people
Aging
Higher education
Nonprofit sector
Equality, rights, and justice
Community development
Countywide
Founding Chairman Fund
Miscellaneous
Source: Atlantic Philanthropies (2015)
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in Northern Ireland. The political settlement 
synonymous with the Good Friday/Belfast 
Agreement in 1998 resulted in a power-shar-
ing devolved government, but there remained 
many of the underlying issues that gave rise to 
the conflict. As noted by Gara LaMarche, then 
chief executive of Atlantic Philanthropies, how 
the social framework applies in Northern Ireland 
“might lead us to see all of our work through 
the lens of whether it serves to perpetuate peace 
through supporting emerging political and social 
structures that encourage the integration of a 
deeply divided society” (2009, p. 3).
Atlantic’s role in supporting a social-justice 
model appeared at odds with the pattern of 
spending in the field of American philan-
thropy (National Committee for Responsive 
Philanthropy, 2003, 2005; Jagpal & Laskowski, 
2011). Suárez’s research, for example, indicated 
that larger private foundations were much less 
likely to discuss social justice than public foun-
dations for fear of “drawing attention to their 
work by using potentially contentious language 
like social justice and social change in their pro-
gramming” (2012, p. 272). Conversely, those 
foundations that mentioned “social justice or 
social change in their programming reject the 
legal and normative restrictions on social action, 
sending signals to activist grant seekers that their 
ideas and tactics are welcome”; as a consequence, 
foundations become “institutional entrepre-
neurs, pushing the broader philanthropic 
community to reconsider funding strategies and 
acceptable priorities” (p. 273).
Although broadly informed by a social-justice 
framework, it is perhaps a more accurate assess-
ment that Atlantic Philanthropies adopted a 
generic theory of change in Northern Ireland 
that had unwritten principles: judiciously select 
well-respected NGOs, set broad parameters 
for the social changes sought, provide them 
with resources to effect change, build their 
capacity to advocate though the use of robust 
evidence funded by Atlantic, and take their 
pilot projects to scale. In that sense, the wider 
theory-of-change agenda was to build from 
the bottom up, and Atlantic’s role was, as one 
Atlantic interviewee said, one of “leading from 
behind” and “oiling the wheels of high-level 
advocacy” where its positional and financial clout 
added value to the work of NGO groups. There is 
no consensus within Atlantic on whether such an 
approach demonstrated clear intentionality or if 
those loose parameters simply offered the space 
for flexibility in the highly volatile political envi-
ronment that is Northern Ireland. What became 
clearer as Atlantic’s funding in Northern Ireland 
shifted to reflect the wider concerns of building 
peace is that it sought to “normalize” society 
through tackling social and religious inequali-
ties that had fueled the violence and left those 
impacted by the conflict most vulnerable (Beirne 
& Knox, 2014; Borooah & Knox, 2014). Atlantic 
points to a range of successes across the thematic 
areas it supported. (See Table 2.)
While these achievements cover a number of 
issues, a set of core themes and approaches emerge 
from the work of Atlantic Philanthropies. Atlantic 
has always sought to build and consolidate peace 
in Northern Ireland — from early support for 
organizations involved in dialogue (former com-
batants) through challenging work with those 
on the margins and on to large-scale partnership 
investments in shared education. It sought ways 
to use Atlantic’s unique position and perspective 
to encourage moves toward a more peaceful and 
stable society. As Atlantic staff envisioned how to 
make lasting impact with its work, the final phase 
of grantmaking in Northern Ireland, from 2014 
onward, focused on working with government to 
enshrine the most successful models the founda-
tion’s grantees had helped develop. We examine 
this exit strategy in some detail.
The Exit Strategy: Partnering 
With Government
The interface between government and philan-
thropy has received limited attention in the 
European literature. Smyllie, Scaife, and 
McDonald (2011), for example, argue that for 
some philanthropic organizations, the willing-
ness of government to subsidize or fund projects 
initiated by philanthropy is a measure of suc-
cess. Whether this happens can depend on the 
nature and form of the particular welfare state. 
European foundations see value in partnering 
Partnership With Government
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with the state; U.S. and U.K. foundations are 
less inclined, although this is changing (Anheier 
& Daly, 2006). Smyllie, et al. pose the question 
of whether “this activity [partnership between 
government and philanthropy] results in pub-
lic policy development,” an area they argue is 
currently unexamined (2011, p. 1141). Thümler’s 
study of the role played by philanthropic foun-
dations that co-operated with public actors in 
school-improvement partnerships in Germany 
and the U.S. highlighted “essentially symbolic 
types of action that satisfy the social appetite 
for reform while they spare their audiences 
the impositions of ‘real’ change — instances of 
‘successful failure’” (2011, p. 1112). Anheier and 
Daly (2006, citing Prewitt, Dogan, Heydemann, 
& Toepler, 2006) argue that while redistribu-
tion is linked to notions of charity, social and 
public-policy change is associated with philan-
thropy — an area that is being given greater 
attention in research. Overall, in a European 
context, research on philanthropic/government 
partnership working, from the paucity of pub-
lished work, is therefore underdeveloped.
Atlantic Philanthropies took the strategic deci-
sion, as part of its legacy, that it would partner 
with government to sustain and embed key 
strands of the work it had supported in Northern 
Ireland. However successful external interven-
tions are, philanthropic funding cannot and 
should not be a substitute for publicly funded 
services for which the state often has a legal or 
societal responsibility, whether as a safety net 
provider for the most vulnerable or as a public 
good. Atlantic’s programmatic strategies had 
Reconciliation
)  Programs of shared services were developed at hostile “interface” communities, 
improving delivery on issues such as early years and parenting, cyber-bullying, 
and youth engagement for many individuals and families.
)  The number of integrated schools and preschools (where Catholics and 
Protestants are taught together) nearly doubled, from 49 to 90, and the number 
of students being educated in integrated schools nearly tripled, from 7,000 
to 21,000.
)  In 2016, some 325 schools (one-third of all schools) were actively involved in 
shared education, engaging 17,000 pupils. 
)  The shared-education model was replicated in the deeply divided societies 
of Macedonia and Israel-Palestine, disseminating lessons learned from 
Northern Ireland.
Human Rights
)  Downing Street Declaration
)  IRA cease-fire
)  Chuck Feeney negotiates with Sinn Fein (republican party) on funding a 
Washington office to promote a political alternative to violence.
)  Atlantic establishes in office in Belfast.
Aging
)  Good Friday/Belfast Agreement
)  A shift in Atlantic’s work supports higher-risk reforms in policing, justice, and 
dealing with the legacy of the past.
Children and 
Young People
)  Northern Ireland Assembly suspended
)  Atlantic supports building research capacity in higher education.
TABLE 2  Atlantic Philanthropies: Key Successes in Northern Ireland
Source: Knox & Quirk, 2016
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been about creating knowledge and evidence; 
designing, implementing, and testing models; 
and advocating for policy change rather than 
funding large-scale service delivery. As Atlantic 
moved to end its grantmaking by 2016, it wished 
to see how the learning and practices it had sup-
ported could change or influence mainstream 
state-run services. 
Atlantic partnered with government via a 
wider policy framework, entitled Delivering 
Social Change (Northern Ireland Office of the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2013), 
which was established by the Northern Ireland 
Executive branch to tackle poverty and social 
exclusion through the combined efforts of sev-
eral government departments. Atlantic’s plan 
to partner with government therefore coin-
cided with a period when the Northern Ireland 
Executive feared it was proving difficult to 
deliver cross-cutting outcomes that straddled 
the individual portfolios of several departments. 
In that sense, the evolution of the partnership 
between Atlantic and the devolved government 
in Northern Ireland was opportunistic rather 
than strategic. Indeed, project leaders within 
Atlantic had been negotiating with individual 
departments before the emergence of Delivering 
Social Change (DSC), which offered an over-
arching policy mechanism to work across 
government. The specific focus of Atlantic’s work 
involved three signature programs launched by 
the first minister and deputy first minister in 
September 2014: early intervention, dementia, 
and shared education, each of which had formed 
part of Atlantic’s previous grantmaking portfolio.
The total investment in these programs 
amounted to $75.5 million; Atlantic 
Philanthropies contributed about $28 million 
of that investment and the remainder came 
from the Office of the Minister and Deputy 
First Minister and from government depart-
ments with a direct interest in their functions 
(e.g., Education, Health, and Justice). The Early 
Intervention Transformation Program tries 
to transform mainstream public services by 
enabling a shift to early intervention and pre-
vention. The Dementia Together Program 
contributes to the government’s regional strat-
egy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern 
Ireland. The Shared Education Signature 
Program aims to scale up the number of schools 
involved in sharing classes on a cross-commu-
nity basis and in sharing resources and teachers 
as a way of breaking down sectoral boundaries 
0 5 10 20 30 40
FIGURE 2  Atlantic Philanthropies’ Signature Programs
Atlantic 
Funding
Government 
Funding
In millions of dollars, 2014 to present
Early Intervention
Shared Education
Dementia
Partnership With Government
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Partnering 
With 
Government
Early Intervention 
Transformation Program
Shared Education Signature 
Program
Dementia Together 
Program
Funding $36.7 million total partnership funds $30 million total partnership funds
$7.73 million total 
partnership funds
Aims
To transform mainstream 
services by enabling a 
shift to early intervention 
and prevention through a 
greater use of evidence 
and focus on outcomes.
To develop the extent, frequency, 
and continuity of meaningful 
shared contact between peer 
groups within cross-community 
school partnerships. Aim is 
to support sustained cross-
community learning through 
shared classes, but at the same 
time for schools to retain their 
own community identity.
To make a significant 
contribution to the 
regional dementia 
strategy, which 
promotes a holistic 
model involving the 
community, family, 
caregivers and services 
in support of people 
with dementia.
Details
Three work streams:
• Equip all parents with 
the skills needed to give 
their child the best start 
in life.
• Support families when 
problems arise, before 
need for statutory 
involvement.
• Address the impact of 
adversity on children. 
Funds high-quality programs 
that provide opportunities for 
shared-learning experiences 
that directly support the delivery 
of the curriculum. The program 
also supports the professional 
development of teachers and 
school leadership to improve 
the quality of sharing and 
collaboration among schools. 
Three work streams:
• Develop human 
capital, including skills 
training for dementia 
workforce.
• Provide respite, short 
breaks, and support to 
caregivers. 
• Raise awareness and 
provide information 
and support about 
dementia. 
Expected 
Outcomes
• A significant 
improvement in 
quality and quantity of 
prevention and early 
intervention services. 
• Improved staff 
development through 
integrated teams. 
• Mainstream resources 
redirected to make 
initiative sustainable.
• Improved educational outcomes 
and enhanced access to the 
curriculum for all pupils involved 
in shared education.
• Normalized peer-to-peer 
cross-community relationships 
built through regular contact 
within mainstream education.
• Shared education as a 
component of regular 
inspection processes in schools 
and strategic plans.
• The onset and 
progression of 
dementia in the 
Northern Ireland 
population is delayed.
• People with dementia 
have the health and 
social-care services 
they need.
• People with dementia 
live well in Northern 
Ireland.
TABLE 3  Atlantic Philanthropies’ Partnership Programs With the Northern Ireland Government
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that reflect wider divisions in society. (See Figure 
2 and Table 3.) We consider in some detail the 
views of stakeholders operating within and out-
side the philanthropy-government partnership 
to deliver these three Atlantic Philanthropies 
exit programs.
Stakeholder Views
Conception, Design, and Content
Having three signature programs operating 
under the same Delivering Social Change policy 
framework conceals some significant similarities 
and differences. The Shared Education Signature 
Program, for example, was largely seen as scal-
ing up Atlantic’s antecedent Shared Education 
Program. The Dementia Together Program 
was unambiguously about working alongside 
government to implement the regional strat-
egy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern 
Ireland (Northern Ireland Department of Health, 
Social Services, and Public Safety, 2011). In so 
doing, it carved out areas of work that would 
add value to the implementation of the strat-
egy: human capital development, respite care, 
awareness raising, and delirium. The Early 
Intervention Transformation Program (EITP), 
on the other hand, could be considered a succes-
sor program to the work Atlantic had been doing 
for the previous 10 years — improving outcomes 
for children through early intervention. Much of 
its work to date had been about testing, through 
children’s NGOs, various preventive measures 
early in the lives of children and whether they 
produced better outcomes.
As one Atlantic respondent noted: 
When we decided to work directly with govern-
ment, each of the three strands had been doing 
their own thing, negotiating directly with potential 
government partners in terms of what we might 
do. Delivering Social Change then came along and 
that seemed to us to be a wrapper which could use-
fully provide a rubric for our work.
The design and content of the signature pro-
grams, however, attracted criticism from 
external stakeholders. Those grantees previously 
working on shared education detected a loss in 
passion and commitment to its essence as the 
effort became absorbed into the public-sector 
bureaucracy. In the Shared Education Program’s 
original conception, creativity and risk-taking 
were encouraged and, in the spirit of learning 
from errors and rethinking practice, schools 
were not criticized for making mistakes. While 
probity of spending was important, account-
ability tended to focus on outcomes — what 
had been achieved in the schools. Inevitably 
those working outside the system on shared 
education felt a sense of loss when it became 
mainstreamed. Beyond the specifics of this pro-
gram, moving from pilots to scale can result in 
a perceived or real diminution of core content 
(Ross, 2014).
The design of the dementia program was crit-
icized for failing to take sufficient account of 
existing provisions and, in some cases, dupli-
cating what was already there. The slow pace 
of the program was linked to what one NGO 
interviewee described as “the clunkiness of the 
system, particularly around commissioning, pro-
curement, and recruitment processes, which [is] 
exacerbated when a number of public bodies are 
involved.” However, most criticism by former 
grantees was leveled at the early-intervention 
program, for a “lack of coherence.” Complaints 
took a number of forms: interventions in which 
Atlantic had invested significantly not appear-
ing to any extent in the signature program; the 
number of pilots in a program whose purpose 
was perceived by former grantees as taking proof 
of concepts to scale; the absence of due diligence 
applied to partnering with government com-
pared with what had been required of NGOs 
who worked with Atlantic; and the seemingly 
Those grantees previously 
working on shared education 
detected a loss in passion and 
commitment to its essence as 
the effort became absorbed into 
the public-sector bureaucracy.
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lower priority of evidence as a consideration in 
program work.
Officials disagreed with these criticisms:
What we are now looking at are projects that draw 
from existing practice and, by improving that 
practice, become part of a systemic change process 
going forward — antenatal and postnatal path-
ways involving holistic support from midwives and 
health visitors respectively in the EITP programme 
is a case in point. This is changing the system.
It is also worth pointing out that while the EITP, 
with an investment of about $37 million, is the 
largest of the three signature programs, Atlantic 
Philanthropies makes a contribution of approx-
imately one-third of the overall budget ($12 
million). It is not therefore unreasonable for con-
tributing departments to promote ideas that they 
deem worthy of support rather than see the EITP 
as simply a vehicle to take Atlantic’s prior inter-
ventions to scale. Officials also disliked some of 
the branded early-childhood programs supported 
by Atlantic that required licensing and the use of 
copyrighted training materials. Moreover, DSC 
expenditure overall is relatively small. As one 
civil servant pointed out: 
Year-on-year, going back to 2012, we should not 
lose sight of the fact that DSC expenditure is less 
than 1 percent of public spending — it’s tiny. Even 
if you want the “tail to wag the dog,” you have a 
very small tail on a very big dog, so it needs to be 
kept in perspective.
Implementation
The key concern raised by external stakeholders 
on implementation was that the signature pro-
grams were being treated like “an initiative, a 
project, or a time-limited intervention.” In other 
words, they did not have confidence that the 
implementation process to date offered reassur-
ance on mainstreaming. In part, this may have 
been a feature of just how slow the process of 
implementation had been up to that point, for a 
variety of reasons. As one external stakeholder 
pointed out,
When we were working on shared education, it 
got to the point where every member of our team 
would walk through fire to make this work. There 
was a solid, unbending belief that this was the right 
thing to do, buoyed up by a network of teachers 
with the same ambition and commitment. The 
energy that you draw from these experiences is 
amazing. The reality is that it is never going to be 
like that when it is part of the mainstream.
An example to illustrate the problems around 
implementation came from shared education. 
The Shared Education Signature Program 
(SESP) faltered at the outset as its introduction 
became entangled with a trade union dispute 
over academic assessment. From this stuttering 
start the SESP has begun to gather momentum, 
but external interviewees expressed the view 
that its implementation is being carried out in 
the most minimalist way. As one NGO inter-
viewee observed,
An example to illustrate 
the problems around 
implementation came from 
shared education. The Shared 
Education Signature Program 
faltered at the outset as its 
introduction became entangled 
with a trade union dispute 
over academic assessment. 
From this stuttering start the 
SESP has begun to gather 
momentum, but external 
interviewees expressed the 
view that its implementation 
is being carried out in the most 
minimalist way.
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Shared education is about much more that shared 
classes. It is about changing the way in which edu-
cation is delivered by pushing the boundaries to 
embrace joint-faith schools, federations, shared cam-
puses, jointly appointed teachers, changes to the 
area planning process, and a host of other things. 
A key aspect of implementing the signature pro-
grams is the interagency work associated with 
all three areas of work. Interviewees saw con-
siderable merit in this idea and credited DSC as 
the vehicle for making cross-departmental work 
happen. As one official noted,
Given the unique mandatory political coalition 
which we have in Northern Ireland, DSC offers 
a vehicle in which a centre left and centre right 
administration can approach diverse issues that 
straddle their ambitions for growing the economy 
while, at the same time, creating a more socially 
just or equitable society. … For some DSC can 
be an article of faith, others may see it in a more 
mechanistic way — for me, it has afforded a real 
opportunity to work horizontally.
The fact that departments made a financial com-
mitment to the signature programs “guaranteed 
their presence at the partnership table, if only for 
accountability purposes,” an NGO interviewee 
said. One criticism is that their commitment will 
wane after activities have been commissioned, 
but still allows them to point to their stake in 
the signature programs. More fundamentally, 
some interviewees criticized the kind of princi-
pal-agent model (Cairney, 2012) that prevailed 
across interagency work, citing the relation-
ship between the Department of Education 
and Education Authority as one of a number of 
examples: the Education Authority may act in 
its own interests rather than the expectations of 
the Department of Education, causing a princi-
pal-agent problem.
Mainstreaming and Sustainability 
While a number of interviewees were vocally 
critical of Atlantic Philanthropies’ move to 
partnering with government (see Table 4), few 
offered plausible alternatives. Rather, they pro-
vided nuanced comments on the process (more 
explicit intentions on Atlantic’s part of what they 
wanted from the partnership and greater overall 
coherence within the three signature programs). 
There was, in general, an acknowledgment that 
to mainstream provision, services piloted by 
Atlantic’s former grantees had to move from 
external interventions into recurrent spending 
by government departments. The issue for NGOs 
was how this process happened in practice.
It is unlikely that the multiple activity streams 
associated with the EITP can be fully resourced 
into the future. What internal stakeholders argue 
is that the working model of the EITP represents 
an approach to transforming children’s services 
through prevention and early intervention that 
can be sustained and embedded in the way ser-
vices are delivered. This approach attempts to 
“change the way we do things” by posing the 
following questions: Where is the evidence for 
introducing the proposed practice change? What 
is the transformation — which piece of the sys-
tem are you going to change? How will this 
change be sustained in the long term?
In shared education, there was an acceptance that 
prior work under Atlantic’s Shared Education 
Program had been hugely instrumental in secur-
ing significant policy and legislative gains that 
would help in the process of sustainability. There 
were concerns that shared education needed to 
be given greater priority within the education 
system if it was not to suffer the fate of integrated 
There was, in general, an 
acknowledgment that to 
mainstream provision, 
services piloted by Atlantic’s 
former grantees had to move 
from external interventions 
into recurrent spending by 
government departments. The 
issue for NGOs was how this 
process happened in practice.
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education (i.e., low growth in numbers, plateau-
ing at under 7 percent of all school children). 
Shared education is not fully embedded in the 
system and political parties see it in very differ-
ent ways — unionists (loosely Protestants) as 
a route to a single, state education system, and 
nationalists (loosely Catholics) as consistent 
with the principles of parental choice. There is 
also a concern, however, that infrastructure and 
buildings — shared-education campuses — will 
become synonymous with shared education and, 
in so doing, its core principles will get lost.
The Dementia Together Program was designed 
to complement the rollout of the regional strat-
egy, Improving Dementia Services in Northern 
Ireland. The portents for sustainability are not 
good as pressure grows on public expenditure 
and there is little sign of a follow-up strategy. As 
one NGO interviewee put it: 
There is talk that the [dementia strategy imple-
mentation group] will be stood down, which is a 
worrying development, on the basis that if we don’t 
have another strategy, then there is no need for an 
implementation group. My concern is that when 
Atlantic’s money goes we could lose the significant 
gains we have made to date.
Lessons Learned
What have been the general lessons learned so 
far in partnering with government as an exit 
strategy, based on Atlantic Philanthropies’ expe-
rience of working outside and more recently 
inside the system?
Internal (Government) Stakeholders External (NGO) Stakeholders
Delivering Social 
Change
Did not attract widespread 
governmental support as a framework 
for change.
Largely seen as unimportant in the 
operation of the 3 signature programs.
Interagency 
working
Departments with “skin in the game” 
were attentive to where their resources 
were going.
Government departments still find it 
difficult to work cross-departmentally. 
Government officials didn’t always 
value third-sector involvement in 
partnership arrangements.
“Do no harm” to 
grantees
Not seen as particularly relevant — the 
relationship between NGOs was with 
Atlantic.
Atlantic more concerned with legacy 
of partnering with government than 
substance/ success of signature 
programs.
Challenge role Signature programs have a “top-down” 
orientation owned and managed by 
government departments.
Atlantic’s partnership with government 
has muted its challenge function. 
There is a need for an external voice.
Mainstreaming 
and sustainability
There is a legitimate role for 
departments to pilot ideas in signature 
programs.
Fidelity of Atlantic pilots taken to scale 
(Shared Education) in other areas 
(Dementia and EITP). Where is the 
change in professional practice?
Role of Atlantic 
Philanthropies
“Keeping us honest” so that resources 
are not absorbed into recurrent 
expenditures.
Transformative influence in the way 
government does things.
TABLE 4  Stakeholder Views on Partnership With Government
Knox and Quirk
The Foundation Review  //  2017  Vol 9:1    35
R
esults
• Expectations. External funders may have 
high expectations of what can be achieved 
with their resources. From 1991 to 2015, 
Atlantic awarded grants totaling more 
than $600 million in Northern Ireland, or 
3.6 percent of one year’s public spending. 
This is not to minimize the level of funding 
involved: far from it. The key learning point 
for external funders is to be very targeted 
and selective in areas where interventions 
are most likely to influence change. So, 
although Atlantic’s overall financial com-
mitment set against the total public-sector 
budget appeared small, within the three 
targeted areas — shared education, early 
intervention, and dementia — the funding 
was significant and its track record in mod-
eling professional practice was impressive.
• Bureaucracies. Public bureaucracies are slow, 
cumbersome, and must adhere to strict 
rules of accountability in spending taxpay-
ers’ money. In partnering with the public 
sector, external agencies have to accept that 
their funding becomes partly subject to 
the same exigencies, although foundations 
have the power to set and hold expecta-
tions because of the resources they commit 
to partnering with government. Hence, it 
becomes frustrating when procurement 
or staffing processes suck the momentum 
out of opportunities when, previously, phil-
anthropic funding could be deft and fleet 
of foot. Somewhat perversely, however, 
government partners have used Atlantic’s 
involvement as a way of bringing pressure 
to bear on other parts of the public sector, 
either to leverage pre-agreed resources or to 
prompt action. Such is the inertia in some 
parts of the bureaucracy that an external 
agent can, through its resources, be used to 
kick-start public agencies.
• The change process. Effecting change in 
the public sector is fraught with difficul-
ties for myriad reasons. The particular 
experience of Atlantic Philanthropies in 
Northern Ireland was at the level of policy 
implementation. Early negotiations around 
partnership arrangements tended to take 
place at the strategic level with parent gov-
ernment departments in a particular area 
(e.g., Education, Health, Justice), but the 
responsibility for rolling out the programs 
lay with government agencies or arms-
length bodies. Departments often adopted 
a principal-agent role and, as a result, 
implementation bodies did not wholly own 
the signature programs or fully endorse 
what Atlantic wanted from them. The sig-
nificant lesson for external funders is to 
recognize the importance of managing 
public-policy networks, or what Osborne 
(2010) describes as new public governance 
that is “both a product of, and a response 
to, the increasingly plural and fragmented 
nature of policy implementation and ser-
vice delivery” (p. 9). There should also be 
some recognition of the problems associ-
ated with systemwide change in the U.K. 
public sector, best illustrated by Pettigrew, 
Ferlie, and McKee (1992), who highlighted 
the factors most likely to create a receptive 
context for change.
• Relationships with government. Partnering 
with government has the potential to 
change relationships. Working as an exter-
nal funder allowed Atlantic to support 
NGOs in developing alternative public-ser-
vice delivery models with accompanying 
evidence of their effectiveness. These 
organizations then advocated for policy 
change based on proof-of-concept ideas. 
In some cases, this pitted NGOs against 
the public-sector status quo by challeng-
ing existing professional practice. In fact, 
Atlantic encouraged and incentivized much 
more than this. It supported organizations 
in developing advocacy campaigns that 
would “take on” public-sector organizations 
with the aim of changing public policy and/
or introducing legislation. By association, 
Atlantic could have been perceived as a 
policy agitator at best, or, at worst, a thorn 
in the side of government. Moving to part-
ner with government changed the nature of 
that relationship, although not its history. 
Atlantic’s capacity to be indirectly critical 
of government through NGOs it previously 
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funded has, of necessity, been muted. Its 
new role, however, offered insider status, a 
working relationship with senior officials, 
and, as a result, influence at the highest 
level of decision-making to advocate for 
mainstreaming.
• Relationships with NGOs. Not only do rela-
tionships with government change, but 
those with erstwhile NGO grantees can 
alter for the worse. In part this may be 
explained by the fact that NGOs have lost a 
valuable funding stream and, hence, there 
is an element of sour grapes. However, it 
is also true that NGOs, whose passion for 
their work helped inform the very changes 
now being supported in government, get 
lost in the routine of what officials might see 
as “yet another project.” NGOs have handed 
over their “baby,” and look with a very criti-
cal eye at the adoptive government parents. 
Moreover, NGOs witness what they would 
see as Atlantic exercising much less rigor 
in selecting government as a partner than 
they had experienced at the outset in their 
relationship. There will, of course, always 
be criticisms from NGOs that government 
officials do not exercise the same personal 
investment and level of commitment to the 
transferred work. When pressed for alter-
natives, however, NGOs accept — albeit 
reluctantly — that services cannot be sus-
tained outside the remit of the public sector 
and their role must be to ensure fidelity to 
the good-practice models they helped to 
develop. For Atlantic, DSC came along at a 
time when it was looking for a way to part-
ner with government, and its standards of 
due diligence, given the partner, may well 
have been lower than those expected of 
NGOs — a double standard, from the per-
spective of former grantees. 
• External voice. This weakening as an 
external advocate is borne out in the role 
Atlantic plays in the governance of the 
signature programs. While Atlantic clearly 
deserves a seat at the oversight board by 
dint of its significant financial contribution, 
civil servants can be resentful of external 
“meddling” their work. Even those officials 
who accept Atlantic’s presence can reduce 
its role to one of “keeping us honest” — 
ensuring that philanthropic money isn’t 
absorbed into revenue spending in strait-
ened financial times. Hence, having taken 
philanthropic money, some officials resist 
external funders playing anything more 
than a prosaic role. The lesson for Atlantic 
here was to make its presence felt not only 
by virtue of its financial contribution, but 
also in the expertise it brought to the table 
in substantive public-policy areas. The 
wider lesson for foundations may be that 
governments can seek to marginalize their 
influence but take their money — not with 
malign intent, but simply by absorbing it 
into the financial black hole that represents 
the public purse. 
• Risk aversion. It is not surprising that with 
mainstreaming external interventions 
comes the prospect of working with pub-
lic officials and elected politicians who are 
risk averse. Philanthropic money allows for 
experimentation, creativity, permission to 
get it wrong, and learning from these expe-
riences. The public sector does not easily 
embrace this approach; the career trajectory 
of officials and ambitious politicians can be 
tied to the success of policies. Civil servants, 
Philanthropic money allows for 
experimentation, creativity, 
permission to get it wrong, 
and learning from these 
experiences. The public sector 
does not easily embrace this 
approach; the career trajectory 
of officials and ambitious 
politicians can be tied to the 
success of policies. 
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of course, must be guardians of public 
money and their actions can be restricted in 
the knowledge that they may at some point 
be called on to publicly account for how and 
why they took a particular course of action. 
That said, the spirit of “delivering social 
change” offered an opportunity for external 
funders to promote innovation and support 
ways of changing professional practice. In 
public-policy theory, these circumstances 
might be described as “a policy window of 
opportunity in which ‘policy entrepreneurs’ 
(Atlantic Philanthropies) frame issues and 
promote their solutions to policy makers 
or ‘solutions chasing problems’” (Kingdon, 
1984, p. 174). So, notwithstanding a policy 
environment in which risk aversion is the 
norm, there are policy windows that allow 
external funders to influence change with 
policies and programs that are demonstra-
bly effective.
• The role of evidence. Despite the overt 
commitment by the public sector to evi-
dence-informed policymaking, in the cut 
and thrust of everyday life and the fluid 
political environment in which they oper-
ate, officials and politicians can be quite 
short-termist in their need for and use of 
evidence. This is different from the external 
interventions funded by Atlantic that placed 
an emphasis on producing a strong evidence 
base to substantiate the effectiveness of 
the work, including funding randomized 
controlled trials over several years. This 
could well be seen as a luxury that the pub-
lic sector can ill-afford in terms of time and 
resources. External funders, therefore, offer 
a robust evidence base that can be persua-
sive in making the case for policy change, 
and find political advocates who can pro-
mote common interests.
• Sustainability. Clearly an important ele-
ment for philanthropic organizations in 
partnering with government is to sus-
tain the interventions, principles, and 
approaches they have funded. It would 
be relatively easy for government depart-
ments, without intent, to simply absorb 
philanthropic funding and continue with 
the status quo. The question for external 
funders is how best to position themselves 
to ensure the optimum opportunity for 
long-term sustainability. One way could be 
to demonstrate cost savings to hard-pressed 
government departments. The experience 
from the three signature programs has 
varied. In one case, sustainability has been 
pursued through successfully advocating 
for a legal commitment to shared education 
and an education policy that rolls out that 
commitment. In the case of early interven-
tion, sustainability has been promoted by 
changing professional practice and doing 
things differently — and not necessarily 
with additional resources — to make pub-
lic services more effective. With dementia, 
the approach has been to assist government 
in the implementation of its strategy while 
testing models of respite care. The learning 
for external funders is that approaches to 
sustainability can be multifaceted and con-
text specific, but that how to mainstream 
their interventions must always be a key 
element in any funding strategy.
Conclusions
None of these limitations should be read as 
reasons for philanthropy not to partner with 
government. Rather, they are set out as reflec-
tive learning and potential issues to be aware of. 
Indeed, partnering with government offers real 
opportunities to embed models that have been 
developed externally and moved to the main-
stream. There are senior officials in government 
receptive to change, open to the challenge of 
doing things differently, and grateful for exter-
nal funding that affords them the opportunity 
for experimentation and innovation. Some are 
simply weighed down by the bureaucracy in 
which they operate and find it difficult to change 
course. Others seize the opportunity, value the 
evidence base of external funders, and promote 
change internally. 
What is the reflective learning for Atlantic 
Philanthropies from partnering with govern-
ment so far? First, the evolution and nature 
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of the partnership may have been different in 
circumstances where Atlantic had not been a 
spend-down foundation. A broader time frame 
would have been available to forge relationships 
with government officials who were conscious 
that Atlantic was in spend-down mode. This 
could have encouraged officials to be less recep-
tive, adopting an “Atlantic is leaving the stage” 
attitude. Where Atlantic encountered dyed-in-
the-wool officials, conservative in their opinions 
and resistant to the whole idea of external 
intervention, it simply circumvented and went 
directly to politicians. The risk in such a strategy 
is to unintentionally antagonize officials who 
ultimately are there to implement government 
policy. While this approach is undesirable, it 
has sometimes resulted in a complete volte-face 
by officials faced with policies that have been 
put in place by their political masters; a longer 
time frame may have prevented such an out-
come. Second, Atlantic underestimated the pace 
of change in partnering with government and 
overestimated its ability to effect systemwide 
change. This was made more problematic in a 
political context where power-sharing arrange-
ments accentuated ministerial fiefdoms and 
made cross-departmental cooperation prob-
lematic. Third, Atlantic had developed a strong 
evidence base illustrating the success of its pilot 
projects and advocated for direct implementation 
through a partnership with government. Here 
again, Atlantic underestimated the difficulties 
in taking pilots to scale within a complex pub-
lic-sector system. Finally, the degree of negativity 
from NGOs and erstwhile grantees toward the 
foundation’s partnership with government came 
as a surprise and disappointment to Atlantic. It 
had anticipated that, at worst, its actions would 
“do no harm” and, at best, that NGOs would 
be more understanding of the need for main-
streaming. Atlantic was therefore unprepared for 
the feelings of abandonment expressed by some 
grantees, who may well have developed a degree 
of unintentional dependency simply because of 
the funding stream they have enjoyed. But grant-
ees’ passion for their work and a desire to witness 
systemic changes were factors far more profound 
than the loss of Atlantic as a funding source. 
While it is no road map to effecting social change 
in the public sector, this article has highlighted 
where the tensions exist and ways in which 
Atlantic Philanthropies is attempting to address 
them. It is too soon to conclude if the partner-
ship between Atlantic and the government of 
Northern Ireland will lead to embedding exter-
nal interventions into the mainstream of public 
services, but there is now good will on both sides 
to make this happen.
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Introduction
While the benefits of beginning evaluation 
efforts at program inception are well known, 
many organizations simply cannot do so. There 
are a variety of practical reasons for this: fund-
ing concerns, lack of capacity, the need to focus 
energies on program development and imple-
mentation, and changing program goals and 
activities. As a result, many such efforts begin 
closer to a program’s conclusion — they are 
often termed “sunset evaluations.” 
The “sunset” descriptor has been used since 
the 1970s in such phrases as “sunset review” 
and “sunset evaluation” — public-policy terms 
referring to an almost always mandated peri-
odic review of a statute, agency, or program to 
determine whether it should be terminated, con-
tinued, or modified. Here, we reframe the phrase 
“sunset evaluation” to describe a rigorous and 
useful evaluation that is conducted at or near-
ing a program’s conclusion. Characteristics of 
these sunset evaluations are that they are volun-
tary and are intended to provide a road map for 
other foundations by describing program effects, 
accomplishments, and lessons learned.
We previously reported findings from an evalu-
ation conducted at the end of a communitywide 
effort to improve school food sponsored by the 
Orfalea Foundation. This sunset evaluation of 
the foundation’s School Food Initiative (SFI) 
showed positive outcomes from the initiative’s 
activities and provided recommendations for 
organizations interested in engaging in similar 
efforts (Carmichael Djang, Masters, Vanslyke, 
& Beadnell, 2016). Because the evaluation was 
begun as the foundation was spending down 
and exiting initiatives, it required creative 
Key Points
 • While the benefits of beginning evaluation 
efforts at a program’s inception are well 
known, for a variety of reasons many 
organizations are unable to do so and 
instead begin these efforts closer to a 
program’s conclusion.  
 • Previously reported findings from a sunset 
evaluation of the Orfalea Foundation’s 
School Food Initiative showed positive 
outcomes of the initiative’s activities 
and provided recommendations for 
organizations interested in engaging in 
similar efforts. Because the evaluation was 
begun as the foundation’s activities were 
winding down, it required creative design 
approaches. 
 • This article uses the evaluation of the 
Orfalea Foundation’s initiative to provide a 
case example of a rigorous and useful sun-
set evaluation, and discusses other possible 
extensions of these kinds of methods.
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design approaches. This article’s goal is to use 
the foundation’s SFI evaluation as a case exam-
ple showing methods for engaging in this kind 
of sunset evaluation. This example illustrates 
approaches we implemented as well as other 
extensions of the methods used.
Case Example: 
A Foundation’s Perspective
Philanthropists are increasingly choosing to 
donate all of their wealth within their lifetime, 
instead of holding it in perpetuity. As a result, 
foundations are building timelines for spending 
down and exiting support for programs. This 
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was the situation with the Orfalea Foundation, 
which had invested in the SFI over a long-term 
period and when the Obama administration 
elevated school-food reform to a national prior-
ity. Foundation leaders wanted to share initiative 
best practices and lessons learned with other 
donors and foundations upon their exit.
The SFI is a case in which conducting a sunset 
evaluation was a useful, even necessary, solution. 
Over an eight-year period, Orfalea had invested 
$14.3 million in operating its own educational 
programs as well as providing grants to schools, 
school districts, and other nonprofit partners. 
The goal of these efforts was to improve the 
quality of food served in schools in Santa Barbara 
County, California. During this period, the foun-
dation prepared for evaluation by developing a 
logic model and by having both foundation per-
sonnel and grant recipients collect field data. 
However, there was minimal capacity to 
integrate or analyze this data and to prepare 
comprehensive evaluation reports. Thus, the 
foundation used these data primarily to make 
real-time adjustments with a given grant recipi-
ent or to provide updates when reporting to the 
board. For many small to medium-size founda-
tions, using data in this limited way is common. 
While desirable and beneficial, it is far less com-
mon for foundations to integrate evaluation 
findings across grant recipients in order to draw 
evaluative conclusions about a complex, multi-
year program. There are a variety of reasons for 
this: foundations may prioritize directing funds 
to programming rather than to evaluation, or 
their personnel may have limited evaluation 
expertise or face competing leadership and 
organizational priorities. Sunset evaluations, 
fortunately, can provide organizations that have 
engaged in limited data-collection and evaluation 
efforts the opportunity to salvage the data they 
have collected and better understand and evalu-
ate their overall efforts. 
Evaluator Approach in 
Sunset Evaluation
Before presenting the methods we used in our 
case example, it is useful to point out two “soft 
skills” woven through each of the methods. Soft 
skills are typically defined as behaviors associ-
ated with well-functioning relationships with 
other people, such as communication, interper-
sonal and social skills, management practices, 
and leadership. These skills — sometimes under-
stood as emotional intelligence in action — are 
frequently undervalued in professional settings, 
but their use can often differentiate between 
average and outstanding performance (Goleman, 
1998; Wilkins, 2014). The two most salient soft 
skills we identified when reflecting on this case 
example are collaborative spirit and group pro-
cess facilitation.
Collaborative Spirit 
Intensive collaboration between organization 
staff and the evaluators was the most essential of 
the soft skills woven through the SFI evaluation. 
First, we worked to develop effective relation-
ships with foundation staff to foster successful 
brainstorming sessions. These sessions were 
particularly important in efforts to identify previ-
ously collected data that could be mined. Second, 
it allowed the identification and engagement of 
key individuals (such as front-line staff and com-
munity stakeholders) who had knowledge about 
the context and effects of the initiative. This col-
laborative process also fostered the buy-in needed 
to understand the SFI’s evolution and identify the 
effects that had occurred over the previous sev-
eral years. 
Researchers have identified two factors that 
strengthen the collaborative work of foundation 
staff and evaluators (Mattessich, Murray-Close, 
& Monsey, 2001): open and frequent communi-
cation, and mutual respect and understanding. 
Building a collaborative relationship can be as 
simple as a timely and friendly email response or 
as complex as tuning into the nonverbal or emo-
tional nuances of communication (Mintzberg, 
Dougherty, Jorgensen, & Westley, 1996). We 
used these and other approaches to communi-
cation to ensure successful collaboration. One 
way we demonstrated mutual respect was to 
explicitly reiterate the importance of foundation 
personnel input and expertise to this work. We 
also worked hard to foster a willingness on the 
part of all parties to step out of their positions 
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as experts in order to hear and learn from one 
another. Doing so set the norm that all evalu-
ator and staff dialogues were opportunities for 
mutual learning. 
This type of collaboration, however, is more 
than a set of techniques. True collaborative spirit 
involves open and honest dialogue. Engaging in 
this way in a professional context can be chal-
lenging to evaluators and organizational staff 
alike. Yet this type of emotional intelligence 
in action is particularly important in sunset 
evaluations, which require identifying creative 
solutions for compiling and collecting evaluative 
information — often in the context of staff reduc-
tions, increased demands, diminishing resources, 
and differing expectations.
Facilitating Group Processes
Another key soft skill used in this evaluation was 
facilitating group activities and discussions to 
draw out and harness the accumulated knowl-
edge of multiple players. These players were 
not limited to initiative staff, but also included 
participants, community members, and other 
stakeholders. In addition to surveys and individ-
ual interviews, we gathered information from 
various constituencies using facilitated group 
processes. Group work can help guide partici-
pants through a process of assessing their current 
situation, envisioning and setting goals, develop-
ing strategies, and planning action steps. Skilled 
facilitation of group processes can produce pow-
erful results — for example, an evaluation plan 
that has been “created, understood, and accepted 
by all participants” (Wilkinson, 2012, p. 5). 
Skillful facilitation of groups is an especially 
important tool in sunset evaluation. It can max-
imize the quality and validity of the evaluation’s 
findings in two ways. One way it does this is by 
eliciting important information that informs the 
evaluation’s design and interpretation. Another 
way is by providing the benefit of bringing 
together the inevitable differences in viewpoints 
that stakeholders have developed over time. For 
example, we encountered differences in opin-
ion among individuals, all of whom had high 
investment in the initiative, about the primary 
outcomes of interest. Maneuvering these differ-
ences can be particularly challenging without 
both access to a range of facilitation tech-
niques and the ability to use them competently. 
Successful group facilitation by the evaluators or 
foundation personnel can bring varying perspec-
tives together and position the group to work 
toward a common viewpoint.
The facilitation techniques we applied in this 
case were guiding, acting as taskmasters, moti-
vating, and building bridges (Wilkinson, 2012). 
To do this, we began with a documented facilita-
tors’ guide describing how we intended to move 
the group through this process, though we also 
allowed for flexibility. By sharing this facilitation 
guide with the group, we made our plans trans-
parent. This transparency served multiple aims. 
First, knowing that we had a plan increased 
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True collaborative spirit 
involves open and honest 
dialogue. Engaging in this way 
in a professional context can 
be challenging to evaluators 
and organizational staff alike. 
Yet this type of emotional 
intelligence in action is 
particularly important in 
sunset evaluations, which 
require identifying creative 
solutions for compiling 
and collecting evaluative 
information – often in the 
context of staff reductions, 
increased demands, 
diminishing resources, and 
differing expectations.
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participant comfort. Second, an explicit agenda 
framed the tasks and helped keep the work on 
track. Third, seeing progress on these tasks cre-
ated a great source of energy and momentum, 
helping us to motivate those involved. 
Perhaps the most important facilitation tech-
nique we used in this case was bridge building. 
We encountered many different perspectives on 
the initiative’s theory of change and its evolution. 
By creating a safe space to discuss them, we were 
able to illustrate how differences in perspective 
were useful. This enabled us to find and focus on 
areas of agreement, and to carefully and respect-
fully dissect areas of disagreement. We believe 
these facilitated processes helped foster commit-
ment to the evaluation among foundation staff 
and board members. In turn, this commitment 
increased the likelihood that the evaluation 
would meet their learning needs as well as their 
desire to share valuable lessons with others. 
Methods Useful in Sunset Evaluation
The Orfalea SFI evaluation highlights that while 
some methods cannot be used at or near pro-
gram completion, many others are still available. 
Not usable are methods that must be imple-
mented before a program begins, such as wait-list 
and randomized-control group trials. However, 
many other options remain available and appro-
priate. (See Table 1.) Because sunset evaluation 
occurs at the conclusion of a program, these 
options typically involve a process of working 
backwards. Here, we present three approaches 
that we used to design and conduct the SFI eval-
uation: mapping program evolution, leveraging 
existing data, and collecting retrospective assess-
ments of program effects. 
Mapping Program Evolution
Many organizations develop their theories of 
change and logic models at the beginning of 
program implementation. These theories and 
models serve as guides for framing program 
evaluations because they explain how resources 
will be dedicated and what effects upon tar-
geted populations are expected. However, many 
times these frameworks shift during a program’s 
life, whether tacitly or intentionally. In sunset 
evaluations, it therefore becomes important that 
evaluators understand the history of the pro-
gram, including how guiding theories evolved 
over time. 
Key elements in the process of mapping pro-
gram evolution include understanding the initial 
theory of program change, factors that led to 
adjustments, decisions made accordingly, and the 
concluding theory of change. By engaging in this 
process the evaluator could learn, for example, 
that the program shifted its activities specifically 
because program staff found that a given activ-
ity was too cumbersome to implement. This 
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Key elements in the process of 
mapping program evolution 
include understanding the 
initial theory of program 
change, factors that led 
to adjustments, decisions 
made accordingly, and the 
concluding theory of change. 
By engaging in this process 
the evaluator could learn, for 
example, that the program 
shifted its activities specifically 
because program staff found 
that a given activity was too 
cumbersome to implement. 
This information itself is an 
important evaluation finding 
that can help others avoid going 
down problematic paths when 
doing similar kinds of work.
44    The Foundation Review  //  thefoundationreview.org
Tools
TABLE 1  Approaches to Conducting Sunset Evaluations
Approach Map Program Evolution 
Leverage 
Existing Data 
Retrospective Assessment 
of Program Effects
Purpose
Understand program evolution:
• Initial theory of program change
• How and why adjustments 
occurred 
• Concluding theory of change 
• Difference in stakeholder 
perspectives about theory of 
change
• Identify outcomes to 
be measured in any 
new data collection
• Answer evaluation 
questions 
Answer evaluation questions
Potential 
Data 
Sources
• Archived documents (e.g., 
theory of change, logic models, 
grant applications, internal 
communications documents)
• Current and prior website 
content 
• Stakeholder surveys
• Staff, stakeholder interviews
• Facilitated, structured activities 
with stakeholders to map 
understanding of program 
theory of change 
• Facilitated discussions with 
organization leaders about 
maps 
Primary data: 
• Past interview data 
(formal, informal)
• Past survey data
• Program participation 
data
• Participant 
demographics 
Secondary data: 
• Community surveys 
• Government records
• Participant questionnaires 
administered at end of 
program 
• Participant interviews 
conducted at end of 
program
Outcomes
• Identification of drivers of 
change 
• Identification of barriers to, 
facilitators of implementation 
• Creation of agreement about 
evaluation questions to pursue 
• Creation of new 
scales and variables 
to be included in 
additional data 
collections
• Assessment 
of participant 
characteristics
• Evaluation of program 
effectiveness, overall 
and for subgroups 
Evaluation of program 
effectiveness, overall and for 
subgroups
Strength/
Weakness
Strength: Evaluators and 
stakeholders are able to 
understand program theory of 
change and shifts in this theory.
Weakness: Understanding of the 
program is circumscribed by who 
participates and what archived 
data are available.
Strength: Cost- and 
time-effective
Weakness: Limited 
by availability, 
completeness, and 
reliability of data 
Strength: Provides findings 
on participant response to 
program 
Weakness: 
• Subject to inaccurate recall 
• Limited empirical data on 
validity for CSEPP approach
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information itself is an important evaluation 
finding that can help others avoid going down 
problematic paths when doing similar kinds of 
work. Similarly, it is important to understand if 
stakeholders had differing perspectives and if so, 
the degree to which these contributed to refine-
ments in the theory of change. This knowledge 
can be particularly illuminating. For example, 
it may turn out that leadership had perspectives 
on program goals or pathways that differed from 
those of program staff, or that external stakehold-
ers were not aware of a specific program activity. 
There are a variety of approaches in the eval-
uation literature that describe processes using 
images or maps to represent program theory and 
evolution. The two most common are “concept 
mapping” (Kane & Trochim, 2007) and “out-
come mapping” (Earl, Carden, & Smutylo, 2001). 
While each describes a distinct approach, all 
share a focus on using participatory methods to 
bring out diverse perspectives to create insight, 
understanding, and consensus among stakehold-
ers. The goal and challenge for an evaluator in 
using these methods, for a sunset or other eval-
uation, is to facilitate and manage a process that 
helps participants develop a shared vision of a 
program’s goals, evolution, and outcomes.
In the evaluation of the SFI, we used elements of 
these approaches to map the initiative evolution 
by reviewing archived documents and facilitat-
ing discussions with organizational leadership. 
We first reviewed logic models that had been 
created in each year of the initiative. Doing so 
allowed us to identify changes across years. We 
then facilitated structured activities in which 
stakeholders independently mapped what they 
believed the theory of change was at the begin-
ning, middle, and end of the initiative, and then 
compared their thoughts to those of other stake-
holders. Following this activity, we facilitated a 
discussion about the similarities and differences 
in their maps, with brainstorming about the rea-
sons behind the differences as well as the reasons 
changes had occurred. In this way, both evalu-
ators and stakeholders were able to understand 
how the initiative evolved, the drivers behind 
change, and barriers and facilitators to successful 
implementation. Additionally, the activity helped 
clarify and create agreement about the evalua-
tion questions to be pursued. 
While not used in this example, extensions to 
these approaches exist. For instance, evaluators 
can uncover programmatic shifts from other 
types of archived documents, such as mission 
statements and internal program documenta-
tion. Another potential source of archived data is 
previous content from an organization’s website, 
since that is a location where programs often 
publish their goals and intentions. Reviewing 
both current and prior website content can 
uncover changes in goals and the theories under-
lying the change process. Using stakeholder 
surveys is another option for gathering input on 
past and current program goals as well as shifts 
in focus that occurred. 
Leveraging Existing Data 
Most programs accumulate data throughout the 
course of implementing their program, whether 
or not it is documented. However, program staff 
may not realize the value of these types of data 
Most programs accumulate 
data throughout the course 
of implementing their 
program, whether or not it is 
documented. However, program 
staff may not realize the value 
of these types of data for use in 
program evaluation. While it is 
not unusual to harvest program 
data for evaluation purposes, 
this practice is especially useful 
in sunset evaluations, with the 
particular advantage of being 
cost-effective. 
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for use in program evaluation. While it is not 
unusual to harvest program data for evaluation 
purposes, this practice is especially useful in 
sunset evaluations, with the particular advan-
tage of being cost-effective (Bamberger, Rugh, 
Church, & Fort, 2004). Such data could be as 
simple as the institutional knowledge among 
program personnel that evaluators formally col-
lect through interviews. Alternatively, it could 
be data that the program team collected for 
reasons other than evaluation, such as program 
participation rates or attendance. Weitzman and 
Silver (2013) argue for the use of existing data in 
program-evaluation activities, and point out that 
while they may not always have all the informa-
tion desired, they often have information that is 
useful or closely linked.
The case of Orfalea’s SFI evaluation provides an 
example of the value, as well as potential pitfalls, 
of mining existing data. One evaluation question 
was whether schools that more fully participated 
in the initiative had greater improvements in the 
intended outcomes. To explore this question, 
we were able to elicit from the initiative direc-
tor her existing knowledge about how engaged 
each school was in the SFI. Based on this infor-
mation, we created a scale that measured the 
level of engagement of each school. We used this 
scale to perform a subgroup analysis in which we 
compared less- to more-engaged schools. Indeed, 
we found that more-engaged schools perceived 
a greater need for the initiative services and had 
greater improvements in outcomes. While cre-
ating this measure of engagement was valuable, 
it points out a potential danger to keep in mind 
— specifically, that creating measures from staff 
recollections carries the danger that the knowl-
edge of outcomes may, without them being 
aware of it, color their assessments. Evaluators 
must consider — and take steps to eliminate 
— such threats to the validity of measures devel-
oped in this way.
Many sources of existing data can support a sun-
set evaluation, and some can even allow for the 
use of a number of traditional evaluation designs 
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). For exam-
ple, data may be available that allow for pre- to 
post-program tests of participant improvement. 
Additionally, data may exist on people who have 
not received a program (or who have received 
different services) who can serve as a comparison 
group. An additional, great example of exist-
ing data is when a program team has collected 
demographic information about participants 
during the course of its program purely to help 
with recruitment efforts. Evaluators could use 
that information to conduct subgroup analyses 
to identify whether a program works better for 
some people than for others, thereby giving find-
ings more precision, richness, and nuance. 
Typically, other sources of data also exist. For 
example, it is useful to keep in mind the value 
of institutional knowledge as a type of exist-
ing data. Evaluators can learn about this using 
thoughtful and reflective interviewing tech-
niques, and this information can inform the 
evaluation design, process, and interpretation. 
Additionally, when evaluating programs that 
intend to make community-level changes, 
secondary data sources and records (such as 
community surveys or government records) 
may provide valuable outcome data. Examples 
include using arrest data to examine how a 
program influences violence, emergency room 
data to explore how a program influences access 
to health care, or population surveys to track 
behavioral changes. 
Retrospective Assessments 
of Program Effects
In testing whether a program led to the desired 
changes, evaluators at program sunset can be 
limited in two ways. First, they may not have 
baseline data available to calculate whether 
change occurred. In such cases, evaluators 
sometimes collect participant perspectives 
using retrospective questionnaires. Such ques-
tionnaires ask participants to rate the direction 
and amount of change that occurred as a result 
of the program. This approach provides some 
information about possible program effects, but 
does not solve the second limitation, the lack 
of a comparison (also known as counterfactual) 
condition. Specifically, evaluators may not have 
access to individuals or groups who did not 
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receive the program and who could serve as a 
comparison group. 
A recent innovation in retrospective data col-
lection has shown promise in this regard. This 
technique is called “counterfactual as self-es-
timated by program participants” (CSEPP). 
With this method, evaluators ask participants 
to answer outcome questions in two ways: an 
assessment of themselves currently and how they 
would be had they not received the program. 
Evaluators then compare the two answers. In 
effect, participants serve as their own compari-
son, providing both program and counterfactual 
data. Research comparing this method to tradi-
tional random-controlled designs indicates that it 
is a valid way of assessing changes in intentions 
and attitudes, though further research is need 
to validate it as a method to assess changes in 
behavior (Mueller & Gaus, 2015). 
In the Orfalea SFI evaluation, we used this 
method to collect data from cafeteria staff rep-
resenting how things actually were after the 
evaluation and a counterfactual comparison 
— how they would have been without the ini-
tiative. The technique provided very useful 
information supporting the effectiveness of the 
initiative’s efforts. For example, the data showed 
improvements attributable to the initiative in 
personnel’s professionalism and skills, kitchen 
equipment, technical assistance, and quality of 
the food served.
Variations on this approach are also available. 
While the CSEPP approach emulates a compar-
ison group evaluation design, a slightly different 
question wording gathers data more like a tradi-
tional pretest-posttest design. This retrospective 
approach asks participants to answer based on 
how things are at the posttest and also to think 
back and describe how things were for them 
before the program (Pratt, McGuigan, & Katzev, 
2000). Evaluators have used this method over a 
much longer period compared to CSEPP, and a 
larger amount of research on it exists. Studies 
have found retrospectively-collected, compared 
to pretest-collected, information to correlate 
more strongly with objective measures (Bray, 
Maxwell, & Howard, 1984; Howard, et al., 1979). 
Moore and Tananis (2009) point out one issue the 
retrospective method is meant to address, which 
is that respondents may not correctly understand 
and interpret questions before an intervention. 
For example, participants may overestimate 
their knowledge on a topic before receiving 
information about it in a program. Hence, their 
self-assessment of knowledge would be inaccu-
rately high if asked before the program. After 
reviewing the literature on retrospective data 
collection, these authors concluded that there 
is substantial evidence supporting this concern, 
with the end result being a less accurate estima-
tion of program effects using pre- and posttesting 
compared to retrospective measures. 
An example of our use of this traditional 
retrospective approach occurred in a differ-
ent evaluation project. There, we assessed 
the effectiveness of training we provided to 
human-service agency staff on evaluation 
techniques. To do so, our post-training ques-
tionnaires asked them to think back and 
estimate their skill level before the training. 
This approach allowed us to compare actual 
post-training knowledge to their estimates of 
pre-training knowledge. 
These methods can be quite useful in sunset 
evaluation, although they have a number of 
important caveats. As with any self-report data, 
respondents’ answers are subject to potential 
sources of error such as presenting oneself in a 
positive light, imagining they should illustrate 
an intervention was effective, or misunderstand-
ing survey questions. While both the CSEPP 
and retrospective approaches are often the only 
choice for collecting participant data on ini-
tiative effects, continued research is needed to 
further identify the conditions that maximize 
the accuracy of information collected using 
these methods.  
Recommendations for Foundations 
Contemplating Sunset Evaluation
For a foundation, there is significant value in 
investing in a sunset evaluation at the end of 
a program or initiative. Doing so can address 
common goals of foundation leadership. For 
48    The Foundation Review  //  thefoundationreview.org
Tools
example, sunset evaluation can capture and 
describe the impact of a long-term investment, 
which helps build a legacy of giving for the 
foundation and a culture of philanthropy in the 
communities that they serve. More importantly, 
providing opportunities for foundations to learn 
from one other can help the philanthropic sector 
better understand and invest in critical com-
munity needs. Sunset evaluation can also help 
build a unified vision of multiyear or complex 
efforts among foundation leadership. Engaging 
various levels of leadership and program staff 
in the evaluation process — for example, map-
ping the evolution of an initiative — can unite 
leadership around a common vision of initiative 
success. Sunset evaluation can also contribute 
to grant recipients’ and other partners’ learning. 
For example, engaging in the evaluation process 
provides an opportunity for such stakeholders to 
reflect on their contributions and success (or fail-
ure), and this can help improve organizational 
effectiveness and future partnering with founda-
tions or donors. 
To increase the likelihood of a sunset evalua-
tion’s success, foundation leadership and board 
members have several important tasks. First, 
they should engage in a facilitated conversation 
to establish how highly they prioritize eval-
uation. Once the decision has been made to 
dedicate resources to sharing foundation learn-
ings through an evaluation, it is paramount to 
ensure the level of investment aligns with the 
prioritization and will adequately support the 
work. Once this has been achieved, foundation 
staff must vet and select an evaluator or evalua-
tion firm to guide the work. Important evaluator 
characteristics to take into consideration include 
the creative design approaches and soft skills 
discussed above that are necessary for a success-
ful sunset evaluation. There are other important 
considerations as well. Does the evaluator 
align with your organizational values? Do they 
understand the level of resources that you have 
available and the implications for the scope of 
work? Do they communicate with you in a way 
that helps you understand expectations and feel 
comfortable asking questions? Lastly, depending 
on the intended audiences and uses for the eval-
uation findings, the experience, credentials, and 
reputation of the evaluation consultant or firm 
may be important to the perceived credibility of 
the evaluation. 
Conclusions
The evaluation of the Orfalea Foundation’s SFI 
is an example of how rigorous evaluation can 
occur late in the life of a program, even in its 
final stages. Specialized techniques such as ret-
rospective assessments of program effects play 
an important role in these types of sunset evalu-
ations. Soft skills like facilitation are equally key, 
and their importance should not be undervalued. 
Together these approaches can produce rigor-
ous, useful evaluations while working within the 
timing of programs drawing to a close. This is 
good news given that evaluation is an important 
element in organizations’ missions to address 
challenging social problems, and that the real-
ity of many programs does not position them to 
begin their evaluation efforts early. 
Sunset evaluation can also 
contribute to grant recipients’ 
and other partners’ learning. 
For example, engaging in the 
evaluation process provides 
an opportunity for such 
stakeholders to reflect on their 
contributions and success 
(or failure), and this can 
help improve organizational 
effectiveness and future 
partnering with foundations 
or donors. 
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Introduction
Funding relationships begin, and they end. All 
foundations periodically revisit program prior-
ities and strategies. Course corrections can and 
often do include exits. Some exits occur at the 
planned end of a time-limited initiative. Others 
may be occasioned by new insights that come 
from research or evaluation. Still others are the 
result of new leaders bringing different priorities 
to the fore. 
Yet little is known about the effects of foundation 
exits on the work, the grantees, and the related 
fields. Given the frequency and ubiquity of foun-
dation exits, the literature is painfully thin.
Grantcraft’s monograph The Effective Exit: 
Managing the End of a Funding Relationship 
(Mackinnon & Jaffe, 2007) was published a 
decade ago and focuses primarily on the grant-
or-grantee relationship. It describes funder exits 
as normal. The authors admonish foundations to 
communicate clearly, build grantee capacity, and 
help grantees find replacement funding. 
In 2011, Exiting Responsibly, a rigorous, cross-cut-
ting study funded by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, looked at the broad context for 
funder exits and discussed the approaches and 
implications of ending field-level support. The 
authors argued that planning for and carefully 
executing the end of a funding relationship 
can help maximize the results of past invest-
ments and solidify progress even as the funder 
Key Points
 • What do funders leave behind when they 
exit? What is lost? Are there approaches to 
exits that are more effective at preserving 
the results of good work? Through 
interviews with 19 professionals who 
have experienced or are currently working 
through a foundation exit, this article draws 
on stories of more than a dozen such exits 
to fill the gaps in what is known about how 
to exit well.
 • This article discusses four areas where 
foundation exits present particular 
challenges and where there are significant 
opportunities to improve practice – deciding 
on and planning to exit, funder leadership, 
clear communication, and final grants – and 
includes summaries of advice from funder 
and grantee perspectives.
 • This article aims to offer practical insights 
that may help improve what is all too often 
an uncomfortable, confusing, and potentially 
damaging process, and, it is hoped, will 
spur continued research and contribute to a 
sustained dialogue about how to preserve, 
or even extend, value in the context of a 
foundation exit.
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exits. “Responsible and respectful field exits 
require careful and deliberate procedures,” 
they observed; however, they continued: “It is 
quite usual for foundations to exit fields, and 
disconcertingly common for them to do so with 
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do
Barbara Kibbe, J.D., S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation
Keywords: Foundation exits; funder-grantee relationships; communication; impact of foundation exits; capacity-
building; final grants
You tell me that you’re leavin’; I can’t believe it’s true. ... 
Think of all that we’ve been through. (Sedaka & Greenfield, 1962) 
                                                                                                                    ¯ Neil Sedaka
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little advance notice and unclear rationales” 
(Petrovich, 2011, p. 4).
Six years and many foundation exits later, there 
is still too little known about how to exit well 
or what the results of foundation exits might 
be — even while recent research and a number 
of recent, high-profile examples of limited-life 
foundations are generating increased interest in 
foundation exits and spend-downs (see, e.g., Loh 
& Buteau, 2017). This article is intended to make 
a modest contribution toward filling that gap. 
Study Design and Approach
What do funders leave behind when they exit? 
What is lost? Are there approaches to exits that 
are more (or less) effective at preserving or 
extending the results of good work? At ensuring 
that grantees and fields thrive? Or even that the 
work continues when there is a persistent need? 
These and other questions were explored in 
the research to inform this article. In all, the 
research draws from stories of more than a 
dozen exits, some from multiple perspectives 
(e.g., funder and grantee, or funder and interme-
diary or consultant). This article focuses on the 
experience of and with perpetual foundations in 
connection with an exit from one or more major 
initiatives or lines of work. 
In addition to a literature review, interviews 
were conducted with 19 professionals represent-
ing a range of foundations, nonprofit grantees, 
intermediaries, and consultants. Each person 
interviewed has experienced or is currently work-
ing through a foundation exit. Interviews were 
conducted using structured protocols. Interview 
subjects were asked to explain the initial goals 
or theory of change for the program or initiative 
that ended or was winding down, the planning 
process for the exit, and the structure of the final 
grants. They were also asked to reflect on chal-
lenges confronted and the ramifications of exiting 
on the work and its field. Funders were asked to 
offer advice to other funders and to speak to any 
evaluation plans. Grantees were asked to offer 
advice to other nonprofit organizations that are 
facing the withdrawal of a major funder. At the 
conclusion of each interview, subjects were asked 
for recommendations of others knowledgeable 
about foundation exits and, in this way, additional 
interview subjects were identified. 
All interviewees were promised confidentiality. 
As a group, they responded with great candor 
and willingness to be self-critical in the interest 
of helping others identify pitfalls in the process. 
Many characterized the topic as understudied 
and underdiscussed. The content covered in this 
article ranges from cautionary tales of precipi-
tous changes in direction with clear damage to 
grantees and fields to stories of considered and 
deliberate exits where great care was taken, 
resources committed, and success achieved. In 
all cases studied for this report, the exits were, in 
a word, complicated.
This article aims to offer practical insights that 
may help improve what is all too often an uncom-
fortable, confusing, and potentially damaging 
process. It is also hoped that this article will spur 
continued research and contribute to a sustained 
dialogue about how to preserve — or even extend 
— value in the context of a foundation exit.
Although the interviews were wide-ranging, this 
article discusses four areas where foundation exits 
present particular challenges and where there are 
significant opportunities to improve practice: (1) 
deciding and planning to exit, (2) implications of 
funder leadership; (3) the confusion of communi-
cations; and (4) final grants. Summaries of advice 
— from funders to funders and from grantees to 
grantees — are also included.
Deciding and Planning to Exit: 
“Should I Stay or Should I Go?”
The reasons for a funder exit vary. Adjustments 
to funding priorities can come from a new 
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do
If I go, there will be trouble. 
And if I stay it will be double. 
 (Headon, Jones, Simonon, & Strummer, 1982)                         
                                    ¯ The Clash
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strategic direction — often brought about by a 
change in foundation executive leadership or the 
expressed desires of the founder or board. Exits 
can also be the byproduct of a desire to seize a 
window of opportunity — for example, when 
new data or shifts in context illuminate a prom-
ising path. In some cases, midcourse evaluation 
findings may suggest a redirection of resources. 
In others, a time-limited initiative comes to its 
planned conclusion. In short, a foundation that 
exits a grantee relationship, initiative, or issue 
area may be responding to internal shifts, chang-
ing external circumstances, or both.
In the situations examined for this study, one 
interviewee oversaw a patient and careful plan-
ning process that led to a responsible exit from 
approximately 75 long-standing grantee relation-
ships. Another, very different case, was described 
by a funder who was troubled by the fact that 
nearly all the grantees in the portfolio had been 
created by the foundation and were seriously and 
unhealthily dependent on the foundation at the 
time of the exit.
Some exits examined were expected from the 
outset, as with time-limited initiatives. Funders 
and grantees generally found these situations 
easier to navigate, although not routine and 
far from simple. In other situations, where 
the expectation was for long-term or ongoing 
support — or where the extent of the funder’s 
commitment was not clear — the exit was chal-
lenging for all sides. 
Not surprisingly, nearly every interviewee 
strongly recommended that foundations plan 
for exit upon entry into a new relationship, issue 
area, or initiative. However, this advice was 
offered with the benefit of hindsight, and heeding 
it may not always — or even often — be feasible; 
virtually none of the funders in this study did so 
themselves. Still, some exits were more inten-
tional than others and, in all instances, there is 
room for improvement and there are big lessons 
to be learned. 
In one notable case, a recently appointed foun-
dation CEO was eager to divert funding to a 
suite of new initiatives but was persuaded by a 
midcourse evaluation that, although some adjust-
ments could and should be made, an abrupt exit 
would undo a great deal of progress:
We had a succession of leadership changes. By 
the end of Phase 1 [of the initiative] there was a 
new president and senior leaders who wanted to 
embrace new opportunities, and there was a desire 
to wind down some existing work to make room 
for the new. There was a proposal to end the ini-
tiative after five years, but an external evaluation 
recommended that we stay the course. We went 
into Phase 2 and readjusted to include more of a 
focus on systemic change. We pared down so that 
we could go deeper with what was working and 
emphasized building institutional capabilities to 
carry on the work.
In this example, although some grantees may 
have lost funding, the work was protected 
and continued via a thoughtful approach that 
included regular dialogue with grantees.
In another situation, which also involved a new 
CEO, external consultants led the foundation 
through an extensive process to reassess its 
grantmaking. This resulted in a fundamentally 
new set of decisions about future focus that 
necessitated foundation staffing changes as well 
as exits from initiatives and whole lines of work. 
Grantees and other field leaders were involved in 
the planning process. The foundation responded 
to grantee feedback with a five-year ramp-down 
plan and significant funding to see the grant-
ees and the work through the transition. In the 
words of the CEO, “Our attempt to begin mak-
ing amends was by collectively planning for the 
field to step into the leadership role and for the 
foundation to move out of the center of things.”
A third example relates to a significant shift 
at a large foundation interested in deepening 
outcomes. It chose to reduce the number of 
grantees in its portfolio, offering larger, longer 
support to fewer organizations over time. That 
foundation is gradually exiting many long-term 
grantee relationships with a commitment to 
transition funding:
[We] did set up a transition fund. … Every unit had 
to cut back by 25 percent. That 25 percent went 
Kibbe
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into a transition fund, and there was a process by 
which you could apply internally for either a grant 
or a set of grants for organizations that you knew 
you would be giving [final grants] to. … That has 
budgetary implications for us. … On the other 
hand, it is a respectful way to treat grantees.
In all three of these cases, foundation leaders put 
significant additional resources on the table to 
help them and their grantees navigate the exit. 
They operated in a consultative manner, seek-
ing the input of grantees and other field leaders 
as they planned their exits. And they supported 
grantees to pivot, formulate new strategies, and 
build new capabilities.
Another case offers a stark contrast; staff had no 
advance notice of the board’s decision to exit a 
field-building line of work, leaving them in the 
unenviable position of needing to notify grantees 
immediately of the shift and of the fact that no 
additional funding would be forthcoming:
A combination of a constrained program budget, 
staff restructuring, and shifting priorities precip-
itated the decision to exit. We received the news 
that we were going to exit about three weeks 
before we saw all of the grantees at a conference.
Although this example is far from isolated, 
previous examples demonstrate that there are 
funders that do take a proactive stance regarding 
future exits. They are aware of the complexities 
of exits and realize that funders simply do not 
control all the variables. They know that context 
matters. According to these funders, there is no 
single or reliably right way to conclude a grant 
relationship or initiative. But there is a way (and, 
arguably, a mandate) to be thoughtful and con-
structive. One interviewee said:
When a decision has been made to exit, it requires 
careful planning and you need to think about how 
you structure the end of that grant relationship. It 
could be a grant, capacity-building grant, a flexible 
final grant, or you can set it up so that they [grant-
ees] can leverage support from other funders. This 
is all context-specific. There is no formula for this 
other than a standard for what seems fair or reason-
able. If you funded a two-year project, sometimes 
four months into that second year can be enough 
of a heads-up for ending support. It is different for a 
long-term, highly funded relationship. You need to 
think in budget terms, in the context of providing 
a fair and reasonable warning. Always, when you 
think about this, ask yourself: How will ending 
funding to this organization affect the field? How 
will it impact the individual organization? Will it 
mean layoffs? How will it affect [the foundation’s] 
reputation and credibility? That is basically the 
framework that we have laid out.
Implications of Funder Leadership: 
“How You Ever Gonna Know?” 
In this, the heyday of strategic philanthropy,1 the 
time-limited initiative is very popular. Funders 
are going beyond (and, at times, far beyond) 
responding to worthy requests for support. It is 
now generally accepted that foundations can and 
should lead efforts at social change — funding 
and convening networks, supporting learning 
communities, and engaging in proactive advo-
cacy related to the goals and specific timelines 
they themselves establish. There is a healthy 
debate in the field about the practice and the 
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do
How you ever gonna know if 
you never take a chance?  
You know failure isn’t failure if 
a lesson from it’s learned. 
(Brooks & Blazy, 1997) 
                                        ¯ Garth Brooks
1Paul Brest and Hal Harvey (2008) defined strategic philanthropy as consisting of “clearly defined goals, commensurate with 
resources; strategies for achieving the goals; strategies that are based on sound evidence; and feedback to keep the strategy on 
course.” At that time, they wrote, “Strategic philanthropy deploys resources to have maximum impact — to make the biggest 
possible difference. This approach is captured by the idea of social return on investment, where ‘return’ refers to improving 
the world rather than financial gain” (p. 17).  In 2009, the Center for Effective Philanthropy articulated a definition of strategy 
for foundations: “a framework for decision-making that is (1) focused on the external context in which the foundation works, 
and (2) includes a hypothesized causal connection between use of foundation resources and goal achievement” (Buteau, 
Buchanan, & Brock, 2009, p.3). 
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value of strategic philanthropy, with smart, 
thoughtful leaders on both sides of the argument 
(Buchanan & Patrizi, 2016).
More than half of the cases studied for this article 
offered examples of funders taking center stage 
in an initiative or issue area. In all of these cases, 
funders were engaged in field building: They 
were pioneers in bringing focus to an issue, along 
with significant resources. They created new 
knowledge and new infrastructure. Along the 
way, organizations were created or scaled that 
were dependent on their foundation partner, its 
leadership, and its reputation.
Regardless of the reasons, when a major funder 
decides to shift priorities away from field-build-
ing work, exiting without harming the field or 
the organizations operating in that field is par-
ticularly difficult. As one funder noted, “Our 
central presence in the field actually made 
attracting other funders more difficult because 
we were seen as being so involved.” In the words 
of the foundation CEO who championed such a 
change in direction and approach:
We did a lot of stuff that was heavy handed from a 
funder perspective. ... It was successful, but I don’t 
think we would want to do it again. We experi-
enced lots of staff turnover and lots of grantee 
frustration.
The lack of collaboration with others in the 
field was viewed as a handicap, according to a 
grantee formerly funded in connection with this 
work. Also, according to grantees interviewed, 
the foundation’s central role in the direction of 
the field preempted the opportunity for organi-
zations to learn how to work together without 
mandated collaboration. In the words of one 
grantee, “It remains to be seen whether we are 
all able to learn to play together without the 
funder forcing that.” 
Across the range of cases studied, funders, grant-
ees, and intermediaries discussed the challenges 
associated with an exit where the funder was in 
the lead. When asked what they would do dif-
ferently if given the chance, many echoed this 
funder’s statement: “Initial conversations should 
have included more dialogue about distributed 
leadership and about how to replace the foun-
dation’s funding. If I had it to do over again, I 
would look at a more open leadership model.”
Leaders in philanthropy talk and write about the 
role of funders in providing more than money. 
In general, the funder is lauded when it invests in 
capacity building; funds evaluation, knowledge 
building, and infrastructure for fields; and is 
unafraid to be visible and vocal in service of a big 
goal. But it is precisely when there is more than 
money at stake that an imminent exit is most 
likely to cripple grantees or stall fields.
What, then, is the path forward for a funding 
initiative that has field building at its core? What 
can or should a funder do where there is a com-
pelling need, an alignment of donor intent, and 
a will on the part of foundation board and lead-
ership to address that need? If there is no mature 
ecosystem of grantees and funders, the work will 
be inherently risky.
The first step is to acknowledge that risk.
When interviewed, exiting funders that pursued 
a central role were reflective and self-critical. 
Most saw significant downsides to their promi-
nent and visible place in the work and the field, 
and would take a different approach in the 
future. In the words of three different funders:
I have especially strong feelings about the situa-
tion where a funder is the last donor — a situation 
where it is clear that there is not a critical mass of 
ingredients that will take the grantee anywhere 
good, especially where we helped the organization 
get started and develop. We have a long, poor track 
record of staying in there when we shouldn’t have. 
Donors should not try to substitute themselves in 
terms of agency and leadership.
What became pretty clear was that the grantees 
really relied on [foundation] staff and energy to 
come together. ... They were not staffed in a way 
that really had anyone to coordinate group con-
venings. We offered them a consultant to help 
organize convenings. After that, they really had 
to tear down group expectations of what they 
were going to be able to do. In hindsight, it seems 
Kibbe
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obvious. Whether it was wishful thinking that this 
would be able to continue merrily without us or a 
real misassessment of their capacity, in hindsight it 
seems so obvious.
I’m much more attuned to how well the initiative 
aligns with the core business of the organization 
that we are funding. If they’re really taking on 
new work because [the funder] is kind of focused 
on an area, that requires a lot of careful thought. 
Whereas, if it is much more embedded in their core 
mission, I am less worried because after five years, 
if you need to tie off support, you haven’t affected 
the DNA of the organization as much.
The most thoughtful funders interviewed con-
fronted their exits with a desire to leave grantees 
strong. Some put significant resources into final 
grants, capacity-building efforts, and consulting 
for themselves and their grantees. Some did an 
admirable job of mitigating risk, and others offer 
advice born of lessons learned the hard way. What 
emerged in the course of the interviews was a 
sense that the more central the funder’s role, the 
more challenging the exit and — arguably — the 
more responsibility the funder should shoulder.
The Confusion of Communications: 
“Hello, Goodbye”
The common wisdom on communicating about 
an exit is easy to recite: (1) communicate early 
and often, and (2) deliver consistent messages. 
The reasons often cited are: (a) the grantee 
should have as much time as possible to prepare 
for the loss in funding, and (b) any change or 
inconsistency in messaging will signal to the 
hopeful grantee that there may in fact be an 
opening for future funding.
Literally all of the funders, grantees, and inter-
mediaries interviewed for this report would 
quickly agree that early, clear, and consistent 
communication about an impending foundation 
exit is a worthy goal.2 At the same time, inter-
viewees all shared stories about how hard it is to 
follow this seemingly straightforward advice. 
Over the course of the research, it became more 
and more clear that communicating effectively 
about a foundation exit requires more than one-
way messaging. In case after case, we heard 
that without sustained and genuine dialogue, 
momentum can be lost, organizations dam-
aged, and fields diminished in their influence. 
In one case, there was a serious gap between 
foundation board and staff about the time frame 
of support for an initiative. Staff believed that 
the initiative would span a decade; the board 
declined to renew support after five years. This 
was a failure of communication within the foun-
dation that had significant ripple effects. The 
fundamental disconnect resulted in confusing 
and contradictory communications; reasonable 
expectations in the field were unmet, leaving 
many disappointed:
It was a five-year commitment from the board. I 
don’t know how else to describe it, but there was 
a 10-year commitment from the staff. I think the 
idea was that the board would launch it and then it 
would get incorporated into the regular program-
ming. Depending on whom you talked to it was a 
five-year or a 10-year initiative. ... If you are inside 
a foundation, you understand what it means for a 
board to back something for five years and then, 
after that, it depends on the program priorities. 
From the outside looking in, it looks as though that 
program has a 10-year lifespan. The true length of 
time was unclear internally. It was also a lack of 
clarity in the messaging; the messaging was not 
good — internally and with the grantees. 
I say high, you say low. You 
say why, and I say I don’t 
know. You say goodbye, and I 
say hello. (McCartney & Lennon, 1967) 
                                            ¯ The Beatles
2As stated in the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s A Practical Guide to Outcome-Focused Philanthropy, “It is 
imperative when the foundation exits a strategy or initiative to do so thoughtfully, openly, and respectfully. This includes 
careful planning, beginning as soon as exit is on the table. Still more important, it includes communicating clearly to 
grantees, funding partners, internal colleagues, and the larger field why, when, and how we are leaving” (Twersky & Grange, 
2016, p. 85).
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The foundation executive interviewed in con-
nection with this exit reported that out of 10 
grantees supported through the initiative, only 
two have been able to continue the work as 
envisioned.
A second funder described a similar challenge 
with internal alignment: 
One problem with exits is the foundation’s own 
ambivalence, which makes the whole process more 
complicated. We were challenged by our own 
inability to be clear about the foundation’s objec-
tives on exit. For example, I asked many folks about 
our goal in accomplishing the exit — is it to attract 
other funding to fill in behind us? Or is our goal 
to wrap up our work without encouraging others 
to give because we are ready to move beyond the 
work of that initiative? Planning the exit was hard 
until we settled on our goals.
Clearly, when a foundation staff, executive lead-
ership, and board are not aligned about the depth 
and breadth of a commitment, it is impossible to 
communicate clearly about the why and how of a 
funder exit and/or to set realistic expectations for 
a field. In the words of one foundation staff per-
son who was surprised by the board’s decision to 
suddenly defund an initiative:
This was a five-year initiative that provided 
operating support and supplemented with capaci-
ty-building consulting support. Grants were very 
time intensive. The parameters of the support were 
not established in advance, and different people 
heard different things about the foundation’s com-
mitment. ... I did not have much time [to carefully 
research and plan for the exit]. I didn’t have the 
luxury of a thought partner or resources to plan for 
this exit. Our planning was a bit off-the-cuff, espe-
cially in communicating the news to the grantees. 
Another funder described a situation where very 
little information was shared with grantees until 
the final stages of the exit, which left grantees at 
a disadvantage in preparing for the shift: 
I don’t know how clear we were. ... At the time, 
we probably weren’t being very vocal. There was 
the possibility that more funding could come in, 
too. ... I think there were certain grantees who 
knew, possibly.
An aspect of much-needed and valued dialogue 
relates to grantees communicating with each 
other across a portfolio in preparation for the 
funder’s exit. In more than one case, funders 
expressed some surprise “that grantees weren’t 
talking to each other, which suggests that there’s 
a place for communication among grantees that 
a funder can promote, but will ultimately need 
to leave to the field after the exit is completed.” 
Another highlighted concern about the quality 
of ongoing communication among grantees once 
the funder was no longer the catalyst:
We were able to foster grantee communication 
through affectionately blunt ways. That kind of 
thing goes away once you step out. It’s not just the 
money. They lose the entity with the 10,000-foot-
level view. That kind of loss wasn’t anticipated. 
Notably, for their part, grantees would rather be 
in the conversation early, even if all the decisions 
are not yet clear. One grantee put it this way:
Give grantees a heads-up early on that [the foun-
dation is] going through the process and [isn’t] yet 
sure where it’s going to land, or inform them that 
[the foundation is] sure it’s going to land in a par-
ticular place. The more transparency a funder can 
offer its grantees, the greater the potential of suc-
cess for the grantee going forward.
While many lessons emerged from the pitfalls of 
inadequate communication surrounding exits, 
there were notable examples where funders 
engaged grantees and others in planning and 
implementing the exit. The process was still 
challenging, but much more satisfying for all. 
One grantee put it this way:
First, they were very clear from early on about the 
time limitation of the investment. As soon as they 
were sure of their exit date, they told us. We had 
several years of very clear communication from 
the foundation about what was going to happen 
and when. 
One funder began the exit planning with grant-
ees and developed a plan that took into account 
recommendations from the field. This foun-
dation showed itself to be learning, open to 
feedback, and flexible in terms of next steps with 
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the active intent to protect programmatic gains 
and ensure that grantees remained strong:
We started planning to exit the work in earnest in 
2012. We had a grantee gathering and committed 
to four more years. We started then communicat-
ing with grantees to get clarity about the goal line 
and what we could accomplish together in the time 
remaining. This process was important for all of 
us. We started the convening with a panel discus-
sion with our own team facing the grantees and 
invited the grantees to ask anything they wanted. 
It was very important for grantees to understand 
what we were wrestling with. The issues were very 
much the same as issues grantees were troubled 
with. There was something about the willingness 
to engage in this discussion that helped. Even if the 
grantees weren’t happy, they could better under-
stand the foundation’s perspective. The convening 
was also important because it meant that key play-
ers were together to discuss opportunities. We 
asked grantees what we should stay with, where 
to double down, and where and when to cut loose. 
We considered their input in designing the last four 
years of grantmaking, and what the foundation 
did was pretty consistent with what the grantees 
recommended.
A place-based funder reported on a process of 
reaching out to colleagues in the funding com-
munity to discuss their exit from a neighborhood 
initiative. They engaged other funders who had 
a stake in that community in formulating their 
exit strategy, and they were willing to exit slowly 
even though it meant they would expend more 
than the 5 percent minimum payout for a num-
ber of years.
One foundation CEO noted that frequent per-
sonal contact with grantees throughout the exit 
can pay significant dividends. His experience 
illustrates the merits of empathy in grantmaking, 
and the notion that exits can and should be 
hands-on rather than passive:
A little bit of my time goes incredibly far — just 
showing up and putting a face on the change, 
talking to people about it. It seems silly, but it really 
does make a difference. At the end of the day, it is 
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still hard. But it makes change more humane and 
easier — just showing up and relating to them, rec-
ognizing their feelings are real.
From the point of view of the grantees, the most 
careful, thoughtful, and respectful exits had 
empathy and patience at their core, which in 
turn led to the open dialogue that can position a 
grantee or a whole field for success in the wake of 
an exit. In the words of a foundation CEO inter-
viewed for this study:
Exits take a long time to do respectfully and well. 
You have to be simultaneously working the inter-
nal culture of the foundation and working the 
transition externally. Think about the individuals 
that are affected. It’s not just strategy. People’s lives 
are changed because of your actions. Don’t under-
invest in respecting that piece of it. 
Hard-won wisdom leads to the conclusion that it 
is not one-way or even two-way communication 
that secures results and leads to resilience for 
grantees following a funder exit. Rather, it is all-
way communication anchored in deep listening 
on the part of the funder whose exit is imminent. 
At its best, communicating during a funder exit 
involves ongoing dialogue among foundation 
staff and leadership, grantees, and colleagues in 
the funding community who may be looked to 
for future funding.
Final Grants: “The Last Waltz”
In nearly all the cases studied for this report, 
final grants were made after the decision to exit. 
The goals for these investments were varied. In 
some cases, all the funder hoped to do was offer 
the grantee time to find replacement funding. In 
other cases, specific goals accompanied the final 
grant. In all cases, funders wanted to help their 
former grantees navigate the future. This meant 
that other opportunities were set aside or delayed 
while resources supported the work of grant-
ees that were no longer in the bull’s-eye of their 
funder’s strategy. A final grant was sometimes 
accompanied by consulting, facilitation, con-
vening, and/or introductions to potential new 
sources of funding. 
In those circumstances where both grantees 
and funders were most satisfied, the final grants 
were generous and flexible. Funders listened 
carefully to the grantees about needs and pri-
orities; grantees influenced the funder’s exit 
plans and were encouraged and supported in 
thinking about their future. One large founda-
tion described a highly contextual and flexible 
approach to final grants:
To sum up the different strategies that we used, 
we offered flexible final grants, funded grantee 
convenings without us in the middle, capaci-
ty-building grants, and also a promotional piece. 
The promotional piece was not in the vein of‚ `look 
what [the foundation] did and learned,’ but more 
of something that each group could use for their 
own outreach, fundraising, and communications. 
Basically, they felt that being able to publicize 
their work as part of a larger cohort would be 
really advantageous. Instead of doing a foundation 
`lessons learned,’ we helped develop some press 
releases and things that they wanted, not just as 
individual grantees but as a group. It was very 
much driven by what they thought would be help-
ful to them. 
Nearly all interviewees referenced the impor-
tance of capacity building in navigating an 
exit. Funders want to help prepare grantees for 
the loss of funding, and they want to secure 
the gains made. Grantees want the time and 
resources to understand the implications of the 
funder’s exit for their organization and its work, 
and they want to plan a path forward. But, capac-
ity building as part of a funder exit is no panacea, 
especially not if mandated or overly structured 
by the funder. Some capacity-building invest-
ments discussed by interviewees were highly 
successful; others failed and were more of a dis-
traction than a help. 
It’s the last waltz. The last 
waltz with you. But that don’t 
mean that the party is over. 
(Robertson, 1978) 
                                               ¯ The Band
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Funders interviewed that made a big commit-
ment to capacity building during an exit advise 
that the locus of responsibility for building 
capacity needs to be the grantee, not the funder 
— that these investments at the end of a funding 
relationship should enhance the grantee’s inde-
pendence and therefore should not be dictated 
in type or process by the funder. In the words of 
one funder: 
We don’t have one approach to capacity building. 
What we try to do from the perspective of our 
unit is to put some markers in the ground to help 
us think about it. The first is that a funder cannot 
build the capacity of an organization. It is only 
the organization itself that can do it. The funder 
can just create enabling conditions …. We are not 
organizational development experts. We are not 
the protagonists here. What we say has undue 
weight. We need to make sure that the agency is on 
the part of the organization. Once the organization 
has its own clear sense of what it needs, you can 
respond by giving them specific money or increas-
ing the flexibility of the grant you are giving them.
All in all, reports of capacity building linked 
to an exit were mixed. Especially problematic 
were efforts to support fundraising as part of an 
exit. One funder who was charged with exiting 
a field-building initiative with very little notice 
discussed the fact that the foundation literally cre-
ated most of the organizations in the cohort and 
had disappointing results when supporting these 
grantees to build their own fundraising capacity:
Those relationships didn’t really work out very 
well. I don’t think any of those organizations had 
a successful engagement with their fundraising 
consultant. Mostly what I heard from the consul-
tants was that the organizations weren’t really 
willing to do what they needed to do to beef up 
their fundraising.
Another funder echoed the sentiment:
We tried supporting efforts to build fundraising 
capacity, but haven’t figured out how to do it well. 
We didn’t get great results. We had more success 
when we worked directly to bring new donors to 
the work.
Simply stated, the problem generally predates 
the exit decision, and if a funder is complicit in 
creating unhealthy dependency prior to the exit, 
it should expect trouble that no single capaci-
ty-building grant can address. However, both 
funders and grantees are articulate about the 
benefits of capacity building throughout an ini-
tiative or funding relationship — not just upon 
exit. In other words, building capacity that will 
help grantees withstand and even thrive in the 
event of a major funder exit cannot be an after-
thought or a “consolation prize.” The best, most 
effective capacity-building efforts in the cases 
studied began long before exit. These approaches 
accompanied the work across the duration of the 
grant relationship while also reflecting a specific 
focus on preparing for the exit.
In addition to capacity building centered on 
individual organizations, one grantee urged 
foundations to take the opportunity of the final 
grant to consider the broader context. Doing this 
well requires listening, which harkens back to 
the previous discussion of communicating effec-
tively before and during an exit:
The funder has to think about the network and 
the ecosystem of the environment that they are 
exiting, the signals that they are sending to the 
organizations about what their strategy should be, 
and also how it can possibly go south. Once you 
are gone, the grantees could start competing and 
start spinning off into other territory. You have the 
opportunity with the final grants to set the table 
for the direction of the ecosystem. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Given the variety of reasons to exit, as well as 
the complexity and interdependence of a funding 
relationship, the experiences reviewed for this 
article call for funders to balance their goals and 
aspirations against the potential harm to grant-
ees and fields as they are planning to take their 
leave. Dialogue and empathy are indispensable 
attributes of any valued relationship between 
funder and grantee and doubly important in the 
context of an exit. 
From the cases studied for this article, the great-
est exit challenges related to the confluence of 
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Speaking from experience, funders offer 
remarkably consistent advice to colleagues 
that are contemplating or making an exit. 
Overall, they advocate for respect, patience, 
flexibility, empathy, generosity, learning, and a 
consultative stance. They recommend:
1.  Stay off center stage, unless playing a 
principal role is the only approach likely to 
work. Use a steering committee or some 
other form of shared leadership to encour-
age ownership from the field.
2. Screen potential grantees based on how 
well the foundation’s goals or initiatives 
align with the core business of each 
organization.
3. Be explicit about the need for sustainable, 
resilient programs and organizations, and 
support capacity building throughout, not 
just as part of final grants.
4. Study the broader implications of an exit 
before finalizing plans or taking action, and 
create an exit plan that is adjustable. It is 
inevitable that things will change. 
5. Communicate as you go. It may not be 
possible to have every relevant decision 
made in time to communicate early with 100 
percent clarity. Share what you are thinking 
and what you know as the process unfolds.
6. Help grantees avoid fiscal cliffs. Tier 
down support through multiyear exit plans 
whenever possible. Consider offering 
increased funding for field leaders and 
infrastructure as part of the ramp-down. 
7.  Broker relationships for grantees with 
other funders, and do this early — not as an 
afterthought, when funder partnerships are 
very hard to forge.
8. Allow grantees to set the priorities for 
capacity-building grants. Don’t default to a 
final-stage grant for fundraising, as it will 
almost certainly be too little, too late.
9. Take advantage of your role as a convener 
to bring grantees together for collective 
learning and planning about how to cope 
with the exit.
10. Commit to your own learning and improve-
ment through each exit.
Advice from Funder to Funder
Having navigated the loss of a major funder, 
grantees were asked to offer advice to other 
organizations that may face such a situation. 
Here is the essence of what they said: 
1.  Accept that even your most staunch 
supporter may change its focus/priorities 
and withdraw funding at some point.
2. Be entrepreneurial and be prepared. Even if 
the loss of major funding is unlikely, engage 
in contingency planning as a regular habit. 
3. Hold to your own mission/vision through-
out. Don’t lose your focus to chase funding 
— ever.
4. Avoid dependency on one, or even a few, 
funders so that an exit — expected or not — 
will not destabilize your organization. 
5. Expect relationships with other grantee 
organizations to shift when a major funder 
withdraws. When the funder is no longer 
at the center of an initiative and/or they no 
longer convene or support collaboration, 
colleagues may suddenly become 
competitors.
6. Consider the fate of deliverables and work 
products. Together with the funder, plan 
and ask for support for appropriate curation 
and dissemination of what the grant(s) 
produced.
7.  Communicate about the work done and the 
value created to set the stage for others to 
come forward and support the work in the 
future. 
8. Negotiate the final grant for maximum 
flexibility.
9. Ask for the funder’s help in identifying new 
sources of financial support. 
10. Work to maintain the funder relationship 
post exit. Your key contacts may be able 
to help connect you to new partners or 
possibilities down the road.
Advice from Grantee to Grantee
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three factors: (1) the central role the funder had 
chosen for itself; (2) the scale of support offered, 
especially when it outpaced other support for 
the issue or organization; and (3) the difference 
between the expected and actual duration of 
that support.
Much more needs to be understood about why 
and how funders exit as well as about the effects, 
but this limited research does suggest some sen-
sible practices that can immediately improve 
both relationships and outcomes related to 
funder exits:
• Assure strong alignment of mission and 
goals at the front end of any funding 
relationship and revisit the question of 
alignment regularly. In the words of one 
grantmaker:
Funders planning to exit a field should be mind-
ful that the most durable investments will be 
those closest to the grantees’ own core purposes. 
Grantees that “stretch” to qualify for funding may 
not be able or willing to maintain the effort once 
the funder exits.
• Commit to dialogue with grantees as 
well as colleague funders about impend-
ing exits, taking input to help shape 
timing and approach to an exit. In inter-
views, funders and grantees spoke of the 
benefits of dialogue in navigating an exit. 
Some funders offered powerful examples 
of how grantees influenced their thinking 
and helped develop reasonable and respon-
sible exit plans that preserved program 
gains and kept grantees strong. For their 
part, grantees value thought partnership 
as much as they value clarity as a funder is 
preparing to exit.
• Consider grantee capacity and 
dependency throughout all fund-
ing relationships, and work to build 
grantee resiliency before an exit 
becomes necessary. One funder noted 
that the problems associated with exits 
likely have much earlier origins:
Some of the challenges are pre-exit — for instance, 
grantees that have unsustainable revenue mod-
els to begin with. A donor is almost tipping them 
already, and then that donor leaves. That’s a chal-
lenge that you need to be paying attention to well 
before the exit, as a part of financial due diligence. 
What are you doing early on so that in year three, 
five, or 10 — or however long your program spans 
— your grantees aren’t overly reliant on your 
revenue? The challenge is more about creating a 
healthier landscape pre-exit. 
• Once a decision to exit is made, set aside 
time and appropriate resources to ease 
the transition for grantees and protect 
the affected fields. Although the amount 
of time and resources needed will vary 
according to the context, generally, funders 
at the center of the work have a greater 
responsibility to grantees and to the broader 
ecosystem of actors in the field. Factors to 
consider in deciding how and how much 
to invest in an exit should include consid-
eration of whether the field is mature and 
stable, or nascent and highly dependent on 
one or a few funders.
• Contribute to building much needed 
knowledge in this arena. There is a need 
— perhaps even a great need — for addi-
tional research in this area. While this 
article shares stories and insights from 
about a dozen foundation exits, it is far from 
a comprehensive study or a representative 
sample. There are many thousands of foun-
dations, each driven by a charitable mission, 
that are routinely entering and exiting rela-
tionships and fields. Even if such comings 
and goings were only modestly disruptive, 
the aggregated effects are likely substantial 
— albeit — for the most part — out of sight. 
The field should commit to learning more, 
sharing insights, and generally exercising 
care and mitigating the risks when exiting.
 In fact, only one case examined for this 
study invested in a retrospective evaluation 
following an exit. In that case, the report 
was not shared externally. With that one 
notable exception, the funders studied 
did not look back after the close of their 
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Foundation relationships with grantees differ widely. Some foundations work in a responsive manner, 
defining a community or area of interest; publishing guidelines; then reviewing and funding (or 
declining) proposals on a rolling basis. In these cases, the grantee is leading, defining the project or 
program, implementing its plans, and reporting to the funder on progress at regular intervals. This 
approach is favored by many place- and community-based grantmakers that describe a broad issue 
or need and invite interested organizations to propose programs and potential solutions. The funder 
supports the most promising proposals, sometimes limiting the number of years an organization can 
receive support, and/or may exit relationships with only those grantees that routinely fail to achieve 
their stated outcomes.
In this era of strategic philanthropy, funders also use a range of other, more proactive tools and 
tactics — from prizes to mission-related investing — in pursuit of their goals. One commonly used 
proactive tool is the initiative — a labeled body of work that typically spans multiple years and 
engages multiple grantees. Often, research takes place to further understand the need or opportunity 
that is core to an initiative. There may be early outreach to capture insights and inputs from grantees 
and potential grantees as well as other leaders and experts as the initiative is designed. Proposals 
are typically solicited by invitation only. Initiatives are time limited, and, increasingly, funders include 
a learning component, convening grantees and commissioning external evaluations that look across 
the whole portfolio of investments over time. In short, the grantmaker ultimately defines an initative’s 
goals and the time frame as well as the budget and the learning agenda.
Some funders go even further when they perceive a gap in the ecosystem of organizations ready 
and able to respond to a priority need or opportunity. These funders may seed the creation of new 
organizations, commission and disseminate research, build leadership, and create new infrastructure 
in an effort to build a field. These instances — where a funder is chief architect, the work is branded 
through the initiative, and identified with the funder — place the greatest responsibility on the funder 
that chooses to exit. Funders interviewed stated again and again that, upon exit, they felt a great 
weight of responsibility in those cases where they were at or near the center of the work.
From Responsive Grantmaker to Branded Builder: 
The Continuum of Funder Responsibility in Exits
FIGURE 1  From Responsive Grantmaker to Branded Builder
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initiative or line of work. This means they 
cannot say with any certainty that goals 
achieved were durable or that grantees 
remained strong and successful. 
 Next steps should include a fieldwide 
longitudinal study of foundation exit prac-
tices to illuminate the scope and scale of 
the challenge, and the courageous com-
mitment of funders to study the impact 
of their exits from a modest distance. 
Together, these efforts would go a long way 
in encouraging responsible exits and illu-
minating best practice.
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Introduction
Exiting from an initiative is an inevitable part 
of philanthropy. Yet the process is too often 
treated as an afterthought, and funders rarely 
devote enough time to planning for and work-
ing through the tensions and issues that arise. 
Pointing to a lack of consistency around exit 
planning, Jaffe and Mackinnon (2007) write, 
“Exiting tends to be regarded as something dis-
crete and separate, a phase in the life of a grant 
or program that is fundamentally different from 
what comes before” (p. 2). 
Among the studies on foundation exits, research 
tends to focus on how funders can exit from 
specific grants or programs (Association of 
Charitable Foundations, 2012; Kerhoven & 
Herweijer, 2013). A few focus on strategies for 
exiting from a field or on spend-down foun-
dations specifically (Fleishman, 2011; Jaffe & 
Mackinnon, 2007; Petrovich, 2011; Gardner, 
Greenblott, & Joubert, 2005; Markham & 
Ditkoff, 2013; Ostrower, 2009, 2011). To date, 
however, no studies have examined how funders 
have managed to effectively exit from major, 
time-limited, place-based initiatives that aimed 
to simultaneously change policies and systems at 
multiple levels.
Methodology and Underlying Research 
We wish to help fill this gap in knowledge by 
sharing some of the findings the 2020 Transition 
Research Project, which we conducted on behalf 
of The California Endowment (Yu, Lewis-Charp, 
Berman, Diaz, & Bollella, 2016). 
Key Points
 • This article shares insights and lessons 
from a research project commissioned by 
The California Endowment in early 2016 to 
inform the planning for its transition out of 
Building Healthy Communities, a 10-year, 
place-based, policy- and systems-change 
initiative. The goal of the nationwide study, 
which included literature reviews and 
interviews with 30 executives and directors 
from 17 foundations, was to tap into 
philanthropic leaders’ accumulated wisdom 
about exiting out of similar initiatives. 
 • In generalizing the study’s findings for the 
broader philanthropic audience, this article 
presents a guiding framework for exit and 
sustainability planning in the form of a set 
of recommendations that relate to issues 
such as managing relationships between 
funder and grantee partners during the exit, 
using the initiative’s theory of change as a 
tool for decision-making, finding a balance 
between demonstrable success and equity, 
and managing the internal processes of the 
funding organization.
 • The research shows that even though an 
exit is inherently difficult, it is possible to 
carry out in a way that does not undermine 
the accomplishments of the initiative 
and leaves the foundation and its grantee 
partners in strengthened positions.
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As the foundation entered the second half of 
its decade-long Building Healthy Communities 
(BHC) strategic plan, it wanted to learn from 
other funders who had exited from similar 
time-limited, place-based initiatives and transi-
tioned to new lines of work. To help inform its 
decision-making, the foundation commissioned 
Social Policy Research Associates (SPR) to con-
duct a research study built around the values and 
assumptions that steered the BHC initiative. The 
foundation not only embraces its role as a highly 
engaged partner and change-maker, it also exe-
cutes a rare combination of strategies that seek to 
align local and statewide policy-change efforts, 
grassroots community organizing, resident 
power, youth leadership, and narrative change 
within BHC.
Our research was conducted using a mixed-
method approach, collecting data from both a 
literature review and semi-structured interviews. 
(See Appendix.) To be included in the study, a 
foundation had to have completed an exit or be in 
the process of exiting from a particular initiative 
or strategy in which it had been invested for at 
least three to five years, as well as contribute to 
the geographic-level diversity — national, state-
wide, and local — of the final mix of interviewed 
funders. A research advisory group developed an 
initial set of funders that met these criteria and 
narrowed the list based on those available for 
interviews during the project timeline.
Between November 2015 and January 2016 we 
conducted interviews with 30 foundation lead-
ers1 representing 17 place-based, organizing, 
policy, and spend-down foundations: the Annie 
E. Casey Foundation; Atlantic Philanthropies; 
the David and Lucile Packard Foundation; First 
5 Los Angeles; the Ford, MacArthur, Marguerite 
Casey, Northwest Area, Open Society, Robert 
Wood Johnson, S. D. Bechtel, Jr., Skillman, 
W.K. Kellogg, C. S. Mott, Edward Hazen, 
and Surdna foundations; and The California 
Endowment itself. We also interviewed two 
expert researchers in comprehensive community 
initiatives (CCIs). All the interviewees were nom-
inated by The Endowment’s research advisory 
group based upon their experience with place-
based and organizing initiatives. 
Due to the long-term nature of most large-scale 
initiatives, only a handful of interviewees had 
experienced the complete process of exit from 
place-based work and were able to speak about 
the full range of the experience; among these 
were individuals from the Annie E. Casey, 
MacArthur, and Northwest Area foundations. 
Further, only one interviewee was associated 
with a funder — the Mott Foundation — that 
had exited from a community-organizing port-
folio. Finally, although several funders engaged 
in policy- and systems-change work, no funder 
intentionally linked place-based and statewide 
policy-change strategies in the same way the 
endowment did in its BHC initiative. These lim-
itations suggest that it will take time to generate 
knowledge about exiting from these kinds of 
grantmaking efforts. 
We knew before we began our study that 
the research literature on philanthropic exits 
acknowledges the disruptive and often painful 
nature of the exit process for funders, grantee 
partners, and entire fields (Petrovich, 2011; 
Fleishman, 2011; Ostrower, 2011). By the time 
we completed our work, however, we were con-
vinced that even though an exit is inherently 
difficult, it is possible to carry it out in a way 
that does not undermine the accomplishments 
of the initiative and leaves the foundation and 
its grantee partners in strengthened positions. 
This outcome — what we refer to as “successful 
exit” — becomes more likely when the exit is 
guided by respect for the relationships the foun-
dation has forged with grantee partners; a clear 
intention to sustain the change-making efforts 
at the core of the initiative; inclusive and evi-
dence-based decision-making; thoughtful and 
advance consideration of what comes next; and 
Exiting From Large-Scale Initiatives: Insights From a National Scan of Philanthropy
1Interviews were conducted with 10 CEOs, presidents, and executive directors; six vice presidents and directors; nine 
evaluation directors, managers, and advisors; two program officers; two field CCI experts, and five current and former 
employees of The California Endowment. Of the 17 funders represented among the interviewees, 10 were place-based funders 
or conducted place-based initiatives, seven had a policy focus, and five had an organizing focus.
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proactive management of the internal changes 
likely to accompany transition to new efforts and 
focuses. 
Wisdom on Successful Exit From Major 
Place-Based Initiatives
The purpose of an exit strategy is not to hasten 
the exit — exit is not valuable for its own sake — 
but to improve the chance of sustainable outcomes 
for the program.
–Gardner, Greenblott, and Joubert, 2005, p. 7 
Although our research was intended to inform 
The California Endowment about its future 
exit from the BHC initiative, we recognized 
that many of our findings could be relevant and 
helpful to those in the larger philanthropic com-
munity who face the prospect of exiting from 
similar initiatives. To communicate our findings 
to this audience, we recast them in the form of 
discrete recommendations that can be used by 
diverse funders to craft their own unique exit 
plans. Although many of these recommendations 
may be familiar to some members of the phil-
anthropic community as “best practices,” they 
are often overlooked when the exigencies of the 
exit process begin to exert their influence. By 
collecting them together in a single article with a 
carefully calibrated amount of supporting detail, 
we hope to increase the likelihood that they will 
be thoughtfully considered and actually imple-
mented. Further, we believe that our expert 
respondents have contributed some genuinely 
new ideas to the field and broached some issues 
in unforeseen ways.
These recommendations assume that planning 
for exit begins well before the exit itself — ide-
ally as part of the design of the initiative. The 
research on effective exits emphasizes metic-
ulous attention to planning. Developing and 
implementing an exit and transition plan early in 
an initiative will reduce many future operational 
challenges, improve outcomes and sustainability, 
build communities’ preparedness and ownership 
of the transition process, and draw from commu-
nities’ own resiliency and assets (Gardner, et al., 
2005). Our interviews with foundation leaders 
similarly underscored that a carefully consid-
ered exit and sustainability plan increases the 
likelihood of a successful exit. Exit plans must 
be thorough enough to offer firm structure, yet 
flexible enough to allow foundations to adapt 
to unanticipated changes. Exit plans must be 
tailored to the demands and circumstances of 
specific initiatives, but they can be constructed 
from generalized best practices such as those 
articulated here.
Managing Relationships With Grantees 
and Other Partners
Effective philanthropy is based on strong 
relationships with grantees and other communi-
ty-based partners. Intentional planning around 
how to manage these relationships prior to and 
during an exit can mitigate some of the potential 
challenges that funders often face further down 
the line. Acknowledging that program staff 
Cao Yu, Berman, and Jhawar
A successful exit becomes more 
likely when the exit is guided 
by respect for the relationships 
the foundation has forged 
with grantee partners; a 
clear intention to sustain 
the change-making efforts 
at the core of the initiative; 
inclusive and evidence-based 
decision-making; thoughtful 
and advance consideration of 
what comes next; and proactive 
management of the internal 
changes likely to accompany 
transition to new efforts and 
focuses. 
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members are the “biggest advantage of a place-
based strategy,” a Skillman Foundation leader 
said that the quality of the foundation’s relation-
ship with partners is, to a large degree, based on 
program officers’ abilities to form trusting rela-
tionships with key community members. 
Build Trust Through Transparency 
The quality of a funder-grantee partner relation-
ship can be measured by the extent to which 
the grantee partner trusts that the foundation 
will responsibly attend to the community’s sur-
vival and well-being. This trust is grounded 
in transparency and respect, which requires 
that communication between the foundation 
and grantee partner be candid and recurring, 
particularly when it addresses the foundation’s 
commitment, its key objectives, and its expecta-
tions for the exit process. 
“Talking about [exit] nonstop from the begin-
ning,” said an Annie E. Casey Foundation 
representative, “is difficult but necessary.” A 
leader from the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation 
made the complementary point that the rela-
tionship between funder and grantee partner 
during exit is “really more about communi-
cation and being clear” than it is “about new 
strategic direction.” 
Don’t Feed False Hopes
A few respondents in the research study spoke 
about how difficult it can be for grantee partners 
when the foundation talks about exit with-
out being able to communicate clearly what 
the foundation will be doing afterward. It can 
be challenging to know how to communicate 
openly with grantee partners when there are 
many decisions that have yet to be made, but it is 
important to be clear on where the foundation is 
in the decision-making process. 
To help articulate their messaging around 
exit, Skillman staff members relied upon the 
foundation’s values framework so that any 
communication, however indecisive, would be 
consistent with the beliefs of the foundation. A 
Mott Foundation representative underscored 
that it is the responsibility of the foundation to 
say “yes,” “no,” or “we don’t know,” but never 
to create the false hope of continued funding by 
saying “maybe.” An Annie E. Casey Foundation 
leader added this caution: During the final few 
years of an initiative, a foundation often scales up 
its efforts while simultaneously winding down its 
involvement. The potentially misleading nature 
of this opposition for grantee partners requires 
that funders clearly explain the intent and end-
point of exit activities.
A Ford Foundation representative observed, 
There is a price to transparency. It was really hard 
in that middle period where we couldn’t tell groups 
where we were landing but we could tell them that 
we didn’t know if they were going to be funded 
again. … If [the funder is] going to be transparent, 
at least let the group feel like they had a line in and 
it levels the playing field. 
Underscore the Long-Term Commitment 
In many cases, the foundation leaders inter-
viewed had long-term relationships with grantee 
partners that existed prior to and persisted 
beyond a particular place-based initiative. Such 
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The quality of a funder-
grantee partner relationship 
can be measured by the extent 
to which the grantee partner 
trusts that the foundation 
will responsibly attend to 
the community’s survival 
and well-being. This trust is 
grounded in transparency and 
respect, which requires that 
communication between the 
foundation and grantee partner 
be candid and recurring.
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relationships are common among funders that 
have a mission to serve particular cities or 
regions. When these foundations exit an ini-
tiative and make a pivot in funding strategies, 
their relationships with their grantee partners 
undergo a change in status but they do not end. 
Thus, one important message to relay to grantee 
partners is that relationships do not end just 
because the particular funding strategy ends — 
and, indeed, the foundation can stay connected 
to the grantee even if it is not through a funding 
relationship. 
Manage ‘Tension’ Between Community 
Ownership, Foundation Decision-Making 
While evaluation respondents varied widely 
in what they believed was the ideal balance 
between community ownership and foundation 
direction, they agreed that managing this tension 
is vital to the success of foundations’ community 
change initiatives and plays an important role 
in a successful exit. A “hands off” approach can 
increase the chances, upon reaching the end of a 
long-term initiative, of a foundation feeling that 
important goals have not been accomplished. 
Alternatively, a hands-off approach can help 
build a sense of community ownership, which 
in turn is a key factor in sustaining the efforts 
at the core of the initiative. Regardless of the 
degree of control exercised by the foundation, 
however, exit represents a change in the locus 
of decision-making, and this transition, respon-
dents noted, is best managed by ensuring from 
the outset that there is a common understanding 
of desired outcomes. A MacArthur Foundation 
representative advised,
Make sure that you are exactly on the same page: 
What are the expectations for impact? What are 
the shared expectations for the mode of achieving 
that impact? What are the shared expectations 
about what sustainability means? Then, when you 
come closer to the [exit], you can always harken 
back to that moment of … shared expectations for 
going forward.  
Ease Grantees Into a Changed Relationship 
In place-based initiatives in particular, it is 
natural for program officers to assume indis-
pensable roles in the work of grantee-partner 
organizations and to become quite embedded in 
communities. Removing them suddenly would 
represent an immense loss to grantee partners, 
so it is important to strategically prepare for this 
eventuality well ahead of time. 
Our interviewees described several instances in 
which program officers who had been heavily 
involved in local-area work shifted their roles so 
that they were more “at arm’s length” toward 
the end of an initiative. First 5 Los Angeles, for 
example, worked to ease communities into devel-
oping their own leadership, decision-making, 
and collaborative capabilities, rather than relying 
on First 5 staff members. Program officers helped 
grantees form partnerships with other organi-
zations so that they could develop capacities and 
skills together. Staff members then took on high-
er-level roles in which they transitioned from 
being on the ground to focusing on policy advo-
cacy. First 5 leaders saw this as a way to lessen 
community partners’ dependence on First 5 in 
advance of the exit. 
In place-based initiatives 
in particular, it is natural 
for program officers to 
assume indispensable roles 
in the work of grantee-
partner organizations and 
to become quite embedded in 
communities. Removing them 
suddenly would represent 
an immense loss to grantee 
partners, so it is important to 
strategically prepare for this 
eventuality well ahead of time. 
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Making Exit-Strategy Decisions 
When planning to exit a major time-limited 
initiative, it is important to develop a clear set 
of criteria or a process that can be used to guide 
decision-making throughout the exit period and 
navigate the challenges that come with it. 
• Use the initiative’s theory of change 
to inform decisions about exit and 
sustainability. Foundation leaders empha-
sized their belief that the theory of change 
underlying the work of an initiative is an 
important resource for developing a strong, 
results-oriented approach to exit. The 
theory of change can be used to evaluate 
indicators of initiative impact, and then 
the results can determine what to sustain. 
Hazen Foundation leaders, for example, 
used an initiative’s theory of change as a 
lens to select the community capacities that 
needed to be sustained in order to keep their 
grantee partners from reverting back to 
how they were before the initiative began. 
Whether or not an action or decision would 
sustain each of these capacities then became 
the criteria for exiting out of the initiative. 
• Establish a well-developed learning and 
evaluation system to help create clarity 
around capacity, traction, and impact. 
Foundation leaders and the CCI experts 
spoke about the necessity of having robust 
data on community impact and grantee 
partners’ capacity. Evaluation and assess-
ment can inform a foundation’s decisions 
about whether and how to exit, and can 
help determine when it is appropriate to 
proceed with the next phase of an initia-
tive. Annie E. Casey Foundation leaders, for 
example, focused on using data to inform 
their approach at both foundation and site 
levels, which allowed for a “continuous 
learning process to track progress” and to 
assess the ability of sites to thrive after exit. 
In fact, as a national funder exiting multiple 
geographic areas, Casey maintained work-
ing relationships with site partners through 
continued learning and documentation 
after its initiative ended. S. D. Bechtel, Jr. 
Foundation leaders conducted retrospective 
investigations into the organizational 
capacity-building of grantees, which pro-
vided lessons that could be used to inform 
its later exit as a spend-down foundation. 
Several foundation leaders and field experts 
suggested that it is important to keep in 
mind that grantee partners and foundation 
staff are likely to describe their site prog-
ress positively so as to ensure continued 
foundation support. Therefore, formal and 
independently gathered site-specific assess-
ment and evaluation data may be needed to 
complement the reports made by grantee 
partners and program officers. 
• Engage staff members in decision-making 
to promote their investment in the exit 
strategy. Ford Foundation leaders opted for 
a very open process of dealing with specific 
exit issues by having a broad conversation 
among staff members about the change 
in the foundation’s work. Northwest Area 
Foundation representatives echoed that 
value of staff involvement, and described a 
collaborative exit-strategy design process 
in which program staff, senior staff, and 
board members participated. They said they 
believe that including staff members in the 
creation of the exit strategy was critical to 
the success of the exit because it allowed 
staff to deeply invest in the strategy. 
• Take advantage of foundation staff mem-
bers’ knowledge by involving them in exit 
planning. A number of foundation leaders 
chose to make the exit process largely staff-
driven because they believe that program 
officers have the deepest knowledge of the 
strengths and weaknesses of specific ini-
tiatives and grantee partners’ fit with the 
foundations’ values, mission, and man-
date. Staff members not only understand 
the foundation’s risk tolerance, collective 
skill sets, and interests, but they are also 
best positioned to draft exit or transition 
“memos” on initiative accomplishments 
and potential new directions that build 
upon needs and opportunities. One rep-
resentative of a major place-based funder 
described using a team approach to exit in 
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which foundation staff members collaborate 
as cross-disciplinary teams; this individ-
ual described the approach as “very useful 
because it brought different perspectives to 
a topic.” In another example of this strategy, 
Ford Foundation leaders engaged their com-
munications department early in the exit 
process to think through how to commu-
nicate difficult issues about the exit to their 
grantee partners. In addition to ensuring 
clear and honest communication, this effort 
revealed aspects of the exit that foundation 
leaders had not yet thought through. 
Sustaining Initiative Accomplishments 
Many foundation leaders said that when con-
sidering the exit from an initiative, they often 
lacked clarity on which specific pieces of the 
initiative were important to sustain and what the 
role of the foundation was in supporting those 
pieces. Respondents also emphasized that at the 
tail end of an initiative there is a natural move-
ment to “the next thing.” These factors point 
to the importance of thinking about issues of 
sustainability early in the exit process and keep-
ing these issues in the forefront. 
Even when an initiative has a set time limit, 
consider being flexible about the timing of exit 
so as not to adversely affect the sustainability 
of the initiative’s achievements. Setting a spe-
cific timeline may prove beneficial in that the 
time limit can sharpen the foundation’s focus on 
establishing sustainable systems; however, the 
time limit may also impose artificial restraints 
and restrict progress by promoting a false sense 
of closure to the initiative. 
A CCI researcher remarked that if sites are “hard 
to leave because they’re doing exactly what needs 
to be done and there’s momentum and leverage,” 
then the foundation “should not be rigid in its 
timeline.” In accordance with this view, founda-
tion leaders recommend an open-ended approach 
in which the funder chooses a time to investigate 
what has been accomplished and what remains 
unfinished relative to the original goals of the 
initiative, and then makes decisions about the 
timing of exit on that basis. “[What is,] really, the 
calendar of social change?” a Hazen represen-
tative observed. “I don’t know. So my tendency 
would be to be thinking about how far did we 
get, what’s next, what can be closed out responsi-
bly, what needs to be continued.” 
When making decisions about what aspects 
of an initiative to sustain, it is helpful to solicit 
input from outside observers. It can be problem-
atic to ask only grantee partners and foundation 
program staff to identify what to leave behind 
in communities because of their personal con-
nection to the communities and their financial 
reliance on the foundation’s continued presence. 
A CCI researcher recommends that foundation 
leaders conduct interviews with people who 
have been in the target communities for some 
time but whose salaries are independent of 
foundation initiatives. These key onlookers will 
be able to answer questions about the role the 
initiative has played in the community and its 
impacts, where the absence of the initiative will 
be most felt, and what the future would look like 
if the foundation was only able to continue with 
select priority areas.
To sustain the efforts begun under their initia-
tives, several foundations deliberately took a 
When making decisions about 
what aspects of an initiative to 
sustain, it is helpful to solicit 
input from outside observers. 
It can be problematic to ask 
only grantee partners and 
foundation program staff to 
identify what to leave behind 
in communities because of their 
personal connection to the 
communities and their financial 
reliance on the foundation’s 
continued presence. 
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step back in their leadership and management as 
they neared exit, giving local stakeholders and 
grantee partners the space to step forward and 
choose their own governance groups and inter-
mediaries — thus supporting a transition to local 
governance and community ownership. Annie 
E. Casey Foundation staff members created local 
management entities led by community residents 
that could oversee the sustainability of grantee 
partners post-exit. Skillman Foundation staff 
similarly facilitated the creation of governance 
groups made up of local residents and grantee 
partners. These groups have allowed for wider 
ownership of the Skillman initiative and will 
be responsible for its sustainability. In another 
approach, Marguerite Casey Foundation staff 
members asked local stakeholders to choose a 
“network weaver” — a person or organization to 
convene grantees and other partners in commu-
nities to work on cross-sector issues. As one CCI 
researcher observed, 
[It is important to] have some kind of path for the 
community to go from the foundation-directed 
work to more community-driven work around 
which they know they have local commitment. 
They know they have local capacity, and they are 
committing themselves to get support for it from 
a variety of other sources; somehow that’s the exit 
that has to happen.
Leverage the broader network of relationships 
that exist outside of the one between funder 
and grantee partner. Place-based funders have 
a great opportunity to connect community 
stakeholders to power brokers and to amplify 
the voices of community residents. As funders 
seek to exit, it is important to understand that 
the exit influences a broader and often less vis-
ible set of partners and community members, 
and that thoughtful engagement of these part-
ners can play a role in supporting longer-term 
sustainability. Furthermore, funders can forge 
new relationships for grantee partners by con-
necting them to national networks to which they 
would otherwise not have access. 
Grantee partners should also have help building 
capacity, so that they are in stronger positions 
after the funding ends. Support for capacity 
building, leadership development, and connec-
tions to broader networks of support are critical 
elements of sustainability, and they can be accom-
plished with nongrant funding. For example, 
Skillman Foundation program staff created a 
resource center for grantee partners that helped 
them bolster their data-collection capacities and 
internal monitoring systems, making them ulti-
mately more attractive to other funders. In the 
same vein, a CCI researcher recommended build-
ing the strategic, adaptive, and technical capacities 
of grantee partners through training on strategic 
decision-making, fundraising, and development. 
Many of the funders we interviewed shifted their 
working relationships with grantee partners as 
they neared an initiative exit, placing more of 
an emphasis on promoting leadership and orga-
nizational development. An Annie E. Casey 
Foundation leader suggested that as a foundation 
nears exit it should think of its role as a funder 
differently than it did when it began the project; 
specifically, the foundation should “move from 
Place-based funders have a 
great opportunity to connect 
community stakeholders to 
power brokers and to amplify 
the voices of community 
residents. As funders seek 
to exit, it is important to 
understand that the exit 
influences a broader and often 
less visible set of partners and 
community members, and 
that thoughtful engagement 
of these partners can play a 
role in supporting longer-term 
sustainability. 
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being an initiative investor into being a strategic 
and tactical investor in particular pieces of work.” 
A Mott Foundation representative observed, 
The key was making sure that funding didn’t 
hollow out the organization or scoop up all the 
talent in a community such that when the project 
ends, the community has to go through a process 
of rebuilding its leaders. It’s funding that’s really 
directed at building local capacity and leadership 
that is capable of addressing whatever the next 
issue is that comes along. 
Managing Changes in 
Funding Practices
Although few of the funders had fully exited 
from a long-term place-based initiative, they 
were able to speak to how they would shift 
funding practices to allow for flexibility and 
leveraging of other resources.
They suggested engaging other funders on key 
issues of concern through funder collaboratives, 
which are used to connect program officers with 
other foundation leaders so that the program 
officers can bring new funders to their sites. 
Hazen Foundation staff members, for example, 
use collaboratives to highlight their grantee part-
ners and create a funding environment that will 
be receptive to the work of their grantee partners 
once they have exited. A representative from the 
S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation similarly believes 
that capacity building needs to be about creating 
a “resilient ecosystem of nonprofits” working 
towards the same goals. Grantmakers engaged in 
this way can play a role in linking grantee part-
ners to future funders, convening funders to raise 
awareness of urgent issues, and leveraging field-
level knowledge and research to support work on 
the ground. As a foundation approaches an exit, it 
may want to intensify this type of work to ensure 
that key community capacities are sustained after 
the sunset of the initiative. The ability of grantee 
partners to “attract other resources into the 
community” was of key importance, a Skillman 
Foundation representative observed. “Part of 
what we tried to do from the beginning was to be 
really intentional about helping … communities 
leverage funds and helping our grant partners, in 
particular, understand the funding landscape and 
how to maneuver through it.” 
The exit period may consist of multiple phases 
tailored to specific communities and designed 
to capitalize on key points of strength. Leaders 
from the Skillman and Annie E. Casey founda-
tions, for instance, made hard decisions in the 
second phases of their initiatives to cut some of 
the original sites. This narrowing of focus ulti-
mately helped them exit, as the leaders felt that 
they could achieve more impact with fewer sites 
and a more intense focus on specific issues. In 
another example, MacArthur Foundation lead-
ers selected half of their original communities 
to continue working with beyond their origi-
nal 10-year commitment. These were grantee 
partners who had gained traction on key issues, 
and the additional funding was designed to help 
them make significant change. 
In addition to building the capacity of grantee 
partners to secure funding from other sources 
on their own, it can be important during exit 
In addition to building the 
capacity of grantee partners 
to secure funding from other 
sources on their own, it can 
be important during exit for 
foundations to forge or solidify 
relationships with other 
investors who share their goals 
and values and who may be able 
to support the grantee partners 
in the future, and to work 
together with those funders 
to sustain what communities 
believe will shift power and give 
voice to residents.
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for foundations to forge or solidify relation-
ships with other investors who share their goals 
and values and who may be able to support 
the grantee partners in the future, and to work 
together with those funders to sustain what 
communities believe will shift power and give 
voice to residents. Few foundation representa-
tives reported dedicating the necessary resources 
and staff energy to engaging other funders from 
the beginning.
Transitioning to New Areas of Work 
Making decisions about what new areas of 
work to transition to is difficult but important. 
Foundation leaders shared that they have made 
weighty decisions about new directions based on 
a combination of internal and external factors, 
including the foundation’s mission and values, 
the length of investment in initiatives, lessons 
and successes from initiative implementation, 
history and reputation in specific fields, and 
strategic outlook based on analysis of funding 
opportunities. 
An environmental landscape analysis can reveal 
what has changed and where future needs and 
opportunities lie. Site context changes frequently 
and often unpredictably, making it crucial to 
acknowledge these changes in the larger political 
and social environment when planning for exit 
and a transition to new work. Leaders from the 
Skillman Foundation, for example, are attempt-
ing to understand the changing trajectory of the 
city of Detroit, where their initiative is located. 
They have opted to forgo a strategic-planning 
process in order to use what they learn about 
changes in Detroit as a platform for the future 
and to allow their grantee partners to inform the 
next iterations of the work based on the shifting 
context of the city. A Hazen Foundation leader 
further noted that it is important for a funder to 
articulate how the world has changed since the 
beginning of its initiative, how institutional goals 
may have shifted, and how the foundation will 
respond to those changes and move forward. 
“There’s change and growth and development 
over 10 years,” this leader said. “[It’s important] 
that as you move forward, you’re not measuring 
yourself by irrelevant and obsolete criteria.”
Several of the foundation leaders we interviewed 
described an internal process of creating a val-
ues framework to guide prioritization of the 
areas and goals on which to focus after an exit. 
These frameworks are typically grounded in the 
core principles and beliefs of the foundations. 
Northwest Area Foundation leaders first created 
a “very broad and aspirational strategic vision 
document” that laid out an ideal account of the 
exit and the foundation’s future plans. In order 
to focus the values framework more sharply, the 
foundation leaders translated it into a strategic 
framework that had the specificity needed for 
actual decision-making about exiting from their 
initiative and pivoting to new lines of work. 
In relation to making choices about where to 
focus resources after an exit, one foundation 
leader identified an underlying conflict of which 
all funders should be conscious: Funders identify 
[O]ne foundation leader 
identified an underlying 
conflict of which all funders 
should be conscious: Funders 
identify themselves as 
committed to equity for the 
neediest communities, but at 
the same time they are intently 
focused on demonstrating 
success. Unfortunately, the 
communities and organizations 
best able to successfully 
implement foundation 
initiatives are often the ones 
that possess the most resources 
and capacity.
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themselves as committed to equity for the need-
iest communities, but at the same time they 
are intently focused on demonstrating success. 
Unfortunately, the communities and organi-
zations best able to successfully implement 
foundation initiatives are often the ones that 
possess the most resources and capacity. It can 
be enticing for a funder to prioritize continued 
support for these communities when it explores 
its next steps, but doing so can undermine the 
goal of helping higher-need communities. This 
particular foundation leader recommended that 
funders “stick with the places that have trac-
tion and are demonstrating what can be done,” 
but also develop “a different strategy for the 
really tough places.” A representative from The 
California Endowment observed that “to get 
some critical mass, you need to perhaps work 
with folks who are a little more well off, even as 
there are … communities that are desperately in 
need. How do we reconcile those things with our 
core values?”
Managing the Internal Process of Exit
Exits from large-scale, multiyear initiatives can 
be particularly vulnerable times in foundations’ 
organizational life cycles. These periods are 
characterized by heightened anxiety among 
key stakeholders about programming and 
operational procedures, as well as changes and 
potential upheavals in leadership, staffing, and 
funding structures. 
Foundation leaders often devote too little time 
to addressing their own team members’ anxiet-
ies around exit. In addition to its impact within 
the foundation, this stress has negative effects 
outside the foundation when it becomes a major 
cause of partners’ anxieties. One place-based 
foundation leader described this dynamic suc-
cinctly: “Your place-based strategy plays out the 
same way that your internal strategy plays out.” 
In other words, the foundation needs to establish 
internal clarity or grantee partners and people 
in the community will not have clarity either. 
Invest in the internal process to make the exter-
nal strategy more effective.
As program staff members transition to reduced 
roles in their communities, they are often the 
ones who are most in touch with community 
partners and hold the greatest trust. Therefore, 
it is crucial to build the capacity of staff members 
as key agents of the foundation and communica-
tion linkages to grantee partners, and to secure 
staff buy-in on key decisions about the exit. As 
one place-based funder observed,
The more you can equip [your staff], the more you 
get them aligned, [and] the more comfort and clar-
ity they have about where you’re going, the better 
everybody else will be. ... They are the people who 
help you execute, that hold the relationships that 
do all that. I would spend some time really focus-
ing on that talent, helping to transition that talent 
wherever they may be. You need them to make big 
pivots [and] create the capacity to help them do 
that really well. 
An outside change-management expert can 
lend an objective perspective. One foundation 
engaged a facilitator to ask the hard questions 
that informed decision-making and moved the 
foundation past the resistance and mourning 
stages that came as a reaction to the decision to 
exit. The process of moving to a “new begin-
ning” required assessing which staff members 
would be brought along into the new phase of 
work. After a two-year exit process, another 
funder acknowledged that the transition could 
have happened more quickly and less pain-
fully with the help of an expert who could 
attend to different levels of staff readiness to 
embrace change. “If I had it to do over again,” 
this foundation leader said, “I would have had a 
change-management expert by my side to help 
me manage the internal dynamics.” Another 
organizing funder observed that “an outside 
facilitator” is necessary “to push and really ask 
these questions,” since “there is absolutely no 
way to authentically ask staff to disengage from 
the work and the people that they have come to 
admire and love.” 
Staff departures become more likely as the 
foundation engages in deep discussions about 
potential new directions, and such turn-
over should be anticipated. One place-based 
Cao Yu, Berman, and Jhawar
The Foundation Review  //  2017  Vol 9:1    75
Sector
foundation’s leaders, for example, found that as 
the exit process began, staff members began to 
assess their commitment to the foundation given 
where the work was headed. Some staff members 
who wanted to continue to support community 
change found positions at other foundations and 
organizations that were taking on place-based 
work. Although every staff member was guar-
anteed a job if he or she wanted to stay at this 
particular foundation, other foundations chose a 
different approach. Those leaders advised having 
a strong staff transition plan in place and being 
decisive and clear about shifts in job descriptions 
that reflect new strategic priorities. 
As a consequence of staff departure and the 
additional burdens of exit planning, those staff 
members who remain are often spread too 
thinly between their normal workloads and their 
exit-planning responsibilities. At one founda-
tion, the staff members found the extra work of 
exit planning to be exhausting and challenging; 
although this foundation did not shut down its 
grantmaking operation completely during the 
exit period, the program officers had to cut back 
significantly on their field engagement due to 
their heavy workloads. During and after an exit, 
it is critical to provide extra support to staff. 
“The exit took its toll,” a place-based funder said. 
“Be respectful [to staff] in the same way that 
we’re all very careful to be very respectful of 
grantee partners. … Don’t forget that for staff at 
all levels. A little extra care … goes a long way.”
Place-based funders often use an “embedded 
funder” approach to build trust and strong 
relationships with community partners. In the 
course of playing this role, program staff mem-
bers can become very closely and personally 
aligned with their communities, and may have 
great difficulty with the exit process. Foundation 
leaders have addressed this dynamic during exit 
periods by more clearly defining roles, rotating 
positions, or assigning individuals to more than 
one site. The tensions that can arise when pro-
gram officers are deeply embedded in their sites 
should be proactively addressd.
Conclusion
The planning and implementation of an exit 
from a major investment is not an easy task. The 
process can be arduous and represent a loss of 
valuable resources and relationships for com-
munity partners, no matter what foundations 
do to soften the blow. A graceful, responsible, 
and ultimately successful exit can occur when 
funders who are deeply committed to helping 
the most vulnerable communities build on the 
strength of relationships with grantee partners 
and communicate with clarity, transparency, and 
consistency. They celebrate hard-fought victories 
and build awareness of accomplishments that 
need to be sustained. They allow adequate time 
for exit planning, maintain flexibility, and use 
evaluation data to guide decision-making. 
Our research revealed that communities and 
partners will understand and support an exit plan 
if a funder is able to convey that there is a natural 
and logical progression from previous initia-
tive goals and gains, and if it can express and 
demonstrate a compelling vision for the future 
consistent with its mission and values. 
Staff departures become 
more likely as the foundation 
engages in deep discussions 
about potential new 
directions, and such turnover 
should be anticipated. One 
place-based foundation’s 
leaders, for example, found 
that as the exit process began, 
staff members began to assess 
their commitment to the 
foundation given where the 
work was headed. 
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The questions used during the interviews were created in collaboration with executives from The 
California Endowment based upon their primary areas of inquiry. The following topics were covered 
in each interview; here, each topic includes one example of an associated interview question;
• Relationship management with partners. How did you think about maintaining relationships 
with partners during the transition and post-transition?
• Sustaining partners’ capacity and infrastructures. How did the organization decide which 
assets were a priority to sustain?
• Structural transition. How have you transitioned from foundation-created entities to ones 
that are more widely owned?
• Funding practices. Are there particularly innovative funding practices used post-transition to 
sustain previously funded work?
• Decision-making/prioritization. How did you make decisions about ending or transitioning 
the initiative?
• Communications. How did you manage communications with partners about transition?
• Internal dynamics. What decision-making structure did the foundation use to support 
transition?
• Managing multiple phases of transition. Were there staff members at the foundation who 
managed the transition while other staff managed the next phase of the initiative?
The interviews were analyzed by first creating individual interview write-ups based on transcriptions 
and interviewer notes. These write-ups were then uploaded into NVivo, a qualitative data-analysis 
platform, and there they were coded for common themes. Based upon the themes — both expected 
and emergent — that were highlighted in the coding analysis, the report authors were able to 
synthesize and create recommendations for the endowment. Many of these were used in this article.
APPENDIX
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Introduction
What impact are we having? How should we 
refine our approach? What are we learning that 
could inform related efforts? These are among 
the fundamental questions all foundation leaders 
confront. But for a limited-life foundation, there 
is another pressing and unavoidable question: 
What will we leave behind?
Of course, every foundation hopes that its 
legacy will be comprised of program out-
comes achieved. But many of the problems 
philanthropy seeks to address are complex, deep-
seated, and pervasive. Few, if any, can be solved 
within a brief, defined time frame. Limited-life 
foundations addressing these problems cannot 
expect to declare victory when they sunset — 
they can only strive to move the ball down the 
field, and then enlist and prepare others to carry 
the work forward. Given this reality, it would be 
foolish — perhaps even irresponsible — for these 
foundations to exit the game without making a 
deliberate effort to share what they have learned 
with the players who remain.
Purposeful, focused evaluation seems critical in 
this context. As will become clear, the authors 
believe that systematically capturing and shar-
ing knowledge — about programs, as well as 
social-change methods and grantmaking prac-
tices — can increase a foundation’s influence and 
impact during its final years and beyond. This 
article shares the emerging hypotheses of two 
foundations, The Atlantic Philanthropies and 
the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, each four years 
from sunset as of this writing, about the oppor-
tunities and challenges for evaluation in the 
limited-life context. (See Figure 1.)
Key Points
 • This article shares the emerging hypotheses 
of two foundations, The Atlantic Philanthro-
pies and the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation 
— each four years from sunset — about the 
opportunities and challenges for evaluation 
in the limited-life context. 
 • Few, if any, of the problems philanthropy 
seeks to address can be solved within 
a brief, defined time frame. Limited-life 
foundations can only strive to move the 
ball down the field before they sunset, 
and then enlist others to carry the work 
forward. Given this reality, these foundations 
are obligated to make a deliberate effort 
to share what they have learned with the 
players who remain.
 • The article argues that systematically 
capturing and sharing knowledge — about 
programs, as well as social-change 
methods and grantmaking practices — can 
increase a foundation’s influence and 
impact during its final years and beyond.
DOI: 10.9707/1944-5660.1352
End-Game Evaluation: Building a Legacy of 
Learning In a Limited-Life Foundation  
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The Atlantic Philanthropies
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Hypothesis 1: Urgency Is Evaluation’s 
Best Friend and Worst Enemy 
As the dark-witted Samuel Johnson once said, 
“When a man knows he is to be hanged ... it 
concentrates his mind wonderfully.” Indeed, 
impending deadlines have a way of bringing 
work into focus. As a limited-life foundation 
approaches closure, with the sound of the count-
down clock ever present, the sense of urgency 
can be both exhilarating and overwhelming — 
and it can advance or hinder evaluation.
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The decision to sunset makes imminent the 
question of what a foundation can and should 
seek to learn — as well as the need to decide 
how that information will be gathered, and with 
whom and how it will be shared. At both Atlantic 
and the S. D. Bechtel Foundation, Jr. Foundation, 
this urgency has helped generate demand and 
attention for evaluation, ensuring that it is ade-
quately prioritized, resourced, and concentrated 
in areas where the opportunities for learning and 
influence are greatest.
But urgency creates challenges, too. We worry 
that the drive to move quickly may cause 
mistakes that will cost time and resources 
later. On the other hand, moving too slowly 
may restrict what we can accomplish. After 
all, the scope of evaluation efforts can only be 
as expansive as time permits. Deadlines can-
not be extended, meaning work that is delayed 
may never be completed. And there will come 
a point when it is simply too late to initiate any-
thing new. Finally, enlisting the attention of 
program staff is difficult; no matter how well 
they understand and believe in the importance of 
evaluation, the time-sensitive demands of their 
grantmaking responsibilities can hamper their 
ability to focus on it.
End-Game Evaluation
About the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation
In 1957, Stephen D. Bechtel, Jr., former 
chairman and CEO of the Bechtel Corp., 
created the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation as 
a personal commitment to the prosperity he 
envisioned and desired for California.
The foundation’s vision is pursued through  
two programs:
• The Education Program focuses on helping 
young people develop the knowledge, 
skills, and character they need to become 
productive, engaged citizens. The 
foundation supports STEM education and 
character development, and encourages 
effective education policy.
• The Environment Program concentrates 
on the management, stewardship, 
and conservation of the state’s natural 
resources by supporting organizations 
and partnerships that inform, 
demonstrate, implement, and advocate 
for improvements in water management 
and land stewardship.
In 2009, the foundation decided to invest all  
of its assets by 2020 in order to spur 
significant progress in these areas sooner 
rather than later.
About The Atlantic Philanthropies
The Atlantic Philanthropies were founded by 
entrepreneur Chuck Feeney, who decided in 
1982 to devote his wealth to the service of 
humanity. A champion of “giving while living,” 
Feeney has long maintained that people 
of wealth should use it to better the world 
during their lifetimes. That belief led trustees 
to decide in 2002 to limit Atlantic’s life to a 
fixed term.
Chuck Feeney felt a connection to each of 
the eight regions where Atlantic has made 
major investments. With grantmaking and 
partnerships in the United States, Republic 
of Ireland, Northern Ireland, South Africa, 
Vietnam, Australia, Bermuda, and Cuba, 
Atlantic has sought to advance opportunity, 
equity, and well-being. Culminating grants 
aim to address 21st-century problems and 
achieve significant, lasting results in the 
following areas:
• Aging
• Children and Youth
• Health
• Reconciliation and Human Rights
FIGURE 1  The Atlantic Philanthropies and the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation
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In this context, we have found that a proactive 
approach to evaluation planning and imple-
mentation is essential. Because time is short, it 
is a consideration in every aspect of the plan-
ning process — from what to prioritize (see 
Hypothesis 4), to which methods to use (see 
Hypothesis 6), and even how to prepare for 
contingencies, knowing that time will limit the 
range of course corrections at our disposal. At 
both foundations, we do our best to keep eval-
uations on track by anticipating and mitigating 
potential obstacles, exercising disciplined project 
management, and frequently recalibrating our 
plans to reflect what is feasible within the time 
remaining. These may be sound practices in any 
setting, but in ours, they are absolute necessities.
Hypothesis 2: Big Programmatic 
Bets Create Big Opportunities for 
Learning — and Accelerating Impact
By definition, when a foundation spends down 
it liquidates and distributes all of its assets, and, 
as a result, it typically operates with a far larger 
grantmaking budget during its final years than 
it would if it remained perpetual. With these 
resources, a limited-life foundation may be able 
to place “big bets” to advance solutions to soci-
etal problems within a defined time frame.1 Big 
bets play a central role in Atlantic’s grantmaking; 
a Bridgespan study found that Atlantic has 
directed 50 percent more of these investments to 
social-change causes than other U.S. philanthro-
pies, on average (Powell, Huang, Foster, Boyd, & 
Sakaue, 2016).2 Similarly, at the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. 
Foundation, a small number of large, multiyear 
initiatives constitute the majority of the founda-
tion’s work in its final decade.
This increase in resources creates significant 
programmatic opportunities. But if our founda-
tions fail to document and share what is learned 
through these investments, we will leave orga-
nizations and fields inadequately informed when 
we go out of business. If, however, the big pro-
grammatic bets are accompanied by strategic 
investments in evaluation, our foundations may 
be able to propel grantees and fields forward by 
accelerating their learning.
For example, the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation is 
currently supporting two cohorts of California 
school districts to implement new academic 
standards in math and in science. The founda-
tion’s decision to sunset created an opportunity 
to invest significant resources in this work at a 
critical time in education reform. On its own, 
this investment would have paid dividends for 
participating school districts. But in order to 
spur broader impact, the foundation made a 
Halverstadt and Kerman
A thoughtful organizational structure can 
help keep evaluation top of mind. At the 
S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, most evaluation 
activities are embedded in program work 
and funded by program budgets. As a result, 
program leadership must be truly committed 
to evaluation in order for it to occur. However, 
program staff are supported by a separate 
organizational effectiveness team, including 
an evaluation and learning officer who serves 
as an advocate and internal consultant for 
evaluation. While program staff are under-
standably focused on grantmaking, evaluation 
staff can gently and continually raise questions 
about what is being learned and how that 
learning can be leveraged. This structure has 
the additional benefit of enabling program staff 
to seek “free” in-house evaluation expertise 
whenever they need it. When time and money 
are limited, the ability to walk down the hall for 
advice is proving to be a real asset.
Building the Right Team
1Bridgespan defines “big bets” as investments of $10 million or more to an organization or defined initiative, and suggests 
that investments of this nature have been instrumental to the success of some of the most effective nonprofits and social 
movements in the U.S. (Foster, Perreault, Powell, & Addy, 2016). 
2Between 2000 and 2012, 20 percent of philanthropic big bets in the U.S., by dollar value, were allocated to “social-change 
causes,” as defined by Bridgespan. (The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation was treated as an outlier and excluded from this 
analysis.) Comparatively, a review of Atlantic’s 1989-2015 grantmaking found that 30 percent of its big bets were directed to 
social-change causes.
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complementary and substantial investment in 
evaluation — and in many ways, this evaluation 
will be the true legacy of the work. WestEd — 
a nonpartisan, nonprofit education research, 
development, and service agency — is conduct-
ing formative and summative evaluation of the 
foundation’s math and science initiatives. By 
extracting lessons learned and actively dissemi-
nating this knowledge to education policymakers 
and other school districts across the state and the 
nation, the foundation seeks to support system-
wide change.
Hypothesis 3: Going Out of Business 
May Erode Some Traditional Barriers to 
Learning in Philanthropy
A central barrier to learning in any institution is 
our natural reluctance — as human beings and 
as organizations — to admit failure. Employees 
have an obvious incentive to appear successful in 
order to advance their careers and, in the case of 
foundation program staff, to protect their grant-
ees. Cultivating an environment in which staff 
feel safe enough to speak openly about mistakes 
is hard. Building this kind of trust with the orga-
nizations we support — in spite of what often 
feels like an inescapable power dynamic between 
grantmaker and grantee — is even harder.
For this reason, one of the most interesting 
implications of going out of business is the way 
in which it disrupts the usual incentives and 
dynamics of the philanthropic environment, 
potentially to the benefit of evaluation and 
learning. As a grantmaker, would you be more 
willing to own your mistakes if you knew your 
job had a short shelf life? As a grantee, would you 
feel more comfortable reflecting on what went 
wrong with a funder if you knew your relation-
ship with that funder was coming to an end? 
We see evidence that, for our foundations, the 
answer might be “yes.”
On an institutional level, our impending sunsets 
have triggered some shifts in the way we think 
about the purpose and audience for evaluation. 
We are looking outward and forward, thinking 
most about how we can generate useful knowl-
edge for grantees, funders, policymakers, and 
others who will carry on vital work after we 
exit. We are investing in few, if any, evaluations 
where our foundations are the only audience. 
(See Hypothesis 4 for a full discussion of where 
we do invest.)
And because our institutions are now argu-
ably less concerned with brand building, we 
are becoming more candid, particularly about 
failure. Challenges and surprises — along with 
what they mean and how they were addressed 
— can, should, and will be celebrated. Early on, 
Atlantic publicly committed to sharing a “top 
10” list of lessons learned, including instruc-
tive examples of where and how it fell short. 
Likewise, the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, at 
the encouragement of trusted colleagues and 
partners, is making a deliberate effort to com-
municate more openly and more often about its 
learning during its final years.
Although each of our foundations is at a some-
what different stage (as of this writing, Atlantic 
has made its final grant commitments and the 
S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation still has several 
years of intensive grantmaking ahead), we both 
see shifts in staff behavior as well. As the sun-
set approaches and staff find that they are no 
End-Game Evaluation
[O]ne of the most interesting 
implications of going out 
of business is the way in 
which it disrupts the usual 
incentives and dynamics of the 
philanthropic environment, 
potentially to the benefit of 
evaluation and learning. As a 
grantmaker, would you be more 
willing to own your mistakes if 
you knew your job had a short 
shelf life? 
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longer competing for promotions or persuad-
ing the board to fund their work, some feel less 
pressure to deliver glowing evaluation findings, 
and more comfortable pointing to where things 
went wrong. We hope that grantees will become 
increasingly candid, too — in reflecting on their 
own work and in providing feedback to us on our 
performance — especially after their final grants 
have been received.
In other words, the limited-life context seems to 
create an opportunity to disentangle learning 
from accountability — to focus evaluation on 
building knowledge that will advance our fields 
of interest, and to speak more honestly than ever 
before about failure and lessons learned from it.
Hypothesis 4: Focus is Imperative, 
But It Requires Difficult Choices and 
Clear Criteria for Decision-Making
It’s axiomatic that translating insight into impact 
requires focused learning at both the level of 
the grantee and the foundation. But we have 
found that setting priorities for evaluation — 
not to mention setting priorities generally — is 
a major challenge in a limited-life foundation. 
Not everything can be evaluated; and the more a 
foundation takes on, the greater its risk of being 
spread too thin, spending time and money on 
low-yield efforts at the expense of activities that 
hold greater promise for learning.
At both Atlantic and the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. 
Foundation, some form of reflection is required 
of every grantee. At minimum, we require 
grantees to clearly delineate their intended out-
comes at the outset and then reflect on progress 
against those outcomes in grant reports. In 
some cases, a light-touch retrospective by staff 
or an evaluation partner is also expected. At 
Atlantic, retrospectives on concluding lines of 
work focus not only on progress made but also 
on challenges remaining; the aim is to advance 
grantee sustainability by helping inform and 
attract other funders (e.g., a synthesis of U.S. 
comprehensive immigration reform highlighted 
unfinished business for stakeholder groups; pro-
files of aging and economic-security advocacy 
organizations were potential fundraising tools 
for these entities).
At the other end of the spectrum, for some pro-
gram areas or initiatives, evaluation is central 
to the theory of change. For example, Atlantic’s 
strategy for prevention and early intervention 
services for children in the Republic of Ireland 
and Northern Ireland hinges on rigorous eval-
uation. The primary goal of this work is to 
identify successful, evidence-based practices 
through evaluation, so that Atlantic’s govern-
ment agency partners will be more informed and 
disciplined about investing in effective services. 
Thus, a significant commitment to evaluation is 
nonnegotiable.
But what about the messy middle — all those 
cases where there may be something to learn 
through evaluation, but where evaluation is not 
central to strategy? Making such choices is hard. 
In our experience, it is important to establish 
agreement internally about how these decisions 
will be made, and by whom.
The criteria used by our foundations to deter-
mine where to invest in evaluation converge 
around several dimensions. To maximize our 
remaining years, we have both focused on areas 
in which (a) there is an opportunity to be influen-
tial in service of foundation goals; (b) there is an 
[T]he limited-life context 
seems to create an opportunity 
to disentangle learning 
from accountability — to 
focus evaluation on building 
knowledge that will advance 
our fields of interest, and to 
speak more honestly than ever 
before about failure and lessons 
learned from it.
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identifiable audience with corresponding dis-
semination opportunities; and (c) the foundation 
has relevant, informative experience to bring to 
bear on existing gaps in knowledge, as well as 
the ability to generate knowledge products that 
are appropriate to the audience and opportunity.3 
(See Figure 2.)
Understanding our goals and potential to advance them
• Based on our mission and values, what influence do we hope to have  
on the organizations, fields, or systems with which we are working?
• How do these “influence goals” manifest in this potential project?
• Will an investment in evaluation help us achieve these goals?
Identifying our target groups, and opportunity
• Who is our target audience—the foundation, the grantee(s), the field,  
other funders—and how much does that audience care about this work?
• Is there currently an opportunity to influence our target audience?
• Are there partners that can help us influence this audience and ensure  
the durability of the learning after we exit?
Assessing our ability to deliver meaningful learning
• Are there gaps in knowledge in the field that our work could help address?
• Is there something particularly valuable or interesting to be learned  
from our experience?
• Will we be able to deliver knowledge products to our standards of 
quality, given the time, resources, and staff remaining?
GOALS
AUDIENCE KNOWLEDGE
GOALS
AUDIENCE
KNOWLEDGE
FIGURE 2   Setting Priorities
The greatest potential  
for influence occurs here, 
where the foundation’s 
goals align with an 
opportunity to generate 
relevant knowledge and 
deliver it to key audiences.
FIGURE 2  Setting Priorities
3In some circumstances, accountability emerges as a fourth consideration, as there may be unusually high-stakes 
accountability concerns at play that require an investment in evaluation.
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In both foundations, evaluation priorities are 
established through a highly collaborative pro-
cess that includes program, evaluation, and 
communications staff, senior leadership, and, in 
some cases, the board. Decisions about where to 
invest are never made by evaluation staff alone.
As our foundations prepare to close, evaluation 
of some grants, initiatives, or lines of work may 
need to be set aside or scaled back in order to 
devote adequate attention to the most pressing 
priorities. These decisions come with some sense 
of disappointment in lost opportunities for learn-
ing, but when time and other resources are finite, 
it is important to look for the most significant 
points of leverage — and if necessary, decline 
opportunities that are less likely to bear fruit.
Hypothesis 5: Staff Transitions 
Complicate the Work, and Institutional 
Memory Is No Longer a Given
Based on our experiences and those of other 
limited-life foundations we have studied, it 
seems that staffing levels may diminish as sunset 
approaches, whether through design, attrition, or 
some of each. Meanwhile, staff who remain will 
likely see their roles evolve and often expand, in 
ways that may or may not suit their interests and 
abilities. These realities can make it difficult to 
keep evaluation efforts adequately staffed, and 
to extract the institutional memory needed for 
meaningful learning.
Atlantic has implemented a human resources 
strategy in which the foundation’s staff has 
gradually but steadily decreased over a five-year 
period. Although the foundation will not offi-
cially close its doors until 2020, grantmaking 
drew to a close at the end of 2016. By then, most 
program staff had moved on, while staff focused 
on evaluation and communications modestly and 
temporarily increased. As bandwidth constricted, 
staff began to wear multiple hats, including an 
increased emphasis on learning and dissemina-
tion — regardless of their interest or expertise 
in such work. In some cases, this created a mis-
match between the organization’s needs and 
the staff’s capabilities, but it also created oppor-
tunities for individuals to grow. Some staff 
— primarily impassioned by their grantmaking 
responsibilities — self-selected out of the organi-
zation, while others embraced the new activities 
to build and broaden their professional skill sets.
The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, on the other 
hand, is not planning to reduce its workforce 
prior to sunset. The foundation has ambitious 
goals for its last few years and is hoping that 
most of its roughly 35 staff will choose to stay 
until the end, in order to shepherd final grants to 
completion, prepare organizations and fields for 
the foundation’s departure, and document and 
disseminate learning. But even in the best-case 
scenario, it is possible that some staff will decide 
to move on before sunset. And since there will 
likely come a time beyond which departing staff 
Regardless of the human 
resources strategy employed, 
a limited-life foundation’s 
staff might well shrink 
toward the end. As a result, 
evaluation staff must 
grapple with the reality that 
institutional memory may be 
slowly drained, since some 
information is carried in the 
minds of staff and not formally 
documented. In a perpetual 
organization, information can 
be orally transmitted across 
generations of staff. But in 
a limited-life foundation, 
information is at risk of 
disappearing when staff do. 
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are no longer replaced, bandwidth may become a 
challenge in the final years.
Regardless of the human resources strategy 
employed, a limited-life foundation’s staff might 
well shrink toward the end. As a result, eval-
uation staff must grapple with the reality that 
institutional memory may be slowly drained, 
since some information is carried in the minds 
of staff and not formally documented. In a per-
petual organization, information can be orally 
transmitted across generations of staff. But in a 
limited-life foundation, information is at risk of 
disappearing when staff do. This makes it more 
and more difficult to engage in reflective practice 
as sunset approaches.
At both foundations, we are working to mitigate 
this problem through deliberate and proactive 
efforts to capture staff knowledge. We have 
established protocols, processes, and tools for 
extracting important information from staff, as 
well as systematic ways to store that data so it 
can be easily retrieved when needed. Atlantic 
developed a program review protocol that was 
completed by current and former program staff, 
in concert with evaluation and communica-
tions staff. After taking inventory of relevant 
documentation for each program area, staff 
developed a consensus summary of each pro-
gram’s goals, salient strategies and investments, 
impacts, and lessons learned.4 The S. D. Bechtel, 
Jr. Foundation expects staff to complete a written 
analysis of every grant at key inflection points.
Hypothesis 6: A Limited Window 
for Data Collection Presents 
Technical Challenges
We are finding that the end-stage environment 
also poses technical challenges for evaluation 
design and implementation. Both Atlantic and 
the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation are investing in 
complex program areas — human rights, edu-
cation reform, sustainable water management, 
and others — where change does not occur over-
night. Perpetual foundations have the ability to 
track progress on issues like these longitudinally 
if they choose, or to postpone evaluation until 
the time is right. Limited-life foundations may 
not have these options.
Foundations such as ours may be forced to 
evaluate the impact of investments within a 
much shorter time frame than might be ideal. 
For example, the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation’s 
STEM-education work includes efforts to help 
K-8 teachers shift their instructional practice to 
align with new academic standards in math and 
science. Enabling this kind of behavioral change 
at scale will take many years, and it will take 
even longer to see measureable improvements in 
children’s academic performance resulting from 
these shifts. In this case, the optimal window for 
conducting summative evaluation will not open 
until after the foundation’s doors have closed.
Since limited-life foundations may be out of 
business before it is feasible to measure direct 
indicators of impact, at times we instead must 
use leading indicators — measureable factors that 
are predictive of outcomes and likely to change 
before outcome indicators change — to deter-
mine whether we are on the right path. Finding 
valid, timely, and accessible measures can be 
difficult. Many leading indicators are imperfect 
proxies, but they may be the only option when 
the window for data collection is closing.
For example, Atlantic’s board will make final 
investment decisions for far-reaching funding 
of its social-change fellowships5 based on early 
assessment of organizational development, 
initial implementation performance, and lead-
ing indicators for much longer-term systemic 
impacts. Key-informant interviews may be held 
with knowledgeable community leaders (e.g., 
advocates, public health leaders, policymakers, 
and policy analysts) who are positioned to rec-
ognize early systemic changes, but it may take 
many years for the fellows to facilitate broader 
improvements in health and/or racial equity. 
For this reason, one of the most anticipated 
4See, e.g., www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/subtheme/school-discipline-reform 
5See http://www.atlanticfellows.org
End-Game Evaluation
86    The Foundation Review  //  thefoundationreview.org
R
eflective Practice
evaluation criteria concerns evidence of strong 
grantee capacity, including a culture of learning 
and adaptation, which is considered to be essen-
tial for long-term success.
Hypothesis 7: Influence May Wane 
in the Final Years if It Is Not Actively 
Cultivated
It is a well-known joke in philanthropy that when 
you leave the field, you will suddenly discover 
that you are not as good-looking, smart, or funny 
as you used to be. There is an underlying truth in 
this humor: When you have the power to affect 
how philanthropic dollars are allocated, you have 
influence; people pay attention to you and your 
messages. If individuals lose influence when they 
exit philanthropy, it seems likely that institutions 
may as well. With four years until sunset and 
grant commitments declining during this period, 
each of our foundations is asking whether — in 
terms of influence — we will be finished before 
we are done.
This may be a hurdle for us and for other limit-
ed-life foundations that have ambitious goals for 
their final years. Our influence may dwindle at 
precisely the time that our opportunity to build 
and disseminate knowledge may be peaking. 
Mindful of this risk, we are experimenting with 
several strategies designed to help us retain a 
voice until the end.
Engaging End Users From Start to Finish 
At both foundations, we strive to include import-
ant stakeholders in evaluation activities early on, 
to ensure that research questions and methods 
are relevant and responsive to stakeholder needs 
and that stakeholders feel invested in the project 
and its findings. We consider this to be sound 
evaluation practice generally, but particularly 
important in the limited-life context.
Atlantic sees its diverse experience with advocacy 
grantmaking — spanning time, topics, strategies, 
and geography — as one of its most valuable yet 
underdeveloped learning assets. Approaching 
sunset, the foundation sought to produce rele-
vant syntheses of lessons learned from this work 
that would complement the existing literature 
on advocacy, in formats that would be useful to 
the field. To pursue this goal, Atlantic partnered 
with the Center for Evaluation Innovation on the 
Atlas Project, building a learning agenda through 
ongoing reconnaissance of other funders, advo-
cates, and government representatives. Several 
funders and advocates expressed hopes that 
Atlantic would share successes, failures, and 
lessons concerning collaborative financing 
and strategic application of 501(c)(4) funding. 
Throughout the process, on these topics and 
many others, key internal and external stake-
holders provided critical insight, institutional 
memory, and assistance — from identifying 
audiences and defining evaluation questions, 
to developing data-collection approaches and 
interpreting findings, to supporting targeted dis-
semination of actionable lessons.
Stakeholder engagement is proving critical for 
the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation as well. For 
instance, a key stakeholder in the foundation’s 
science education initiative is the California 
State Board of Education. To ensure that the 
external evaluation of the initiative is responsive 
to the needs of this audience, the foundation 
encouraged the evaluator to create a technical 
working group to advise on the project, includ-
ing prominent members of the board. Early on, 
the technical working group’s input informed 
the research questions and evaluation design. 
Now midway through the initiative, the group 
remains active, helping to interpret and prioritize 
findings for publication. By engaging this audi-
ence in the work so directly, the foundation aims 
to ensure that the evaluation findings are useful 
to state policymakers.
Working With and/or Through Partners 
Partnerships are an especially important asset 
for limited-life foundations and serve multiple 
purposes. During the final years, they may help 
attract and retain the attention of target audi-
ences; for example, if a foundation’s influence 
begins to wane, it may be able to rely on the 
influence of its partners. Following closure, part-
nerships may enable the ongoing application of 
lessons learned by transferring leadership to the 
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field and creating permanent “homes” for the 
knowledge that was built.
But there is a dynamic tension in play with 
respect to partnerships. We urgently need part-
ners in order to ensure that our learning is 
widely disseminated and productively used. And 
yet, the reality is that we have very little time 
or bandwidth with which to forge or sustain 
partnerships. Given the many nonnegotiable 
constraints of the limited-life context (e.g., time, 
money, staffing), we cannot always accommo-
date other institutions’ timelines or needs in the 
name of partnership building (and vice versa). 
And we worry that potential partners may not 
be willing to invest time and resources in collab-
orating with us, knowing that the relationship 
will not endure. In other words, we are learning 
that partnership building — for both program-
ming and learning — can be at its most difficult 
when it is most needed.
Atlantic has pursued a number of partnership 
approaches in order to ensure that learning is 
applied during and after the foundation’s culmi-
nation. Scaling of several initiatives that embed 
lessons learned has been achieved through 
carefully cultivated partnerships with govern-
ment; in Vietnam, for example, investments in 
epidemiological data collection and professional 
education led to a stronger, data-driven public 
health system.
Atlantic is also cultivating leaders who are poised 
to apply learning, and commissioning work 
with long-term evaluation partners. A constella-
tion of Atlantic Fellow program grants reflects 
both strategies. Anchor institutions are funded 
to pilot new leadership-development efforts for 
emerging social-change leaders, incorporating 
learning from Atlantic’s experience as well as 
other sources. And, evaluators selected in concert 
with corresponding program grantees support 
a “learn while doing” approach that combines 
developmental features to inform fellowship 
program design, formative assessments to refine 
program components and build quality improve-
ment capacity, and summative evaluation to 
inform the Atlantic board’s final 10- to 20-year 
investment decisions.
The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation is building 
funder collaboratives to support several major 
program and evaluation efforts. For instance, the 
foundation is a founding member of the Water 
Funder Initiative, a collaborative effort to identify 
and activate promising water solutions through 
strategic philanthropic investments. The foun-
dation’s aim, with respect to evaluation, is for 
participating funders to invest in learning as a 
collective, ensuring that its reach extends well 
beyond any individual funder’s scope of influence.
Convening 
Approaching sunset, both of our foundations are 
increasingly bringing grantees, funders, and oth-
ers together to exchange knowledge and identify 
opportunities to work together toward shared 
goals. Particularly as our grantmaking tapers off, 
we may be able to leverage our role as conveners 
Partnerships are an especially 
important asset for limited-life 
foundations and serve multiple 
purposes. During the final 
years, they may help attract 
and retain the attention of 
target audiences; for example, if 
a foundation’s influence begins 
to wane, it may be able to rely 
on the influence of its partners. 
Following closure, partnerships 
may enable the ongoing 
application of lessons learned 
by transferring leadership to the 
field and creating permanent 
“homes” for the knowledge that 
was built.
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to retain the attention of key stakeholders, 
while simultaneously creating opportunities for 
those stakeholders to digest evaluation findings 
together and forge relationships that may live on 
after we exit.
In some cases, we have taken advantage of 
existing convenings to disseminate knowledge. 
For example, lessons learned from a jointly 
conducted evaluation of our capital grants 
have been shared at national philanthropy con-
ferences hosted by Grantmakers for Effective 
Organizations and the Center for Effective 
Philanthropy. Atlantic has also made use of 
standalone funder meetings in the United States, 
Ireland, Belgium, and Australia to share findings.
In other instances, our foundations have 
hosted convenings to bring target audiences 
together. Atlantic and the Center for Evaluation 
Innovation hosted a meeting in 2015 to examine 
cutting-edge advocacy evaluation methods, as 
well as an international conference in September 
2016 on public interest law and strategic litiga-
tion. Meanwhile, in July 2016, the S. D. Bechtel, 
Jr. Foundation brought its National Character 
Initiative grantees together for a two-day work-
shop on youth character-development research. 
The workshop, led by the National Research 
Council, was immediately followed by a one-
day convening of the grantees to reflect on 
the research and identify opportunities for 
collaboration.
Developing a Strategic Approach to 
Communications
An external communications strategy seems 
essential at this time if our foundations hope to 
remain influential and helpful to the organiza-
tions and fields we support. This means that for 
each of our major evaluations — especially those 
associated with our big bets — we are developing 
a corresponding communications plan.
The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation is currently 
working through this process for several of its 
education initiatives. In close collaboration with 
communications consultant Williams Group, 
the foundation is bringing stakeholders together 
to clarify learning and influence goals, identify 
target audiences, and specify — for each audi-
ence — the information that audience needs, 
the product or format it will find most useful, 
the message and messenger it is most likely to 
respond to, and the channels through which it 
can best be reached. In many cases, the most 
suitable format in which to convey evaluation 
findings will not be a tome-like report, but 
rather a policy brief, handbook, presentation, 
webinar, or any number of other knowledge 
products. And the best messenger and dissemi-
nation channel may not involve the foundation 
at all, but will instead leverage the voice of a key 
partner in the field. 
At the same time, the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. 
Foundation has been working to strengthen its 
own communications capacity, so that tools, 
resources, and lessons learned — for which the 
foundation is the appropriate messenger — can 
be widely shared in real time. In 2016, the foun-
dation launched a new section of its website 
to house knowledge products, and began to 
actively disseminate information and resources 
to external audiences via email campaigns. For 
many of the foundation’s initiatives, summa-
tive evaluation findings will not be available 
until the last year or two of the foundation’s 
An external communications 
strategy seems essential at this 
time if our foundations hope to 
remain influential and helpful 
to the organizations and fields 
we support. This means that for 
each of our major evaluations 
– especially those associated 
with our big bets – we are 
developing a corresponding 
communications plan.
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life or even post sunset, but by sharing interim 
learning along the way, the foundation seeks to 
engage the field now and build anticipation for 
future publications.
Hypothesis 8: Post-Hoc Evaluation 
Is Challenging, But of Tremendous 
Benefit to the Field
A key question for limited-life foundations is 
whether, when, and how they should assess the 
ultimate impact of their work. At Atlantic and 
the S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, we are placing 
big bets during our final years of grantmaking. 
What will become of these investments? What 
will become of our grantees and the gains they 
have made? Will these organizations and their 
progress endure? The potential for meaning-
ful and beneficial learning does not end when a 
foundation’s lights go out. Yet there is very little 
existing research on the impact of exiting, and 
we believe there is a need for more limited-life 
foundations to commission post-hoc evaluation.
The question we face is: Who will do it? Since the 
foundations will be closed and our entire staffs 
will have moved on to other endeavors, a third 
party must lead the work. But who should be 
entrusted with this responsibility? How do you 
vet an organization for this unusual role? Who 
will manage the contract, holding the evaluator 
accountable to the intended level of rigor and qual-
ity, course correcting when things get off track, 
and helping to interpret the findings? How will 
the findings be disseminated and applied? When is 
the right time to conduct this type of evaluation?
Atlantic has been working into its sunset with 
collaborators like the Center for Evaluation 
Innovation to look at advocacy lessons over time, 
and Bridgespan to look at lessons about big-bet 
grantmaking. Other external partners are posi-
tioned to gauge and share the results of final 
efforts as they become available. Each of these 
partners has a vested interest in the knowledge 
being built. At the same time, Atlantic chose to 
articulate its most “personal” institutional learn-
ing on its own, finding the process of reflecting 
with past leaders and staff helpful and satisfying 
as a way to mark the impending transition.
For grantmaking initiatives that require coordi-
nated evaluation and dissemination post sunset, 
Atlantic has identified like-minded partners to 
oversee the work. For instance, Atlantic has 
asked the James Irvine Foundation to assume 
management of Atlantic’s investments in Linked 
Learning, a career pathways-based education 
model. Irvine is well suited for this role because 
the foundation actually initiated and supported 
the development of the Linked Learning model. 
In general, such relationships seem to work best 
when the partner has similar values and goals 
related to its own mission, a deep knowledge of 
the grantmaking approach and context, and a 
commitment and capacity to help grantees adapt 
to changing conditions.
The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation is still wres-
tling with the question of whether and how to 
assess final impact. Because organization and 
field building is central to its work, the foun-
dation may conduct a longitudinal study of the 
capacity and resiliency of a sample of grantees. 
Such an effort might involve one or two interim 
reports during the foundation’s lifetime, fol-
lowed by publication of a final report a few years 
after sunset (e.g., 2023). The goal of such a study 
would be to assess the impact of the foundation’s 
A key question for limited-life 
foundations is whether, when, 
and how they should assess 
the ultimate impact of their 
work. At Atlantic and the 
S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, 
we are placing big bets during 
our final years of grantmaking. 
What will become of these 
investments? What will become 
of our grantees and the gains 
they have made?
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capacity-building investments, as well as the 
impact of its exit, on the strength of grantees.
In addition, the foundation may consider com-
missioning an impact evaluation to assess the 
attainment and/or durability of program out-
comes for select lines of work. As of this writing, 
further exploration is needed to determine who 
would be entrusted with this work and how it 
would be managed.
Hypothesis 9: Knowledge Needs 
a Home and a Caretaker in Order 
to Be Made Useful
When all is said and done, limited-life founda-
tions like ours face the question of what to do 
with the knowledge we have built. This pertains 
not only to the direct products of evaluation and 
learning efforts, but in an even broader way to 
the entire “paper trail” of the foundation.
Every institution amasses a huge amount of 
documentation that may help to tell a story. But 
what do you do with it all when you close? When 
does it make sense to establish an archive? It 
may not be necessary in every case, especially if 
strong partners are poised to become stewards of 
the foundation’s knowledge. If you do establish 
an archive, how do you ensure that it is not just a 
storage facility, but rather that the information is 
accessible and productively used to inform deci-
sions, drive continuous improvement, or catalyze 
shifts in policy or practice? Our assumption 
is that making information available is rarely 
enough; it will need to be curated, repackaged 
for different audiences, and actively promoted in 
order to get uptake.
Atlantic has elected to create an archive at 
Cornell University, which will encompass the 
organization’s paper and digital records. The 
foundation has done its best to try to understand 
and predict the priorities of potential audiences 
for this archive. Program, evaluation, and com-
munications staff have tapped grantees and other 
funders to help determine who might be inter-
ested in the archive, how they would learn about 
it, and what they would do with it.
However, it simply is not possible to fully antic-
ipate the future interests and needs of every 
potential audience. Atlantic’s leadership team is 
thinking hard about how to make the archive as 
flexible and responsive as possible. For example, 
by including raw data (not just final research 
products) and by making the archive easily 
searchable, Atlantic hopes to accommodate the 
uncertain and potentially wide-ranging research 
needs of coming decades.
In addition, the contents of Atlantic’s archive 
will be actively curated and disseminated. The 
website will be regularly updated for 10 years 
following the end of grantmaking in 2016, and 
outreach efforts will help make other materi-
als available to philanthropic, nonprofit, and 
academic communities with interests in top-
ics including “giving while living,” limited 
life, big bets for social change, and leadership. 
Modest grants to infrastructure organizations 
like the Center for Effective Philanthropy, the 
Foundation Center, and Rockefeller Philanthropy 
Advisors will support new data collection and 
syntheses, resulting in tailored materials that 
address emergent information needs and high-
light opportunities to use the archives.
The S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation, aware that 
establishing an archive of this scope and nature 
requires years of careful planning is, as of this 
writing, considering a wide range of approaches 
to synthesizing and sharing insights, including 
but not limited to preserving foundation docu-
ments in a formal archive.
Every institution amasses a 
huge amount of documentation 
that may help to tell a story. 
But what do you do with it all 
when you close? When does 
it make sense to establish an 
archive?
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Conclusion
In the experience of our two foundations, the 
decision to sunset has advanced evaluation in 
many ways. The focus and urgency it brings is 
refreshing and energizing. There are opportu-
nities to “go big” on evaluation during the final 
years and to leverage learning for grantees, peer 
funders, and field leaders. And the ability to shift 
from “evaluation for accountability” to “evalua-
tion for learning and influence” has helped break 
down many of the barriers that typically stand in 
the way of meaningful reflective practice.
But there are challenges, too, and unique con-
siderations. We face difficult choices about what 
to evaluate. Staff capacity and attention are 
strained. Institutional memory may be gradu-
ally drained unless efforts are made to preserve 
it. Time constraints introduce methodological 
limitations. Our influence may diminish with 
our grantmaking budgets, even as our abilities 
to build and disseminate knowledge are peaking. 
Partnerships are essential but more difficult to 
forge than ever. Decisions must be made about 
whether to commission post-hoc evaluation as 
well as whether and how to archive all or parts of 
a mountain of information.
There is no guidebook to help limited-life foun-
dations navigate these challenges. As S. D. 
Bechtel, Jr. Foundation President Laurie Dachs is 
fond of saying, “We’re building the plane as we’re 
flying it — and soon we’ll have to start disassem-
bling it.” But in the spirit of interim learning, the 
combined reflections of our foundations have 
been offered here in hopes of encouraging other 
limited-life foundations — or those considering a 
sunset — to make the most of evaluation.
Our advice?
• Put an evaluation and learning plan in place 
early, including a strategy for capturing 
institutional knowledge.
• Resist the temptation to evaluate every-
thing. Don’t invest unless your research 
questions have relevance and value to exter-
nal stakeholders.
• Make sure you have partners in the field at 
every stage — from scoping and designing 
evaluations to curating and diffusing knowl-
edge — so that everything you do will have 
its own legs after you exit.
• Commission a post-hoc evaluation of your 
work. There is a dearth of research on what 
happens to program outcomes, grantee 
organizations, and fields following the 
departure of a major funder.
• Commit to publishing findings — good, 
bad, and ugly. Long after your grant dol-
lars stop flowing, the lessons learned from 
your experience — what you tried, and 
how others can build on your work or avoid 
repeating missteps — will continue to have 
impact. In a way, the knowledge you gen-
erate through evaluation will be your final, 
parting gift to the field.
Our foundations are eager to continue docu-
menting and disseminating learning — leading 
up to but also following our sunsets. Over time, 
we hope others will join us in this journey.
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At work where Detroit’s kids live.  In 2006, the Skillman 
Foundation committed $100 million to a decade-long investment 
in six neighborhoods. (See Figure 1, page 83.) Through this Good 
Neighborhoods Initiative, the foundation directed a majority of its 
grantmaking toward an intensive focus on changing the conditions 
where, at the time, one-third of Detroit’s children lived. The goal 
was to ensure that children in those places were safe, healthy, well- 
educated, and prepared for adulthood. 
The initiative concluded in 2016, ultimately spanning 11 years and 
involving $122 million in grants, which represented 67 percent of the 
Foundation’s total grant spending in this time frame. Along the way, 
the foundation reset its strategy and sharpened its goal — in response 
to seismic shifts in the local context and informed by indicators of 
progress. 
To capture information on the unique challenges facing an embedded 
funder as it changes program direction, Bob Tobin, senior consultant 
at Williams Group, interviewed Marie Colombo, Skillman Foundation 
director of strategic eval-
uation and learning. The 
interview took place on 
Dec. 8, 2016.
Changing in Place: 
The Skillman Foundation, Detroit, and the 
Good Neighborhoods Initiative 
How did a hometown grantmaker conduct 
and conclude its largest-ever initiative?
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Bob Tobin (BT): When launching the Good 
Neighborhoods Initiative, the Skillman 
Foundation defined this as a 10-year 
effort. Why that particular horizon?
Maria Columbo (MC): We had a good sense of 
what it would take to do serious place-based work 
— we knew we needed to allow time to actually 
build capacity and see evidence of change. Tonya 
Allen, now our president and CEO, was a prin-
cipal architect of the approach; her team drew 
from many knowledge sources, including litera-
ture and the experience of others — such as the 
Annie E. Casey and W.K. Kellogg Foundations’ 
work in communities on behalf of children. 
The wisdom of the time suggested a commitment 
of 10 or more years, with three distinct phases. 
We followed this thinking, and announced a 
decade-long scope for the work. It started with a 
planning phase that covered the first two years, 
2006 and 2007. That was a time for us to listen, 
learn, and build respectful relationships. Then, 
from 2008 to 2010, we were in a readiness phase, 
which focused on engaging residents and growing 
the capacity of neighborhood leaders, including 
initiating new forms of local decision-making. 
In 2011, we moved into the implementation 
phase. At this time, we were dealing with severe 
change in the Detroit economic, social, and polit-
ical context. We entered into an extensive review 
and evaluation of the initiative in this light, 
revisiting and reshaping our approach in the first 
years of implementation. This very large body 
of work then continued to completion in 2016. In 
total, we ended up with an 11-year initiative.
BT: How would you characterize the 
Skillman Foundation’s approach to this 
work in community?
MC: For our team, it was all about authentic 
engagement with residents in the six neigh-
borhoods where we wanted to have impact. It 
was a multistep, multifaceted process. In each 
neighborhood, the planning phase began with 
resident-engagement meetings where we shared 
our interest and aims for the initiative and 
gained initial reactions and questions. We held 
similar sessions with other stakeholders, includ-
ing local nonprofits and faith-based institutions. 
As the work progressed, we held focus groups 
to more specifically vet our planned approaches. 
Then, with large groups of residents and lead-
ers of community organizations, we ran a series 
of six well-structured planning sessions in each 
neighborhood. These sessions were about the 
community setting overarching goals for that 
particular neighborhood. We took these sessions 
very seriously — with agendas, translators, vot-
ing equipment, and other supports.
Throughout the initiative, the Skillman 
Foundation had a hands-on role that drew on the 
foundation’s deep knowledge about Detroit and 
on our relationships with a wide range of stake-
holders. Program officers worked with residents 
and local organizations, while contracting with 
intermediaries to help with community outreach 
and engagement, capacity building, and techni-
cal expertise.
As part of this approach, each neighborhood 
established four to six action-planning teams 
that received technical assistance to develop 
more specific short- and longer-term goals, along 
with strategies and action steps for achieving 
these goals. To further involve residents, give 
them a say in what happened locally, and build 
their capacity, we set up a small-grants program. 
Initially, we used small grants to provide mod-
est funding for research and learning activities 
to help residents plan; later these small grants 
supported youth-focused grassroots projects. 
The program was administered by a group of 
residents from across the six neighborhoods, and 
they made grants of $500 to $5,000. Over the 
interview
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initiative, the Skillman Foundation invested $2.8 
million through this small-grants program. 
BT: Can you say more about local 
leadership and “new forms of local 
decision-making”? 
MC: From the start, the Skillman Foundation 
created and funded full-time community liai-
sons — typically, people in the neighborhood 
who had some organizing experience — to be 
the on-the-ground lead, helping engage residents 
and providing a point of contact for all the work. 
I should note that the nature of these positions 
has morphed and elevated in responsibilities 
over time — and that three of the six people 
originally in these positions are still in place 
after 10 years.
Beyond these liaison positions, we provided tech-
nical assistance to identify, nurture, and develop 
leaders among residents and others involved with 
local nonprofits and faith-based groups. This was 
another substantive set of supports — including 
a leadership academy that took place over eight 
weekends, a Community Builders Leadership 
Institute that offered ongoing supports across 
the initiative’s first two phases, plus individual 
coaching and customized training.
This approach to local leadership development 
in turn led to the creation of formal commu-
nity “governance” groups. During the readiness 
phase in 2010, six community-led planning and 
advocacy bodies were established — one in each 
neighborhood. Today, these bodies continue to 
be active in five of the six neighborhoods. Board 
members are elected annually, committee struc-
tures have been established, bylaws have been 
developed, and an agenda for improving neigh-
borhood conditions and outcomes for children is 
in place. These governance groups each provide 
a forum for planning within their neighborhood, 
a hub for advocacy activities, and a legitimate 
local group that can be a point of contact for 
those outside the neighborhood — essentially 
acting as neighborhood intermediaries. 
BT: At a program level, what were the key 
elements of the initiative?
MC: We invested in four strategy areas. We 
worked from a detailed theory of change, 
with multiple program strands within each 
strategy area, and I will just illustrate a few 
program components here. We’ve already 
talked about the first strategy area, which was 
community leadership — creating a pipeline 
for resident leaders, including support for local 
decision-making structures, with these efforts 
supplemented by a robust small-grants program 
directed by a resident panel.
Another strategy was about education, which 
is a long-standing priority of the foundation. 
This involved a complex set of programs. We 
focused on both citywide system reform and on 
building-level improvement approaches. Those 
school-focused efforts featured involvement of 
parents, youth, and other community members.
There was a youth-development strategy to 
increase the scale and quality of local youth 
programming as well as employment oppor-
tunities. The Foundation provided funding 
for direct service programs, summer youth 
employment, and technical assistance support-
ing quality improvement for program providers, 
plus creation of a network among these local 
youth program providers.
Fourth, we had a strategy for improving safety, 
particularly around schools and youth-develop-
ment program hubs. This involved support for 
block clubs, community-embedded policing, 
restorative practices, and anti-gang activities.
BT: After a planning phase followed by a 
readiness phase, the foundation began 
implementation in 2011. By 2013, the 
initiative approach had shifted. Why?
MC: The local context for our work had changed 
dramatically. When we began the initiative in 
2006, nobody could have anticipated what would 
take place in Detroit soon after.
Interview: Tobin and Colombo
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In 2008, the national economy went into deep 
recession, which led to the collapse of the auto-
motive industry. We saw two of the Big Three 
automobile manufacturers declare bankruptcy 
in 2009. 
High unemployment contributed to the housing 
foreclosure crisis, which was arguably felt worse 
here than anywhere in the country. For example, 
there were more than 70,000 foreclosures in the 
Detroit metropolitan area in 2009 alone. 
We were also in a period of political dysfunction, 
with three mayors in three years after Mayor 
Kilpatrick pled guilty to felony crimes and then 
resigned in 2008. The city itself was on the path 
to insolvency; Detroit filed for bankruptcy in 
2013. The schools were in a similar plight, as 
Detroit Public Schools came under emergency 
management, accompanied by the unfettered 
expansion of charter schools. 
BT: What went into the decision to reset 
strategy for the initiative?
MC: With our evaluators, in 2011 we began 
assessing what we had learned in the first two 
phases of the work. This included looking at data 
we collected to track progress toward a set of 
2016 goals in each of our four strategy areas. For 
the community-leadership strategy, our goals 
had to do with the number of residents engaging 
in the initiative, the number of leaders emerg-
ing in neighborhoods, and the effectiveness of 
leadership groups in the neighborhoods. Our 
assessment, based on the data and on our own 
observations as our program team worked in 
the neighborhoods, told us that we were making 
more progress toward our goals in some neigh-
borhoods than in others. 
We also identified capacities that were being 
developed in the neighborhoods, including 
neighborhood governance groups, youth-de-
velopment programs, and a connected system 
of providers, as well as school improvement 
efforts. We thought about what it would take 
to continue to build as well as protect these 
capacities moving forward. All this led us to 
realize we needed to reset, to do what we 
labeled a “strategic refresh.”
BT: What were the specifics of this 
midcourse change?
MC: After talking with grant partners and res-
idents, we made the decision to go to a tiered 
strategy in the six neighborhoods where we 
were working. Three neighborhoods would 
continue with full implementation and support 
for all strategies. One would continue imple-
mentation of all strategies but in more of an 
intermediate mode, meaning relatively less 
investment from the Foundation. In two of 
the neighborhoods where governance groups 
were not able to coalesce, we discontinued our 
support for formal community leadership but 
continued to fund youth development, educa-
tion, and safety. In these ways, the foundation 
reallocated resources at a time of tremendous 
difficulty in Detroit, with a deeper commitment 
to the neighborhoods where we were seeing the 
greatest potential for impact.
By continuing funding for youth-specific pro-
gramming in all neighborhoods, we buttressed 
the progress that was being made in improving 
high school graduation rates. Related, we sharp-
ened our overall intent for the initiative in an 
important way at this midpoint, adopting a much 
more specific focus on high school graduation 
rates for young people in the six target neighbor-
hoods. A 90 percent high school graduation rate 
became our overarching goal. 
We worked through and implemented these 
changes in 2012 and 2013.
I should also say that in one of the two 
neighborhoods where we withdrew communi-
ty-leadership support, there was a response to 
this decision. Neighborhood members created a 
functioning governance group that we re-funded 
in the latter years of the initiative.
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BT: Evaluation played a role in the reset 
and throughout the initiative. What were 
the contours of the evaluation effort?
MC: Funding for data and evaluation activities 
was $500,000 to $900,000 annually over the life of 
the initiative. The scope, approach, and evalua-
tion partners varied with each stage of the work. 
In the upfront planning phase, our focus was 
on developing the strategic monitoring, evalua-
tion, and learning framework for this ambitious 
change initiative — as well as building the inter-
nal and external data capacity it required. The 
next phase was about readiness, and the eval-
uation work included refining 2016 goals and 
developing a data dashboard, while continuing 
to conduct process and outcome evaluations. The 
implementation phase included developmental 
evaluation of the revised strategies, final data 
collection against the 2016 goals, and an inten-
sive, comprehensive analytic review of the Good 
Neighborhoods Initiative.
BT: How difficult was it to change several 
years before the initiative was scheduled 
to conclude?
MC: It was challenging, because it meant that we 
had to alter some relationships with grant part-
ners’ organizations and residents. Since we are 
part of the community where we invest, these 
relationships are often very personal for staff.
Interview: Tobin and Colombo
FIGURE 1 
Detroit neighborhoods included in the 
Good Neighborhoods Initiative (GNI)
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But we needed to be resolute in doing what we 
thought was best for Detroit kids. That’s always 
been our north star. In the 2012-to-2013 strategic 
refresh we were motivated to do our best to lay 
the groundwork to achieve sustainable impact for 
children, schools, and neighborhoods. We inten-
sified our efforts to make progress by 2016 and to, 
in effect, build a platform for the next generation 
of the Foundation’s work beyond 2016. 
BT: So your midcourse strategic refresh 
included planning for the end of the 
initiative in 2016?
MC: Yes. We wanted to be intentional in think-
ing about the remaining four years of Good 
Neighborhoods and to get ready to transition 
from the initiative in the most powerful way.
BT: How did you communicate and 
implement the strategic reset in 2012 and 
2013?
MC: We included core grant partners in the 
refresh. They participated in planning meetings 
with us. Once the plan was completed, we held a 
series of large-group information meetings with 
all grant partners and neighborhood leaders. 
Our program officers also met one-on-one with 
individual grant partners. This was especially 
important in cases where our relationship with a 
partner was changing.
BT: You reference relationships in several 
of your responses. Why this emphasis? 
MC: As an embedded funder striving for change 
in our community, we don’t think of relation-
ships as an incidental or secondary aspect of our 
work. For us, in many ways relationships are 
the work, in so much as they are the method for 
most of what we do. We think of relationships as 
an enduring resource that can be valuable to the 
community and the Foundation beyond any indi-
vidual grant or initiative.
BT: How did your grantmaking align with 
the changes you made in the initiative, 
including its endpoint? 
MC: When we did the strategic refresh in 2013, 
we concluded some grantee relationships with 
tie-off grants. Each of these grants included 
specific program goals that supported our over-
all initiative strategies. Some of these grants 
included flexible dollars that the organization 
could use for sustainability planning.
Similarly, tie-off grants were used in recent years 
with the majority of grantees as we began to 
ramp down the initiative.
With a group of grantees highly connected to 
our program approaches, in 2016 we issued 
transition grants that extend through 2018, pro-
viding funds for continued work on initiative 
strategies while allowing for their planning 
beyond the initiative. 
We looked at our entire group of grant partners 
and tried to be very clear in our verbiage with 
each to make sure they knew if we were making 
a concluding grant, or going through a step-
down funding process over multiple years. 
We also wanted to make it clear that a founda-
tion decision to not make a further grant under 
the Good Neighborhoods Initiative does not pre-
clude an organization from applying for funds in 
a future initiative. 
BT: How would you describe your 
management of the initiative’s conclusion 
with grantees as you approached 2016?
MC: Responsibility for the transition rested 
with the foundation’s chief of staff and the vice 
president for program and strategy. Staff from 
our evaluation and communications groups sup-
ported these internal leaders and all program 
staff throughout the process. 
We knew a one-size-fits-all approach would not 
work. With our close-in grant partners, there 
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were a series of meetings — typically one per 
month over 18 months, each a few hours in dura-
tion and involving program and evaluation staff. 
These meetings had multiple aims. We wanted 
to ensure that these partners were clear on what 
was ending, while also asking them to help us 
shape what the transition would look like and to 
think with us about what would come next.
For other organizations, the message about 
transition was communicated in the individual 
meetings that took place once or twice a year 
between each program officer and grant partner. 
Particularly important in the transition phase 
was the presence and voice of the few remain-
ing foundation staff who were involved in 
the initiative since its beginnings. They could 
ground newer foundation staff in the history 
and evolution of the work and relationships; 
this helped support these newer staff in having 
informed interactions with grant partners and 
community members. 
BT: How effective was your approach?
MC: While we communicated well with the 
core group of grant partners, with our broader 
set of grant partners we learned we were not 
doing as well as we thought. In 2015, we got the 
results of a Center for Effective Philanthropy 
grantee perceptions survey. Grant partners said 
loud and clear that, while we were respectful 
of them and our goals were clear, the quality 
of our relationships had diminished in recent 
years. Some of this response was driven by our 
actions, some was probably caused by anxiety 
related to the Good Neighborhoods Initiative 
ending, and some may have come from our 
grants partners’ having grown to hold us to 
high expectations through experiencing our 
deep work with them. 
Regardless of the causes, that input was a real 
wake-up call. Since then we have been much 
more intentional in communicating. We held 
three large-group convenings in 2016 — sharing 
information, gathering insightful input, and nour-
ishing relationships. We now publish monthly 
blog posts from our president, Tonya Allen. We 
also set up an account where anyone can email 
Tonya directly with questions or comments.
BT: What really stands out for you as 
lessons for communicating with grantees?
MC: It’s important to be in contact, even when 
we can’t be as clear as we would like about our 
direction and message. We have been going 
through a lot of analysis and planning for the 
past 18 months to figure out where the founda-
tion is headed beyond the Good Neighborhoods 
Initiative. In this time, we have not been able 
to be totally clear with external stakeholders 
regarding where we are going. Still, we real-
ize it is important to communicate what we do 
know, to talk about what we are doing, and to 
be transparent.
Two-way communication really matters. 
It’s critical to solicit ideas and feedback from 
grant partners. Through listening sessions, we 
have gained a variety of perspectives on how 
to most effectively transition from the Good 
Neighborhoods Initiative and capitalize upon the 
progress and assets built through this work. 
I would also say that all of this — all aspects of 
communication, especially during a transition, 
especially as we seek inputs to inform next steps 
— takes a lot of effort. Funders should not under-
estimate this point.
BT: Were your evaluators involved with the 
community as the initiative concluded?
MC: Evaluators conducted individual as well as 
focus group interviews with community mem-
bers. They were part of several listening sessions 
with community leaders that were led by foun-
dation staff. Evaluators also sat in on sessions the 
foundation held with community leaders that 
focused on planning for beyond the initiative’s 
conclusion in 2016.
Interview: Tobin and Colombo
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BT: Did you rely on any outside sources 
to help you think about handling this 
transition?
MC: We have connected with some other foun-
dations to learn about their experiences. We 
were interested in how they engaged with grant 
partners and other partners in their own pro-
cesses, and with whom they communicated. For 
example, a Skillman Foundation team met with 
colleagues from the MacArthur Foundation. In 
addition to learning about some useful commu-
nication tools, one important takeaway from 
a very thought-provoking day was that it’s OK 
to not have everything figured out before you 
begin to communicate with grant partners 
and stakeholders. Being direct is what matters, 
which is something our team knew already — 
but having senior leaders from one of the world’s 
most significant foundations validate that prac-
tice gave us an emotional boost and confidence 
to charge ahead.
BT: Even though the initiative is 
concluding, it seems that the Skillman 
Foundation doesn’t really refer to this as 
an exit.
MC: Correct. We do not think about this as exit-
ing in the sense of leaving everything behind. 
It is not a full stop in the way that others may 
view an exit. As an embedded funder, we are 
not leaving town or ending relationships. We 
are changing course, and right now we are in an 
active period of transition that involves redefin-
ing many existing relationships in anticipation 
of new work that advances our focus on kids 
in Detroit. Our goal continues to be helping 
these young people get ready for college, career, 
and life. Our means to this end are shifting 
— and much of the investment we have made 
in building the capacity of local leaders and 
organizations, and in the relationships we have 
developed, remains very relevant to our goal. 
So for us it is important to state that we are not 
leaving the work in a way that may be implied 
through the term “exit.” Rather, we view this 
transition as an opportunity to engage with 
grant partners and an array of other stakehold-
ers to ensure that their capacities get used in 
new ways.
BT: Before we hear more about where the 
foundation is going next, let’s do a little 
retrospective. The Good Neighborhoods 
Initiative was a huge investment for the 
Skillman Foundation. Did it produce the 
results you expected?
MC: We feel good about many aspects of the 
progress made in this initiative, especially given 
the dramatic changes and intense new challenges 
for Detroit in the years following launch in 2006. 
This new context affected the foundation’s ability 
to achieve all that we originally hoped for; still, 
we saw meaningful improvements. 
Graduation rates in the high schools serving our 
six neighborhoods went from 65 percent in 2008 
to 82 percent in 2015. These schools once trailed 
but now outpace Detroit schools at large. 
Neighborhood identities and capacities are 
stronger than 10 years ago. New awareness 
and understanding of the six neighborhoods 
came about because of this initiative. Skillman 
Foundation grantmaking totaled $122 million, 
and we can point to $1.2 billion in additional 
investments — this is the amount committed by 
others to support improvement in the neighbor-
hoods where we were working. That is a 10-to-1 
leverage factor.
There are more specific, on-the-ground indi-
cators of improvement. Today, there are many 
functioning resident-leadership groups in the 
neighborhoods. More residents from these neigh-
borhoods are running for or being elected to 
public office, and getting involved with citywide 
boards. There were three times more jobs for 
young people in Detroit last summer compared 
to the summer of 2008. 
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In these and many other ways we can see a differ-
ence from the initiative. Notwithstanding these 
successes, there were also disappointments. For 
example, if we were to do it again, we’d likely 
select smaller neighborhoods and be more inten-
tional about connecting our four strategies more 
effectively within the foundation as well as in 
neighborhoods. As one illustration of this point, 
we learned that when the safety, community 
leadership, and education strategies intersected, 
there was a greater decrease in crime in target 
areas around schools and youth-development 
centers compared to crime levels citywide.  
BT: Did the foundation change through this 
initiative?
MC: Internally, our board and staff feel we 
have become more savvy and effective in our 
change-making work because of the Good 
Neighborhoods experience. For example, we 
are better at attracting and tracking lever-
aged corporate investments, and at employing 
social-innovation financial tools such as pro-
gram-related investments, loan guarantees, and 
equity investments. 
We have also seen an unanticipated rise in our 
own leadership role. One of our evaluators 
writes about the growth in social capital that has 
accrued to the Skillman Foundation through this 
initiative. Our reputation has grown through our 
work in neighborhoods. This has opened doors 
to new forms of collaboration with the mayor’s 
office, with the governor’s staff, and with other 
funders investing in Detroit. For example, we 
helped with a new cross-sector education coali-
tion that has already generated several policy and 
system changes along with an infusion of $666 
million — which is a much-needed new invest-
ment in Detroit Public Schools.
There are other tangible ways we are see-
ing the foundation’s enhanced stature make a 
difference. Our early commitment and program-
ming for boys of color led to local and national 
partnerships under the My Brother’s Keeper 
initiative. Our decade-long work in youth 
employment has been embraced by the current 
mayor, with our initial impact of 300 jobs now 
growing to 8,200 jobs.
BT: What was more difficult than you 
personally anticipated in the transition 
process?
MC: For me, and I think most foundation staff, it 
was the very personal challenge of transitioning 
long-term relationships. We were working in 
relationships where the foundation was very 
hands on. We wanted to transition to relation-
ships that would still be strong, but that would 
be different — with much less direct foundation 
involvement.
We worked closely with residents and grant 
partners for a decade, and we were saying good-
bye to a phase of the work where there was a 
deep human investment. For foundation staff, 
there is a personal adaptive challenge in that, 
and it is hard. 
BT: Is the Foundation evaluating the 
transition?
MC: In the narrow sense, no, since we are not 
conducting a discrete evaluation of the initiative 
conclusion.
In a broader sense, yes, as we are committed to 
continuous evaluation and learning in all our 
work. We are currently wrapping up an exten-
sive, 18-month analytic review of the Good 
Neighborhoods Initiative. We are concurrently 
planning for the next iteration of the foundation’s 
monitoring, evaluation, and learning framework. 
We will also do another Center for Effective 
Philanthropy grant partner perceptions survey in 
2017, and it will include initiative participants. 
BT: What’s in the analytic review of the 
Good Neighborhoods Initiative?
MC: This has been a deep process, involving 
hundreds of people over the last year and a half. 
Interview: Tobin and Colombo
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We engaged evaluators who looked at each strat-
egy in the initiative. We then took initial reports 
to our key implementation partners, who helped 
vet and enrich the findings. 
Next, we did community data walks with a 
broader group of grant partners as well as com-
munity residents, including youth groups. The 
data walks focused on progress toward our 2016 
initiative goals — we asked people to reflect on 
what they noticed in the data, tell us where they 
saw traction, and describe their biggest concerns. 
Additionally, we did education-focused data 
walks with partners working in the neighbor-
hoods to get their interpretation of the data. We 
have also been engaged in listening and learning 
sessions with a variety of individuals and com-
munity groups. 
This series of interactions and iterations is 
informing the next phase of community invest-
ment at the foundation. This process is very alive 
and it is continually bringing new clarity to our 
next stage. We expect that the strategic reset will 
be completed by the end of the year. 
BT: What’s likely to be part of the Skillman 
Foundation’s next stage?
MC: What we do know right now is that we 
will continue to strengthen our ability to 
support civic leadership. Through the Good 
Neighborhoods Initiative, we learned how to 
hear and champion diverse voices. We lifted 
up leaders of our communities so that their 
knowledge and perspective were included in con-
versations at the city, state, and national levels. 
And we worked to prepare our youth for civic 
leadership as well, so that they could contribute 
to Detroit’s comeback. Supporting civic leader-
ship will be central to the foundation moving 
forward, as we work to ensure our city’s recov-
ery is equitable — that children are prepared for 
and connected to economic opportunities, and 
are capable of contributing to the positive change 
they want for their community. 
We also expect that our emphasis will no longer 
be isolated to six neighborhoods; we are thinking 
about the systems that impact youth and families 
in Detroit and the neighborhoods in which they 
live. Detroit kids remain our focus, but the local 
context is now very different than in 2006 when 
the initiative began, and very different than 
in 2011 when the city was under such extreme 
stress. This is a time of continued need as well as 
revitalization in Detroit. We want to ensure that 
youth are benefiting from, as well as leading and 
contributing to, the reshaping of the city. 
BT: Based on the foundation’s experience 
changing in place — both during the 
initiative and at its conclusion — what 
advice would you offer others?
MC: Be respectful, transparent, and as clear as 
possible in working with all grant partners and 
other stakeholders.
Related, know that you can’t present clarity 
externally when you don’t yet have it internally. 
In our strategic refresh in 2012 and 2013, and in 
our final approach to the transition in 2016, it has 
taken time to get clarity and alignment inside 
the foundation regarding our direction. In those 
periods, it is still important to be transparent 
with people outside the organization — letting 
them know where we are at and how we are 
thinking about the next phase. 
BT: Is there a headline for the Skillman 
Foundation as you reflect on this 
experience as an embedded funder?
MC: We worked hard to keep our sights on the 
mission and our boots on the ground. 
We gained credibility as a civic leader, and in 
communities, by always making sure our mis-
sion and goals around children were front and 
center. And through the way we conducted the 
work and engaged people in neighborhoods, we 
accrued trust. Credibility and trust are assets we 
can steward and carry forward.
Changing in Place: The Skillman Foundation, Detroit, and the Good Neighborhoods Initiative
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But building these assets meant being in place. 
As the Good Neighborhoods Initiative got 
started, foundation staff spent a lot of time in 
the neighborhoods — listening, learning, and 
demonstrating that we wanted to hear from 
residents directly, not have their voices filtered 
through neighborhood nonprofits or other stake-
holders. Staff grew to understand — in a way 
that we couldn’t have if program people stayed 
in their offices — the challenges facing residents, 
and the ways in which the six neighborhoods 
were working and not working. 
This led to an authentic sense of knowing and 
being known, which contributed over time to 
the foundation’s reputation as an organization 
that can “stand with the community.” It is this 
accrual of trust and respect, built over time, 
that we believe helps position the foundation to 
evolve in its work on behalf of children. 
BT: How are you and your colleagues 
feeling as you continue the transition from 
the Good Neighborhoods Initiative? 
MC: We see the potential for a powerful evolu-
tion of what has been built in six neighborhoods 
in light of many positive things now happening 
in the city of Detroit — where there are upticks 
in employment, commercial investment, public 
safety, and other indicators of community vitality. 
We see the opportunity for young people to have 
a greater voice and stake in the rebirth of the 
city. We see the opportunity for grant partners 
and other stakeholders to apply capacities they 
now have in new ways. We see the opportunity 
for funders to share information and collaborate 
toward mutual goals. 
We do not take lightly the challenges that still 
face young people in this community, and we 
are mindful of the fragility of institutions serv-
ing them. True revitalization for the city of 
Detroit will be measured by whether children 
do better and are connected to its recovery. We 
are thinking about these things as we shape the 
foundation’s strategic direction. We have reason 
to be optimistic about the future.
BT: How can readers learn more?
MC: Lots of information from our analytic 
review will be released throughout 2017. This has 
really been a massive effort, and we are publish-
ing analyses as well as dialogue with evaluators, 
residents, grant partners, and community allies. 
We invite everyone to visit www.skillman.org/
GNI.
Marie Colombo, (M.A.), is director of evaluation and 
learning at the Skillman Foundation. Correspondence con-
cerning this article should be addressed to Marie Colombo, 
Skillman Foundation, 100 Talon Centre Dr., Suite 100, 
Detroit, MI 48207 (email: mcolombo@skillman.org).
Interview: Tobin and Colombo
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The purpose of this commentary is to share 
my personal reflections on what makes exiting 
from long-term philanthropic investments so 
challenging.1
As a funder, I took part in the design, implementa-
tion and evaluation of dozens of major initiatives 
and programs. I also called grantees and key part-
ners to deliver the news of an exit. These were 
never easy conversations, but with each one, I 
learned so much about the exit process. 
There are many reasons for exiting; among 
them are changes in leadership, strategy, 
resources, program staff expertise and/or per-
formance. Success and achieving the intended 
impact could also be a reason to exit. Regardless 
of the “why” and the “how” of exiting, philos-
ophies or approaches are rarely shared among 
funders and thus are poorly understood. This 
special issue details a number of case studies 
about exits including a review of multiple foun-
dation strategy and initiative case studies. Each 
case describes different explanations for exit-
ing and tactical approaches used to effectively 
implement the exit. 
Filling a critical field knowledge gap, this mono-
graph provides significant lessons from such 
varied experiences leading to the same outcome 
— the decision to end/exit a programmatic 
investment area. In reviewing the articles, there 
is great value in determining what resonates 
and fits with your foundation’s approach and 
Exiting is a Natural Part of Philanthropy — 
Learning From it? Not so Much. 
By Debra Joy Perez, Ph.D.
philosophy for your own foundation. There is 
no “one size fits all” approach. As I reviewed 
the articles in this special issue, I was struck by 
the variations in lessons. However, each case 
unequivocally elevates one common theme — 
the importance of communicating the rationale 
and approach for exiting to grantees, staff, and 
key stakeholders. Specifically, when it comes 
to exiting, funders must communicate consis-
tently, constantly, and collaboratively. This is 
not an uncommon finding from prior studies 
(Petrovich, 2013).
In 2009, I engaged a consultant (Janice Petrovich) 
to conduct a review of how well the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation had implemented 
an unplanned reduction in payout. The reduc-
tion was not a planned exit. It was a necessary 
reduction in payout due to a huge loss in our 
endowment resulting from a worldwide eco-
nomic crisis. In just over a year, the foundation’s 
endowment fell from $10 billion to $7.7 billion. 
Needless to say, those were very trying times 
for many foundations and its grantees. Some 
commentary DOI: 10.9707/1944-5660.1354
1Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation is currently conducting an internal review of programmatic exits. The study is still 
underway so rather than provide any premature assessment of the findings, I will focus on my experience as a foundation 
senior program officer, researcher, and evaluator for the past 20 years.
Debra Joy Pérez, Ph.D., is the 
chief measurement, evaluation, 
and learning officer at the 
Gordon and Betty Moore 
Foundation in Palo Alto, California. 
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foundations and community based organizations 
were even forced to close their doors. 
While maintaining prior commitments, the 
foundation was forced to make substantial cuts 
or reductions in its future grant making. Many of 
our grantees and partners understood and even 
empathized with the economic situation leading 
to the reductions. In fact, many were most appre-
ciative of the direct and frank communication 
provided by the foundation and its president. 
While we were going through the reduction, we 
also wanted to learn as much as we could during 
the process. In fact, while appreciating that the 
crisis of 2008 may not repeat itself to the same 
magnitude, we thought we could apply lessons 
from the downturn to explore how we could 
be more intentional and explicit about future 
programmatic transitions. Thus, building on les-
sons from the 2009 Budget Reduction Study, the 
foundation commissioned a study on responsible 
exiting. The 2010 study, also by Janice Petrovich, 
Exiting Responsibly: Best Donor Practices in Ending 
Field Support (Exit Study) included interviews 
with foundation grantees and staff as well as 
senior leaders from 30 foundations and grantee 
organizations. While the Budget Reduction 
Study was retrospective, the purpose of the Exit 
Study was prospective and intended to result in 
lessons about effective donor practices that could 
be translated into guiding principles for exiting. 
Those effective practices are: 
• Use various forms of communications to 
inform field actors clearly, early and often. 
• Involve the foundation’s chief executive in 
the communications with the field. 
• Ensure that all foundation staff is informed 
of the field exit and able to respond effec-
tively to questions from grantees and their 
field. 
• Invite questions from field actors regarding 
the exit, and involve them in assessing their 
impact on the transitioning field. 
• Publicize the successes, needs and oppor-
tunities of the field and its grantees, 
stakeholders and partners. 
• Involve field advocates in determining their 
capacity-building needs going forward and 
provide support for these opportunities. 
• Attract other donors into the field by signal-
ing continued interest through matching 
and tie-off grants.
Variations on any one of these tactical practices 
are included among the seven articles in this 
special issue. Yet, the decision to stay or go has 
as many emotional implications as it has tacti-
cal implications for funders, grantees, and key 
partners. For those of us who have made the 
shift from responsive grant maker to strategic 
philanthropy, frank and authentic conversations 
about when we leave a body of work are com-
plex. In strategic philanthropy, we see ourselves 
as thought partners and build relationships of 
trust and make long-term commitments. So, 
when a decision is made to leave, we may expe-
rience every gamut of emotion common in any 
break up — betrayal, abandonment, and the grief 
of losing a long-time friend and/or family mem-
ber. Indeed, to some degree, exiting can result 
in stages of grief and loss — denial and isolation, 
anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. 
Denial and Isolation
There is enormous privilege and power in 
philanthropy. Twenty years ago, my first boss in 
philanthropy warned me of the false sense of con-
fidence and wisdom that befalls new entrants into 
the world of philanthropy. Let’s face it, as soon 
as you become a foundation staffer you become 
more attractive, funnier and often deferred to as 
if you were the smartest person in the room (in 
case you are wondering, you are not). 
So when we exit (i.e., de-fund) a program, it not 
only feels like a loss, it is a blow to our confi-
dence and our ego. When our programs end, 
it is as if part of our identity is gone. We deny, 
deny, deny, “This can’t be happening.” We hide 
from the facts and try to make up for what 
might be perceived as a programmatic failure. 
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One form of denial is conjuring up a way to 
“spin” the narrative about why we are exiting. It 
might also result in trying to reinvent the exiting 
program into a new idea or position it as if it has 
a new purpose and relevance for the new strat-
egy. This means using the same grantee to do 
new work even at the cost of mission drift for the 
grantee. Grantees and the non-profit leaders that 
support them are also in mourning and feel and 
enormous sense of loss and abandonment.
Anger
Grantees are rarely the chief engineers of pro-
grammatic exits. Usually, they fall victim to 
changes in foundation leadership, strategy, pol-
icy environment or economic situation. And 
no organization wants to lose a good funding 
partner. When a closely foundation-identified 
program is slated for exit, we become protec-
tive of our grantees and the fields in which they 
work. We begin to exhibit a hyper-sensitivity 
to any criticism of our grantee efforts. We are 
more empathetic to the errors and challenges of 
our beloved ending programs. We ask, “who is 
to blame?” and rationalize our anger by compar-
ing our program to others that are not exiting. 
Why me?
Bargaining
The incentives in any foundation program are 
to keep investing and growing the program. 
There is often little incentive to reduce pro-
gram investments unless otherwise dictated by 
the senior leadership or board. Any reduction 
to the budget is perceived as a cut; any cut per-
ceived as a failure or at minimum, depreciation 
in value. So, we try to explain to ourselves and 
others just why ending a program is a bad idea. 
Perhaps we blame ourselves or someone else, 
but we mostly try to bargain as much as we can 
and rethink the exit or make the transition as 
painless as possible. 
Depression
Too often, our identities as program funders are 
tied to our program grantees and their success. 
Our internal and external identities are synon-
ymous with our created program. We become 
known for our program affiliation. I was just as 
easily known as Debra as I was known as the 
program officer of New Connections, or Finding 
Answers, or Expanding the Bench Initiative. 
When an exit is imminent, we mourn the loss 
of friends (family) and affiliations, and lose our 
internal and external influence. We even lose 
a bit of our own identities. We realize that we 
are not the smartest people in the room and are 
losing power.
Acceptance
Only at the point of exit certainty, can we imple-
ment best donor practices. We can honor the 
work, celebrate our grantees and partners, begin 
to codify the lessons, and plan for a healthy 
exit. We may need to spend more time with our 
grantees and the field to provide support and 
strategize on messaging, make introductions to 
other prospective funders, or just sit in silence 
and comfort each other. Whatever the motiva-
tion, at this stage authentic conversations about 
sustainability and legacy begin to take shape. 
Conclusion
In my experience, too often funders and grant-
ees fail to acknowledge that exiting is a part 
of the investment life cycle. As a result, they 
also fail to discuss the realities of it and the 
importance and value of exiting. As in any 
Exiting is a Natural Part of Philanthropy
[T]oo often funders and 
grantees fail to acknowledge 
that exiting is a part of the 
investment life cycle. As 
a result, they also fail to 
discuss the realities of it and 
the importance and value of 
exiting. As in any relationship, 
these pain points are key to our 
growth and learning.
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relationship, these pain points are key to our 
growth and learning. 
Foundations prize relationships with close-in 
partners, but they should not get twisted about 
why they funded the grantee in the first place. 
Grantees are leaders and are not blind to the 
difficult choices and tradeoffs made by funders. 
We should respect them enough to speak the 
truth and acknowledge the natural exit process. 
Grantees have their own sense of privilege and 
power from being selected by philanthropy. 
I know this sounds odd but I would like to pro-
pose, at the risk of offending, that exiting is 
healthy and a necessary evil for strategic philan-
thropy. Why? We learn (or could learn) so much 
about our investment, a grantee, and a field 
when they are undergoing a strategic exit. Exits 
are a good opportunity to document progress, 
how the grantee and/or partners contributed to 
the field, their innovation, how they improved 
over time, and any lasting impact. By being frank 
about the intention to exit and by providing a 
timeline, we help level the playing field for grant-
ees. They can be more proactive in their own 
planning and approach to sustainability. 
Breaking up is hard, but leaving one relationship 
makes room for new opportunities. We could 
learn more as philanthropists if we embraced 
foundation exits as a healthy part of an initia-
tive life cycle. As stewards of private resources, 
we have a responsibility to ask ourselves what 
else can we do to reach our goal. Did we do all 
we could? Is our impact significant enough? Is it 
time to look elsewhere to see where impact can 
be greater? 
I once heard a mindfulness podcast describing 
loss as an opportunity for new growth. What 
if we allowed ourselves to see how responsible 
exits lead to new beginnings and an opportunity 
for growth and innovation — not only for the 
funder but also for the grantee?
Commentary: Perez
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the Hewlett Foundation’s Nuclear Security Initiative
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Although time-bound philanthropic initiatives are a well-established practice, there is still 
much to learn about effective ways to implement, evaluate, and wind down these types of 
investments. This article describes the NSI evaluation, how the findings informed Hewlett’s 
philanthropic approach, and provides a case example of a philanthropic-initiative exit. Key 
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Atlantic Philanthropies’ work in Northern Ireland supported three thematic intervention 
areas: aging; children and young people; and reconciliation and human rights. Its exit strategy 
has involved a formal partnership arrangement with the Northern Ireland Assembly to take 
external interventions to scale and mainstream services previously funded through NGOs. 
This article draws on qualitative data gathered through interviews with key stakeholders 
— the funder, government officials, and NGOs — and considers the consequences of this 
approach. It also offers specific and general lessons on partnering with government as an 
exit strategy.
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While the benefits of beginning evaluation efforts at a program’s inception are well known, 
for a variety of reasons many organizations are unable to do so and instead begin these efforts 
closer to a program’s conclusion. A sunset evaluation of the Orfalea Foundation’s School 
Food Initiative showed positive outcomes and provided recommendations for organizations 
interested in similar efforts. Because the evaluation was begun as the foundation was 
spending down, it required creative design approaches. This article uses the evaluation 
as a case example of a rigorous and useful sunset evaluation, and discusses other possible 
extensions of these methods.
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Breaking Up Is Hard to Do
Barbara Kibbe, J.D., S. D. Bechtel, Jr. Foundation
Funding relationships begin, and they end. Yet little is known about the effects of foundation 
exits on the work, the grantees, and the related fields. This article draws on interviews with 
funders and grantees involved in more than a dozen exits to fill the gaps in what is known 
about how to exit well. The article discusses four areas where foundation exits present 
particular challenges and where there are significant opportunities to improve practice — 
deciding on and planning to exit, funder leadership, clear communication, and final grants — 
and includes summaries of advice from funder and grantee perspectives.
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as a set of recommendations that relate to issues such as managing relationships between 
funder and grantee partners during the exit, using the initiative’s theory of change as a 
tool for decision-making, finding a balance between demonstrable success and equity, and 
managing the internal processes of the funding organization.
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Few, if any, of the problems philanthropy seeks to address can be solved within a brief, 
defined time frame. Limited-life foundations can only strive to move the ball down the field 
before they sunset, and then enlist others to carry the work forward. This article shares the 
emerging hypotheses of two foundations, The Atlantic Philanthropies and the S. D. Bechtel, 
Jr. Foundation — each four years from sunset — about the opportunities and challenges for 
evaluation in the limited-life context. The article argues that systematically capturing and 
sharing knowledge — about programs, as well as social-change methods and grantmaking 
practices — can increase a foundation’s influence and impact during its final years and beyond.
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Changing in Place: The Skillman Foundation, Detroit, and the 
Good Neighborhoods Initiative
How did a hometown grantmaker conduct and conclude its largest-ever initiative?
In 2006, the Skillman Foundation committed $100 million to a decade-long investment in 
six neighborhoods. Along the way, the foundation reset its strategy and sharpened its goal 
— in response to seismic shifts in the local context and informed by indicators of progress. 
To capture information on the unique challenges facing an embedded funder as it changes 
program direction, Bob Tobin, senior consultant at Williams Group, interviewed Marie 
Colombo, Skillman Foundation director for strategic evaluation and learning.
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FOR VOLUME 10, ISSUE 1
Abstracts of up to 250 words are being solicited for Volume 10, Issue 1 of 
The Foundation Review. This issue will be an open (unthemed) issue. Papers on 
any topic relevant to organized philanthropy are invited. 
Submit abstracts to submissions@foundationreview.org by May 30, 2017. If a full 
paper is invited, it will be due September 15, 2017 for consideration for publication 
in March 2018. 
Abstracts are solicited in four categories:
• Results. Papers in this category generally report on findings from evalu-
ations of foundation-funded work. Papers should include a description of 
the theory of change (logic model, program theory), a description of the 
grant-making strategy, the evaluation methodology, the results, and dis-
cussion. The discussion should focus on what has been learned both about 
the programmatic content and about grantmaking and other foundation 
roles (convening, etc.). 
• Tools. Papers in this category should describe tools useful for founda-
tion staff or boards. By “tool” we mean a systematic, replicable method 
intended for a specific purpose. For example, a protocol to assess commu-
nity readiness for a giving circle would be considered a tool. The actual 
tool should be included in the article where practical. The paper should 
describe the rationale for the tool, how it was developed, and available 
evidence of its usefulness.
• Sector. Papers in this category address issues that confront the philan-
thropic sector as whole, such as diversity, accountability, etc. These are 
typically empirically based; literature reviews are also considered.
• Reflective Practice. The reflective practice articles rely on the knowl-
edge and experience of the authors, rather than on formal evaluation 
methods or designs. In these cases, it is because of their perspective about 
broader issues, rather than specific initiatives, that the article is valuable.
Book Reviews: The Foundation Review publishes reviews of relevant books. 
Please contact the editor to discuss submitting a review. Reviewers must be free of 
conflicts of interest. 
Questions? Contact Teri Behrens, editor of The Foundation Review, at 
behrenst@foundationreview.org or call 734-646-2874.
call for papers
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